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ROMÂNIA



Security Risks and Threats in the Greater Black Sea Area

Proceedings of
THE 2ND ANNUAL
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE

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**THE 2ND ANNUAL INTERNATIONAL
CONFERENCE**

**Security Risks and Threats in
the Greater Black Sea Area**



**EDITURA MILITARĂ
BUCUREȘTI, 2008**

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- **BLACK SEA UNIVERSITY FOUNDATION** (Conflict Prevention Center)
- **CENTER FOR EAST-EUROPEAN AND ASIAN STUDIES** – The National School of Political Studies and Public Administration
- **INSTITUTE FOR POLITICAL STUDIES OF DEFENSE AND MILITARY HISTORY** - *Conventional and Unconventional Risks and Threats to Security in the Greater Black Sea Area Research Grant*

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Opening Remarks

Major General (r) Mihail E. Ionescu, Ph.D.

Director

**Institute for Political Studies of Defense and Military History
Bucharest, Romania**

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Dear Guests,

My name is Mihail Ionescu. I am the head of the Institute for Political Studies of Defence and Military History in Bucharest and also the General Director of the Centre for European and Asian Studies with the National School for Political Studies and Public Administration, who are the main organizers for this scientific event. I am also associated with Academician Malița's *Black Sea Foundation*, and I would like to salute here the presence of the distinguished academician, the member of the Romanian Academy, Mircea Malița, who recently published three books on International Relations and who is among the most prominent experts on the region. He is the honorary president of the *Black Sea Foundation*.

Welcome everybody, especially our guests from abroad! Just to look around, from Moldavia, Dumitru, welcome; from Ukraine, Tatiana welcome; from Georgia, Nika, welcome; from Armenia, Diana, welcome again in Bucharest; from Turkey, Aslan welcome; and also from France and Germany, represented together by a single person, our old friend Detlef Puhl, who, by the way, was

the teacher of many of us, as the dean of the Security Studies Faculty at the *George C. Marshall*, at Garmisch-Partenkirchen.

Thank you so much for coming here and I would like to commend the participation here of our distinguished guests. On my right is our old friend, professor Vasile Secăreș, former president of the *NATO Studies Centre* in Bucharest and the former rector of the National School for Political Studies and Public Administration. And of course our old friend, the former head of defense of Romania, former teacher at the Garmisch-Partenkirchen from *George C. Marshall Center*, and now presidential adviser, general Constantin Degeratu, who recently launched at the University here in Bucharest a Masters on Security Studies. And it seems to me that some of his students at this Masters are here in the room. And also I would like to welcome here the presence of general Orzeată and I would like to congratulate him for the last star which was acquired by him just last week. As a matter of fact I am honored having here, at this table, in front of you, two generals, the highest rank in the Romanian Armed Forces, one of them infantry and the other one, air force. Thank you so much for being here.

Now I would like to begin, as a matter of fact, the real meeting. We are here for the second seminar in which we will discuss about the risks and threats in the Greater Black Sea Region. This is the second seminar because last year we have had the first one, both of them being developed in the framework of a grant which had been won by our institute, by a group of researchers in our institute, from the Ministry of Education and Research of Romania. As a matter of fact, the proceedings of the first seminar, last year [2007], which developed also here

–it seems to me, Nika, you were present also last year – we have published that in our Occasional Papers. So who would be interested in it, they would find just outside a free copy of it.

And today and tomorrow we will develop the proceedings of the second seminar. As during the first seminar, during this seminar we have guests from all the countries of this region. I am saying *all* because our intention was to invite representatives from all the countries in this region. We have invited also the Russians. We invited Mr. Marchedonov, but unfortunately he was not able to come. Also we invited Dimitri Trenin, but he told me that he would come later on, that he would be glad to come later on, but he was appointed acting director of the Carnegie Foundation in Moscow and he had a lot of things to do and also we are waiting, as a matter of fact we hope that col. Nikolov from Bulgaria would show up. We have guests from all the countries here in the region. If Mr. Hagiyeve is here, he is from Azerbaijan... It seems to me that he did not show up. Anyway, he would come later on.

For sure, we will discuss now, here, the fluid situation in the Greater Black Sea Area. The reason why I am using this word, *fluid*, is due to the fact that **we have witnessed in August this year [2008] a huge event I would say, a war between Georgia and Russia, which created a new security environment in the region** whose features we would have to identify. We would have to discuss about them and assess them in order to think about what kind of security environment we would get, in which we would have to develop ourselves in the future. I would not hide my expectations. In a sense, I hope that we would get valuable conclusions after our discussions here,

on different levels of understanding security. As a matter of fact, we know that this region, **the Greater Black Sea Area, is an important transport corridor of oil and gas, from the East to the West, hence the energy security level.** Here I would like to underline, it is one of our points of interest, during our discussions, but not the only one.

We have witnessed in the last years also the physical presence of international institutions in the Greater Black Sea Area: first NATO, with the admission in 2004 of Romania and Bulgaria into the North-Atlantic alliance, then with the European Union through the admission of Romania and Bulgaria in 2007, and also at the NATO Bucharest Summit the allies' commitment that Ukraine and Georgia would become NATO full-fledged members, without saying when, but a real commitment that these two countries which are bordering the Black Sea would become NATO members. So it is new, **it is another level of understanding security in this region, and also cooperative security** I would say, **through the network of institutions of cooperation which have been developed here, in the region,** many of them being at the initiative of Turkey, like, for example, BSEC (the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization) and also in the field of hard security, in naval cooperation, Blackseafar and Black Sea Harmony.

So, we have a lot of levels of discussion here, in order to get a clear picture of the security framework in the region, and I would not hide my expectations that the conclusions of this seminar would be useful for developing our own studies and enriching ourselves in terms of understanding this fluid situation in the region.

Thank you very much again for your presence, and now I would like to kindly ask general Degeratu, who is the counselor of the Romanian President on security issues, to present his point of view and his welcome address.

Please, general Degeratu, you have the floor.

Lt.-gen. Constantin Degeratu, PhD

Presidential Counselor on National Security
Romanian Presidential Administration
Bucharest, Romania

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you for inviting me, and I wish to congratulate all the people who take part in organizing this conference which is, for sure, a timely one. **It is no secret that in the Romanian National Security Strategy, the Black Sea Region and Black Sea Region's security is playing a very important and major role.** It is a nice picture, a real blue Black Sea Region and for sure it has to be blue. Unfortunately, the region is not so blue in the sense of an optimistic time and for this reason I believe that this seminar is one that could be very useful. **This seminar could be very useful because from the last seminar there were interesting developments.** Interesting, sometimes, we wish to call something which is not necessarily very positive and very optimistic.

At least three major events took place since the last seminar, of course some of them with a very important and positive

impact, others with a less positive impact. The first I wish to mention is the NATO Summit in Bucharest this year [2008]. **The NATO Summit created a real, very important attention to the Greater Black Sea Area.** And NATO pays this much attention because the region is very important for NATO's security, for the European Union's security, and for sure for the security of the countries belonging to this region, for all the actors playing a major or limited role in the security of this region. **The NATO Summit conveys attention in the sense of trying to develop a real common allied approach to security in the sense of increasing cooperation, stability and security of the region, cooperation in the area of security, cooperation in the area of economic and environmental issues.** One of the important things which **the NATO Summit tried to create is a long term frame for cooperation** which it has been steadily developing within the Partnership for Peace, cooperation between the existing countries in the area and the NATO members. In this respect, Romania, Turkey, Bulgaria are expected to play a very important role. Turkey is the oldest NATO member in the Greater Black Sea Area. Bulgaria and Romania are new NATO members in the region.

Secondly, **the NATO Summit also tried to look at the future, the future of the Partnership for Peace, the future of the alliance, the future of security in this area.** And there were interesting developments - generally, in trying to identify the possibility of new members in that area. Georgia and Ukraine were present at that discussion and they walked away with good signals about their future expectations with

regard to their prospective NATO membership. **Your seminar, our seminar is just on time to see that in December [2008] the ministers of Defense and the ministers of Foreign Affairs of the NATO member states have to decide if and which will be the next step in the Greater Black Sea Area of inviting new members to join the alliance.** It is difficult to predict what their decision will be and this is not because of NATO's will or NATO's decision in April [2008], but because of the other developments in this area.

Other aspects were related to energy security in the Greater Black Sea Area and NATO also paid special attention to this topic, alongside new issues such as the democratization of the region, as a condition for more stability and more prosperity.

On the other hand, this summer [August 2008] we faced a new development, this time a negative one. I am speaking about **the Russian aggression against Georgia.** I do not wish to call exactly the cause, which according to Russian officials was an aggression on the part of Georgia against Russia. It is difficult to assess. I am not an expert in international law, but for sure I have some knowledge in that area. **It is difficult to think about an aggression of a state on its own territory, it is difficult to believe it.**

Unfortunately, at the same time, we [NATO and Greater Black Sea Area non-member states] did not have, let us say, a common approach to this problem, in particular in qualifying the Russian aggression against Georgia. What I wish to say is that the matter of how to call such kind of behavior

is a scientific problem. It is the first time after the collapse of the bipolar era, when something like this is taking place in this region.

At the same time it is a pragmatic matter, because **according to the criteria of 1995, the criteria for NATO membership, it will be difficult for Georgia to be considered prepared for NATO membership, because it has no sovereignty over its own territory and it has some trouble with its neighbors.** If we will call upon Georgia to manage this problem, we will punish Georgia. It is up to our capability to identify exactly the matter. **It is possible to invite a country like Georgia, which does not exercise sovereignty over its total territory, to join NATO.** According to the NATO membership criteria of 1995, the answer could be *no*. According to historical facts, and according to our interests, the answer could be *yes*; it could be *yes*, because, for example, in 1955 Germany was invited to join NATO despite the fact that at the time it did not exercise sovereignty over all its territory. It took 40 years for Germany to become re-unified, but Germany was invited to join the North-Atlantic alliance in 1955 nonetheless. Experience in the European Union is also similar, with Cyprus which too was invited to join the European Union even if it has territorial problems.

We have to discuss theoretically, we have to discuss the basic principles in this area and this seminar could provide good incentives for the politicians in this region. **My view, my perception is that the process of NATO enlargement cannot be stopped, because security in the Greater Black Sea Area is one of the most important things which have to be provided together, which have to be ensured together.**

The other interesting aspect for the time being, in the security of the Greater Black Sea Area is the outbreak of the major financial and economic crisis, which is overlapping the existing deep energy crisis. According to the Romanian *National Security Strategy*, the Black Sea Region is a mirror of international security and of global security and we could identify in this region all the important security threats and risks confronting our civilization, indeed our global community. We have to think about whether all of them will remain of the utmost importance, of main concern for NATO, the European Union and for every other country in the region.

I wish to say this because next year [2009] it is a good and interesting opportunity to think about future security in the Black Sea Region because of three reasons: first, a new *NATO Strategic Concept* will be launched. A new NATO *Strategic Concept* has to design exactly, including for this area of the Greater Black Sea Region, which really are the main security risks and threats. Without a common threat assessment, we cannot have common security in the region. Common threat assessment means common threat assessment for all states, but at a minimum for those countries sharing the same values. This is important because during the Georgian crisis, between NATO and the European Union there were some different views about the real matter at hand, the real substance of the situation.

It will also be next year [2009] that a new *European Union Security Strategy* will be launched. We hope this to be so because there are a lot of people working for this, there is enough political will, and we believe it will come out next year [2009].

And a third reason, for sure, is the fact that a new National Security Strategy of the United States will be launched. We call it the Obama strategy. Will security threats remain the same, because today they are the same for NATO, the European Union and the United States security strategy? Will global terrorism, international terrorism remain the first and the most important threat? Will proliferation or condemning proliferation remain one of the most important threats and one of the most important tasks? Will regional conflicts also remain so very important? Will we have to move to the other end of the security spectrum?

During the last years, we saw a kind of asymmetric relation developing between NATO and Russia – asymmetrical because, paradoxically, NATO had an approach, a kind of soft security approach to this region, whereas Russia had a hard security approach, a return to power politics. And for sure it is very difficult, because we have no colleague from Russia to see if this is a permanent trend in Russian foreign and security policy. It is a new trend, according, for example to the last documents which were issued by the National Intelligence Council of the United States' new report, *Global Trends 2025*, which seems to be a kind of new state capitalism in that area.

We have to think about it, because in that document we see proof of a document from the Shanghai Cooperation Organization which is a little bit different from our view. Of course, it is just a scenario, for sure. But we have to think about it because otherwise our strategy will be a very short-term strategy. It will not be a successful strategy. **We have to think about a**

long-term strategy. What kind of pattern will develop in the next 10 years, in the next 25 years?

For sure, very important for our seminar, our conference is to identify what may happen this year [2008], next year [2009], and the year after that [2010]. This is so because we have to develop pragmatic conclusions for the political decision-makers and for the military decision-makers. And I believe that such kind of approach, honest, frank, with not too much diplomatic sensitivity, but merely based on an honest approach, will look at the reality, trying to identify what is really the matter and trying to identify real solutions. **There is no solution, other than cooperation.** What kind of cooperation, to what extent, based on what kind of principles, for sure it is a matter of policy. But for the scientific approach, we have to be honest, we have to be thorough, we have to be bold in our approach.

I wish you all the best, successful conclusions for this conference. Thank you very much for paying attention.

Thank you very much, general Ionescu, for your enlightening opening of the session, giving us food for thought and food for discussion, if we can say so. Thank you again for your insight.

• **Maj-gen. (r) Mihail E. Ionescu, Ph.D.**

Thank you, general Degeratu for your welcoming address. Now I kindly ask general Mihail Orzeață, the representative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Romanian Armed Forces, to take the floor.

General Orzeață, you have the floor.

Lt-gon. Mihail Orzoacă, Ph.D.

Representative
Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Romanian Armed Forces
Bucharest, Romania

Thank you very much.

Ladies and gentlemen,

Let me congratulate both organizers and participants for this very useful initiative, which is earning and giving a more comprehensive image of the security landscape in the Greater Black Sea Area.

I know that the Institute for Political Studies of Defense and Military History has a tradition in organizing conferences dedicated to international and regional security issues and, as a representative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Romanian Armed Forces, I am very interested in the debates on the security strategic issues in this domain.

For Romania and the European Union, the Greater Black Sea Area is an important neighbour, and this explains the legitimate interest in assessing the security environment, in monitoring the observable evolutions, and in limiting the risks and threats which are directed at this region. In the aftermath of the EU and NATO enlargement towards the East, the Black Sea Area became obviously one of the main strategically important regions, on the one hand because there are *risks and vulnerabilities*, such as organized

crime, terrorism, traffic of drugs and weapons, illegal immigration, regional conflicts, and on the other hand because there are some *real opportunities* for the riparian states, such as increased economic development and so on.

The European Union's Defense and Security Policy (ESDP) aims at providing military and non-military security for the EU member states, but also at supporting the neighboring states. Therefore, there is a need for the European Union to get involved in stabilizing the Black Sea states.

NATO will probably further enlarge with some Black Sea states in the mid-term, and many experts from the allied states appreciate that there is a need for a new Atlantic basic strategy. **Giving the Membership Action Plan (MAP) to Georgia and Ukraine could be seen both as a positive sign and as a commitment by NATO to project stability and peace in the region.** The future will show us the results.

Russia and Europe have to be important partners in the Greater Black Sea Area, on the condition of expanding the Union's Charter and the Helsinki Process to help sustain territorial integrity and sovereignty for all the states.

On behalf of the Romanian Joint Chiefs of Staff, I want to express my appreciation for the initiative of the Institute for Political Studies of Defense and Military History to develop a research project dedicated to the analysis of security issues in the Greater Black Sea Area and also for the cooperation with

the Center for East-European and Asian Studies within the National School for Political Studies and Public Administration.

I wish you success with the conference.

Thank you very much.

• **Maj-gen. (r) Mihail E. Ionescu, Ph.D.**

Thank you very much, general Orzeată.

It seems to me that I already told you that general Orzeată acquired last week a new star, the fourth one, and the last one. No more stars for him!

Thank you very much, general, for giving us the privilege to have you here as the representative of the Head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Romanian Armed Forces.

Now, I would kindly invite to take the floor the member of the Academy, Mr Mircea Malița, former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Romania, 40 years or 45 years ago, and the Honorary President of the *Black Sea Foundation*, whose Acting President is our Minister of Defense, Theodor Meleşcanu. Academician Malița is among the most prominent experts on International Relations in Romania, not only due to the fact that he has an institutional memory – he served the Romanian Foreign Policy Minister since the end of 1950s. Think about it! Since the end of '50s, Academician Malița has been close to the laboratory of decisions in Romanian foreign policy. If I could quote some, threshold events of this period, I would quote August '68, which he participated in. But also the opening of Romania toward the West at the beginning

of '60s, when he was the envoy of the Romanian government to the United States of America, and after that he was ambassador at the beginning of '80s in the United States of America. He was also among the people who had thought about Romania at the end of '80s and what kind of track Romanian foreign policy would follow. And he had been close to the group who decided changing the course of Romanian foreign policy at the end of the 1980s. And after that he has been close to, via the *Black Sea Foundation*, also to this laboratory about which I have told you, namely, of decisions in Romanian foreign policy.

Why I have invited him? Because he is among the organizers of this event, through his *Black Sea Foundation*, because tomorrow we will have a round table here, in which we will discuss under his chairmanship, the risks and threats in the Black Sea Area.

So, I would kindly invite Mr. Malița to present his opening address.

Ambassador, you have the floor.

Academician Mircea Malița, Ph.D.

Honorary President
The Black Sea Foundation
• Bucharest, Romania

Thank you, mister chairman, for your warm introduction. Your kind words are truly the ones of a diplomat among generals.

Today, I stand here as the fourth speaker and, though I have no stars to carry on my shoulders, my experience in the world of diplomacy, especially the diplomacy of the Cold War, is long and consistent. My first encounter with the world of diplomacy occurred in the 1950s. Since then and until the late 1980s I have been active in the world of diplomacy.

The diplomatic community is generally concerned with obtaining and maintaining peace. Consequently this means solving problems in international affairs through security measures which do not exclude conflicts. The *Black Sea Foundation*, which is responsible for training and research, creating a network of universities in the Black Sea area, has a department headed by Major General Mihail Ionescu, a good colleague of ours from the Institute for Political Studies of Defence and Military History. Tomorrow, at the round table, we will debate some problems regarding conflicts and conflict resolution in the Greater Black Sea Area.

I like the idea of General Degeratu, to underline our business and problems, to identify our occupations and the long term trends so that we can see what processes we are involved in. These trends should be the main subject of our debate, not events which concur, exist and disappear because these are less important in terms of history.

Speaking about trends, this meeting itself inspired a few trends. While reading your wonderful projects, **I can see that the *Black Sea Foundation* could involve itself in future debates and studies such as *disarmament***, which is a subject that disappeared from the agenda of international

relations after the Cold War. This subject is already debated again in the United States, where an influential group is trying to bring back this subject. We could call this subject: *"Social and Political Implications of Disarmament"*.

Another subject opened for debate in the future is the one concerning confidence measures, which, though they are not mentioned any more, have a high value for the diplomatic community and the policy makers in the Greater Black Sea Area. An appropriate title for this subject could be *"Good Neighbourly Policies"*. Hopefully, this type of collateral issue will be developed by the *Centre for Conflict Prevention and Solution*.

Speaking about trends, we are in the middle of a great changing process. This change will come in about 20 years, so that it will arise approximately in 2040. **The biggest and most important change will be the one concerning the new configuration of power in the world.** This evolution of a small group of great powers is in the direction of *multilateralism*. Unilateralism was on the agenda for a few years, but now it's made place for multilateralism once again. **A multilateral way of understanding the international relations, the state system and logic is natural.**

The great powers are on good terms now based especially on good trade cooperation. The only sensitive subject is the one concerning some *border regions*. All the great powers, China, Russia, the United States of America and Europe have security oriented policies concerning their neighbouring regions. **But in the terms of a great war, or even a smaller war, we don't have to worry.** I think that nobody wants that.

Nobody is prepared for such a conflagration. **The only type of wars we will have to face in the international system will be the local wars, because these represent unfinished business in many frozen conflicts in the Middle East, Central Asia, Latin America and Africa.**

The big shift will come with a new form of cooperation, harmony and partnership among the great powers. Of course, in a mathematical way, there is more than one model of configuring the future international system. Questions asked in this situation are: will the great powers be close to each other or not? Is the international system going to be bipolar or are there going to be more than two great powers? And if so, how many? **The only certainty is the fact that there is no more place for unilateral hegemony in this world.**

The other aspect of this change I am speaking about is the way this big shift will find the small powers. Historically and naturally smaller countries either live in the shadows or under the umbrella of the great powers, or they are integrated in different security systems. Their success is depending on the way they manage the situation they are in.

Globalisation is at our doorsteps. Regionalism is powerful, but limited. Globalisation will be more and more at work being a great platform for competition. This is a healthy competition in areas such as trade, industry, science and technology mainly. Consequently the big powers will want to occupy the more important and dominant positions in this competition.

So in my opinion this is the way our world is headed. The trend is towards the big shift I have been speaking of and

hopefully all the actors involved in the international system will be prepared when this happens.

• **Maj-gen. (r) Mihail E. Ionescu, Ph.D.**

Thank you so much, Ambassador. Your Excellency, it seems to me that you already gave us a vision of how to tackle our subjects here. So, **we enter on short term in an age of turmoil, which is a period of transition toward a big shift, in which the great powers would manage the world, without any room for any of them to play unilaterally in managing the world**, if I have understood you correctly.

And in this framework it seems to me that we would have to think, and I have taken some notes here, to some forgotten processes, like governance, confidence building measures, and all the others, including the Greater Black Sea Area. And if I have understood you correctly, it seems to me that in the age of turmoil, which is on the horizon, we would have to underline this kind of processes, like confidence building measures and disarming, in order to wait for, silently and peacefully, the big shift. Am I right or not? And also to contribute to it.

Alright, thank you very much, Ambassador. As a matter of fact, Professor Malița was right.

So, now you are seeing the program, the meeting today, organized by the *Institute for Political Studies of Defense and Military History* and the *Center of East European and Asian Studies* of the *National School for Political and Administrative Studies*. The former rector of this *National School*, as a matter of fact, the founder of this school, in the early 1990s – it seems to me that in 1990, immediately

after the December revolution – Professor Secăreș is here and I would give him the floor to present his opening address.

Please, Vasile, the floor is yours.

Vasile Secăreș, Ph.D.

Professor

**National School for Political Studies and Public Administration
Bucharest, Romania**

Thank you very much, Mr Chairman.

It is an honor and a privilege to attend this international conference, the second Annual International Conference on Security Risks and Threats in the Greater Black Sea Area. It is a privilege to address such a distinguished audience, with a lot of friends from different countries of this region and I am very pleased to have the opportunity to meet them again. Let me welcome you on behalf of the *National School for Political Studies and Public Administration*, and, of course, on behalf of its recently established *Center for East-European and Asian Studies*.

The *National School* is one of the organizers of this conference. My university started to develop a regional dimension and regional agenda some years ago, more exactly in 2002 a few months before the Prague Summit of NATO, when Romania was invited to join the North Atlantic Alliance.

For me and my colleagues, at that moment a new strategic and security agenda was developing - an agenda connected to

the new Euro-Atlantic frontier, and the geo-political restructuring of Southeastern Europe. As a matter of fact, **I call this process, in one of my papers, a geo-political revolution, changing the destiny of this region.**

With a huge support from the NATO headquarter, we managed to establish in 2002 the *NATO Studies Center* for NATO studies, a center for training and research on the political and security problematic of the Greater Black Sea Area. In a few years, the *NATO Studies Center* managed to become a regional center, training an important number of officers and civilians from all the countries of the Greater Black Sea Area. I was very pleased during the recent Bucharest Summit of NATO to see some of the former students of the *NATO Studies Center* and of the *National School of Political Studies and Public Administration* attending this important reunion in important positions of responsibility in the Euro-Atlantic integration of their nations.

Last year [2007], based on the brilliant initiative of general and professor Mihail Ionescu, the *National School* launched the *Center for East-European and Asian Studies*, as a thing connected to this new agenda of the Greater Black Sea Area. **The decision to establish the center was born out of the recognition of the growing relevance of the Eurasian space for global politics, calling for a fresh approach to scholarship focusing on the region.**

During the past two decades the academic debate in our country, but also in Eastern Europe in general has been to a large extent oriented by the study of the European Union and NATO, ignoring the Eastern dimension. I remember the moment when the political agenda of Romania, the foreign policy agenda

of Romania was dominated by this idea of the importance of the Greater Black Sea Area. It started also to be connected in the late 1990s, with the idea of playing a regional role, for **Romania to develop a regional role**. Maybe you remember the plea, the initiative of the former president of Romania, Emil Constantinescu. But at the same time **we did manage to develop the necessary instruments to cover this new strategic and security agenda and to play a regional role**, not only the political instrument or the diplomatic instrument, but also the intellectual instrument and the economic instrument, so it is the right time to start developing an intellectual role, an academic role in this region, developing this new agenda.

So, the *Center for East European and Asian Studies* of the *National School* aims to fill this gap and to contribute to a renewed focus on Russia and the former Soviet space, as well as their neighbours. Let me mention that the Center is going to develop three research programs, on security, on foreign policy and on energy. So, this is a huge and an important agenda, and I am very sure that they, the center, will manage to develop these programs, and of course, the present conference is a step in the right direction.

Finally, I am really pleased to announce that in February 2009 the Center will launch a new academic journal, the *Journal for East-European and Asian Studies* in English, and I think that this publication will be the first journal of its kind in Romania, and one of the few in the region.

Coming back to the idea that the present conference is a very good and important step in the right direction, I wish all

success to the reunion and I am sure that the representatives of the Center and of the *National School* will contribute to the agenda of the conference.

Thank you very much.

• **Maj-gen. (r) Mihail E. Ionescu, Ph.D.**

Thank you very much, Professor Secăreș, for your kind words and for announcing this initiative. I would add something, if you would allow me. The corporate papers for this journal, this electronic journal, whose its first issue would be published in February, has been received with an unexpected answer. We have received an application from Harvard, am I right, Alexandru? From Cambridge, and from other very famous university centers, ready to publish here about the evolution, the security evolutions in this area, in this region. As a matter of fact, Alexandru Coita, who is here, is editor of this first issue of the *Journal*.

Thank you so much.

Now, I would kindly ask Sebastian Huluban to present his welcoming address from the part of the State Secretary of the Department for Defense Policy and Planning of our Ministry of Defense. As a matter of fact, he is representing my superior echelon, talking in military terms.

Please, Sebastian, you have the floor.

Sebastian Huluban

***Representative
Defense Policy and Planning Department, Ministry of Defense
Bucharest, Romania***

Good morning, everybody.

First of all, thank you very much, general Ionescu, and I have to remind you again that we have a very flexible institution in the Defense Policy and Planning Department. I want to send the apologies of both the State Secretary for Defense Policy and Planning, Mr. Corneliu Dobrițoiu, and the Director General for Defense Policy and Planning, Mr. Dragoș Ghercioiu, who were not able to attend this conference. The former, the director general, is not in Bucharest and is not in Romania this morning.

I will try to be very short, because after so many openings in the Romanian security research community, I will present very shortly how the Ministry of Defense and the Defense Policy and Planning Department look at the Greater Black Sea Area, and what we, in partnership with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, do for this region at this very moment. Also I have to address some questions for further study and reflection, especially for the distinguished audience.

First of all, our perspective at the Ministry of Defense on the Greater Black Sea Area has two basic, fundamental, strategic pillars. *The first pillar is a consequence of the 9/11 events*, especially in terms of the geostrategic and geopolitical repositioning of the United States Armed Forces. *The operations, military operations, in Afghanistan and Iraq,*

like it or not, led to a significant security and geopolitical repositioning, bringing regions such as the Caucasus, Central Asia, the Middle East, the Greater Middle East, however you name it, in the very forefront of public and not very public security debates and attention. The second fundamental pillar on how we look, or the second lens of our perspective at the Ministry of Defense, at the Greater Black Sea Area is based on the strategic documents, both at domestic and international level, that are guiding our activity: the Romanian National Security Strategy, the recent National Defense Strategy, that has been approved a few weeks ago, and of course, the North-Atlantic Alliance's documents, especially the final communiqués, as we can read them on the Internet, released after the Istanbul NATO Summit, or starting with the Istanbul Summit I should say, when Romania also participated for the first time in the North Atlantic Council as a full member of the Alliance.

So, based on these two fundamental security or strategic pillars, **we have the following strategic assumptions**, that we work with at the defense policy and the security policy level. First of all, of course, **the Greater Black Sea Area is one of strategic importance for Romania's political and security interests**. We envisage and we look at the Greater Black Sea Area as a strategic space for cooperation on functional issues, more than narrow geopolitical variables.

Secondly, we believe that democratization and functional free markets generate peaceful neighborhood. Peaceful neighborhood had always been the precondition for an enhanced security, especially in Eastern European history. Additionally, we also look at the Black Sea regional security complex through

the lens of its status, of our status as littoral state, and a NATO and European Union member state. Based on this fact, we will always give preference to political tools, we will always seek cooperation, partnerships and negotiations, and we also give fundamental focus to the principles of transparency, inclusiveness and complementarity especially on security issues.

Consequently, our main strategic goal is to provide the region with a more inclusive profile, to open it to more European cooperation and to avoid narrow security arrangements that will lead in the end to geopolitical isolation, to the exclusion of the Greater Black Sea Area from the strategic map of both NATO and the European Union. We believe that the recent events in Georgia were practical confirmation for the assertion that exclusiveness and the preference for dealing with regional issues exclusively between regional actors is not appropriate.

Based on these assumptions, it is obvious that our preference is for enhancing the possibility for consolidating a regional security regime, based on institutional binding variables and I will only mention a few of the contributions that the Romanian Ministry of Defense and our Department raised to these issues. First of all, we are participating in operations, regional operations, regional-designed military operations, naval operations, the *Blackseafor* and *Black Sea Harmony*. We are developing a system of surveillance for assessing, or better assessing security risks, which is called *Scomar*. Probably all of you are aware of it. We are also significantly involved in NATO, mainly NATO partnership mechanisms with the countries in the region, and I

will only mention Romania's positions in enhancing the partnership relationship with Georgia, raising it to the level of a Membership Action Plan (MAP). Romania has the same position concerning Ukraine. However, without a political decision, a sensitive political decision for an European Neighborhood Policy, we took the decision to enhance our bilateral relationship and, within the NATO framework, our multilateral partnership with Georgia. There was a Romanian MOD team that was offering advice and training to the Georgian Ministry of Defense on modern planning developments in institutional building, creating the new institutional framework for defense planning, etc. Additionally, the Romanian Embassy in Chişinău, in the Republic of Moldova is the point of contact for the NATO allies' embassies in Chişinău. And there are many, many other initiatives.

Summing up, I will again remind you the issue that we believe a functional approach, working more on the issue of neutral, institutional mechanisms for partnership, rather than geographical, geopolitical labels is much more important and it is probably, as we will see, essential.

As for this moment, I shall focus on the distinction between threats and risks in the Greater Black Sea Area, especially after the events of August [2008]. What is a risk, what is a threat to regional security? Then, how can we balance and how can we develop the balanced and common approach at the regional level between the preference for inclusiveness and the tendency for excluding the region from the European security framework? And last, but not least, probably, which is also very important, if not the fundamental issue: how we can deal with the issue of

perceptions? We should not forget there are littoral states in the Greater Black Sea Area that believe talking, just talking and debating about an enlarged or extended Black Sea Region is a risk to their national security.

Thank you very much.

• **Maj-gen. (r) Mihail E. Ionescu, Ph.D.**

So, with this I end the Opening Remarks session.

What can I say now? We have a vision, which it seems to me, is already a fruitful outcome of our first panel, namely on short-term we will have a turmoil, a period of turmoil, and after that being a kind of transition to a big shift, multilateralism and perhaps in this field, Obama's presidency in the United States would be the fundamental factor. And, also, we have a background, namely what kind of issues we would have to tackle, what kind of initiatives are on the table, from which we would have to begin to discuss about the present and the future.

PANEL 1

Major Trends of the Regional Security Environment In the Post-Cold War Period

- **Maj-gen. (r) Mihail E. Ionescu, Ph.D.** (Institute for Political Studies of Defense and Military History, Romania)
- **Chairman**

We are entering now, without any break – the coffee break will be later on – the first panel of our conference. I would kindly ask Nika Chitadze, from the *International Security Research Centre* in Georgia, in Tbilisi, to present his paper, on the Georgia-Russia war. It is one of the main challenges for the development of cooperation in the Greater Black Sea Area.

Nika, you have the floor to present your point of view on this recent event which reshaped the entire security environment in the Greater Black Sea Area.

You have the floor.

Nika CHITADZE, Ph.D.

Researcher
International and Security Research Center
Tbilisi, Georgia

Georgia-Russia War as one of the Main Challenges for the Development of Cooperation in the Black Sea Region

Thank you very much.

Dear Chairman,
Dear participants,

First of all, thank you very much to the *Institute for Political Studies of Defense and Military History* for inviting me here and giving me an opportunity to make my presentation and participate before such a distinguished audience.

Now, with your permission I would like to discuss and analyze with you the main reasons why the war between Russia and Georgia started in August 2008 and main ways for its solution and how, of course, it impeded upon all the cooperation and security environment in the Greater Black Sea Area.

First of all, when we discuss about the main reasons why this war started in August 2008, we should analyze the different factors, which caused the war, such as, for example: historical factors, such as geopolitical factors, geo-strategical factors, geo-economic factors, psychological factors, foreign policy orientation of Georgia, etc.

First of all, with regard to historic factors, with your permission, I would like to point out that during the Middle Ages, the Georgian Kingdom tried to establish some contacts with Russia. The first stage of establishment of relations between Georgia and Russia was signing an agreement in 1783 about the collective security between the Russian Empire and the Georgian Kingdom. But in 1801 the Russian Empire violated this agreement with Georgia, abolished the Georgian Kingdom and declared Georgia a part of the Russian Empire. During the whole 19th and 20th centuries Russia tried to Russify Georgia and the

Georgians, and not only Georgia, but all the nations who lived around the Russian Empire. For example, in Georgia there were prohibited all Georgian schools, no high educational institution was allowed to teach in Georgian, the Georgian language and the elite of Georgia got its education only in Russian universities, in Russian. But despite this fact, that no Georgian government and no Georgian state would be allowed to exit by the Russian Empire between 1801 and 1918, before the restoration of its national independence, Georgia was merely a part of Russian Empire. Even so, Russia could not manage to Russify Georgians, because Georgians kept their national identity. For example, Russia tried truly hard but it didn't managed to Russify the peoples who are living in the Volga region, particularly the North Caucasus. In the Far East for example, Russia tried this too, and now these peoples have forgotten their native languages, etc. Whereas with Georgians, they could not do it!

During the period 1918-1921, when Georgia temporarily restored its national independence, Soviet Russia tried to occupy Georgia. Russia managed to occupy other parts of the former Russian Empire and restore its control over these other nations. For example, there were three wars during these three years period. But Georgia resisted the possible invasion of Soviet Russia. So, Georgia resisted the Russian Empire, and there were several rebellions on the territory of Georgia during the period of the 19th century and at the beginning of the 20th century, and after the Bolshevik coup in Russia, again Georgia was fighting against Soviet Russia.

During the Soviet period, Lenin's Russia managed somehow to occupy Georgia after a three-month long

battle and transformed it into the Soviet Socialist Republic of Georgia, which was among the fifteen soviet socialist republics inside the USSR - one of the disobedient republics, for that matter, because there were some mass demonstrations in Georgia, like for example the ones in 1956 and in 1978 when the Soviet government wanted somehow to abolish the status of the Georgian language as state language within the territory of Georgia. And Soviet Russia was also unsuccessful in its attempt to Sovietize Georgia and at the same time to Russify Georgia, Soviet Georgia.

At the end of the 80's, with the period of *perestroika* and *glasnost*, Georgia was one of the first republics where a national liberal movement has been started, and you know that due to the efforts of Georgia, Ukraine, the Baltic Republics, Armenia and Azerbaijan, in 1991 the Soviet Union collapsed. But after the collapse of the USSR, again Georgia refused to become a member of the *Commonwealth of Independent States* (CSI). This regional organization, as you know, was established at the initiative of the Russian Federation, so as to keep the newly independent former Soviet republics under its political sphere of influence. And after the collapse of the USSR, again Russia interfered in the internal affairs of Georgia during the war reprisal in the South of Asia at the beginning of the 90's, to somehow force Georgia to enter the *CIS* and to choose a pro-Russian foreign policy orientation. But again, Russia could not manage to do it. For example, Georgia, even during the Rose Revolution, clearly fixed its foreign policy with NATO membership as a national security priority. During the Prague NATO Summit in 2002, the former president of Georgia declared that the main foreign policy priority of Georgia is becoming a plenipotentiary member of NATO.

After the Rose Revolution of Georgia, at the end of 2003, of course Georgian foreign policy security priorities became more declared towards West. Because of this Russia tried again, after the Rose Revolution, to punish Georgia. For example, in 2006 Russia closed its market to Georgian wine and mineral water, to somehow force Georgia in this way to change its foreign policy priorities and orientation from the West towards the North. But again, despite the fact that the Russian political elite was thinking that Georgia will be forced to do so, that Georgian economy will collapse after the Russian market had been closed to its products in 2006, the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of Georgia increased by 9.3 percent. And despite the fact that Russia also raised the price of the natural gas and oil from \$110 to \$235 per 1000 cubic meters of gas – maybe Russia tried in this way to force Georgia to change its foreign policy priority – anyway, Georgia found alternatives for the import of gas, from the Baku-Tbilisi pipeline which entered exploitation at the end of 2006. And so Georgia again managed to provide for its energy security. And, for example, in 2007, the GDP of Georgia increased by 12 percent and of course this caused massive irritation on the Russian side.

So what I wanted to say, discussing about the historical factors and starting the discussion from the end of the 18th century and coming to the most recent part of the history of the Georgian-Russian relation, is that Russia could not force this small state of Georgia to be Russified and be under the influence of the Russian Federation. And of course among the Russian political elite and even in the Russian society there is somehow the complex that Russia is a big power, but it nonetheless could not force Georgia, the small state of Georgia, a small nation, under their sphere of influence,

that it could not somehow defeat this small country from the economical, military and other points of view.

Another factor is the foreign policy orientation of Georgia. In the former Soviet space, if we do not take into consideration, of course, the three Baltic republics, **before the Rose Revolution and especially during the Rose Revolution Georgia clearly fixed its foreign policy and national security priorities to become a plenipotentiary member of NATO.** For example, in 2004 Georgia and NATO started the implementation of the Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP). In 2006 Georgia transferred to the next stage in the relations with NATO and I mean here the Intensified Dialogue process.

Georgia is the only former Soviet republic in the South Caucasus, as I mentioned, that fixed the foreign policy priorities towards the West.

Russia somehow managed, for example, to keep under its geopolitical influence certain Asian republics, like Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan where the second official language is Russian. Turkmenistan is depending on Russia for exporting its natural gas through the territory of the Russian Federation. Armenia is a strategic partner and allied of Russia in the South Caucasus. With regard to Azerbaijan, it has more bonus policy between North and West, but Azerbaijan did not fix its foreign policies and intention to be a plenipotentiary member of NATO. Moldova is a neutral country. With regard to Ukraine, of course, Kiev intends to become a plenipotentiary member of NATO. But in Ukraine there are also very strong pro-Russian forces, I mean

Ianucovich and the Party of Regions of Ukraine. But in Georgia there is no Georgian counterpart of Ianucovich. For example, during the referendum up to 77 percent of Georgians supported the idea of Georgia becoming a plenipotentiary member of NATO. So the Georgian foreign policy priorities and also the color revolution which started in Georgia, and after that continued in Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan, was somehow an unacceptable compromise for Russia.

With regard to the geopolitical factors, of course Russia's political elite was, and of course is, very irritated, about these foreign policy priorities of Georgia, and is also irritated by the enlargement of NATO and the European Union eastward. Especially in 2004, for example, Romania and Bulgaria became plenipotentiary members of NATO and in 2007 plenipotentiary members of the European Union. And these two countries somehow are now close to NATO and the European Union, they are riparian Black Sea states, and this factor – the perspective of the further enlargement of NATO – irritated and continues to irritate Russia very much. And Russian geopoliticians and the Russian political elite somehow considered the establishment and strengthening of the South Caucasus region as a means to hamper the expansion of Atlanticism and to cement the interest of Eurasianism. You know that there are two major directions in geopolitics: Western Europe – Atlanticism, and the continental – Eurasianism direction. In this regard, of course, Russia wanted to have this further enlargement of NATO with another nation stopped.

With regard to geo-strategic factors, with regard to geo-strategy, of course, Russia's intention was to open a new

military base in the South Caucasus region. But Russia could not do it, for example, on the territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, without the recognition of these republics, because otherwise Russia would have to negotiate and sign the agreement for the establishment of the new military base with Georgia. But the so called invasion of Georgia in South Ossetia, Georgia has lost its moral right that South Ossetia and Abkhazia be the plenipotentiary part of Georgia, and in this regard **the State Duma adopted the decision to recognize South Ossetia and Abkhazia as so-called independent states.** And after this of course Russia signed the agreement with South Ossetia and with Abkhazia for opening three new military bases: one in South Ossetia, near Tskhinvali, and two military bases in Abkhazia. Abkhazia was especially necessary to the Russians. Why? Because in 2017, you know, the Russian military elite will leave the territory of Ukraine, I mean the Sevastopol port. And **Russia needed to open a new military base, naval military base on the Black Sea coast.** And now Russia got this opportunity to open a naval military base for its Black Sea fleet on the territory of Abkhazia, in Ochamchire, after it signed a so-called intergovernmental agreement with the so-called Republic of Abkhazia. But this way Russia somehow was successfull, of course.

With regard to the two economic factors, of course Russia's intention was to establish control over the gas and oil pipelines, which cross the territory of Georgia – of course, I mean the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline. Through this pipeline about 5-10 million tons of oil are transported from Baku towards the Georgian port of Supsa and then to other ports of the Black Sea region, in Constanța, for example, in Burgas, in Illichovska, etc.

And secondly, by increasing the maximum-capacity level of this pipeline, it will be possible to transport between 50-80 million tons of oil through it. With regard to the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline, about 8 billion cubic meters of natural gas can be transported through it per year. Of course, **the three above-mentioned pipelines are considered competitor pipelines which bypass the territory of Russia, but at the same time cross the territory of Georgia and Turkey, two Black Sea states.** And this way the countries of the Greater Black Sea Area have an opportunity to give alternative sources of oil and gas bypassing, as I mentioned, the territory of the Russian Federation. Furthermore, of course, you already know about the Nabucco project, that I hope will be constructed and will be possible to transport between 20-26 billion cubic meters of natural gas through it. And you know that in this project participate almost all countries of the Greater Black Sea Area except, of course, the Russian Federation. **And it is due to these existing and future pipelines that Georgia is a transit territory for the transportation of different kind of goods.** The Georgian ports of Poti and Batumi got new strategic functions and in this case, the importance of the Black Sea port of the Russian Federation, Novorossiysk, has been decreased. Of course, one of the main intentions of the Russian Federation was to control these strategic spots, I mean not only pipelines, but also railways, roads, ports in Georgia, and this way, increase the dependence of the Black Sea countries, and not only them but the whole of Europe, on the Russian Federation.

Also I would like, with your permission, to point out here the foreign policy of Putin, when he came to power. **There were three main stages of Putin's foreign policy. First**

stage, the period between 2000-2003, was the so-called concentration policy of Putin. By this way, the main purpose of Vladimir Putin was the concentration of power inside Russia, the establishment control in Chechnya.

With your permission, I will discuss about the military events, because there are some questions, like who started the war, etc that need to be answered. I would like to say that over 50 percent of the territory of South Ossetia was under the control of the central government of Georgia, and 50 percent under the control of the separatists and, accordingly, of Russia. **Since August 1st 2008, Russian soldiers and Ossetian separatists started the bombing of Georgian villages, on Georgian territory, which was controlled by the Georgian central government, inside South Ossetia.** This way they wanted to force Georgia to reply to this action and involve Georgia in war and afterwards to show the international community that Georgia started the war against South Ossetia. It is very interesting, to follow what general Degeratu mentioned here, and it is very funny to discuss that Georgia started the war against South Ossetia. So Georgia started the war inside its own territory, a territory which was recognized by the international community, including Russia, as a plenipotentiary member of Georgia? And after this military operation was started, you know Russia replied in one day, because Russia organized military training in the North Caucasus, during this three-month period, and Russia invaded all the territory of the sovereign country of Georgia. Russia destroyed the Georgian villages in South Ossetia and Russia violated not only the main principles of international law related to the territorial integrity of a country, but the Geneva Convention of 1949 and the Hague Convention of 1954 – you know, that is

an international convention related to the conducting of military operations.

So, I apologize, instead of conclusion, with your permission, I would like to mention in half a minute, I would like to express my gratitude to Romania and the Romanian people. Before my departure for Romania, on Saturday I was watching television, and it was shown in the Georgian information broadcast that in Bucharest, I do not know exactly which place, but in Bucharest, it was organized an exhibition of the Georgian-Russian war and many people from the government of Romania and many representatives of the Romanian society attended this exhibition and they saw with their own eyes what happened in Georgia. They saw these pictures; they saw the destroyed villages, the people killed. Thank you very much also to the government of Romania. Romania was one of the first countries which immediately replied to the aggression of Russia and President Băsescu visited Georgia five days after the ending of the military operations.

Thank you again, to you, the Romanian people, the Romanian government and thank you again for your invitation.

• **Maj-gen. (r) Mihail E. Ionescu - Chairman**

Thank you, Nika. Thank you for your very interesting presentation which has value of witness testimony in a way on this event, which, as I said, has shaped the new environment of security here in the region. About where is the place where such an exhibition does exist, it is very close from here. It is the Șuțu Palace, namely the museum of the town of Bucharest, 200 meters on the left, in front of this house, close to the University Square. Anyway, the

Romanians know where this palace is, the Șuțu Palace is. Thank you so much.

Now we have another 25 minutes for three papers. So, I would kindly the following three speakers, who are by chance Romanians not to extend too much. Șerban, you all know that you have only seven minutes, not more. Simona, at least seven minutes and Hari, more than seven minutes. Please.

Hari Bucur, our old friend. Hari Bucur, by the way, is wondering around the Black Sea region. He has been in every country of the region, testing the reform in the security sector. So, he would present some of his findings. By the way, he is also the author of the handbook, if I would say, *"Security Sector Reform in the Greater Black Sea Area"*.

Please, Hari.

Hariton Bucur-Marcu, Ph.D.

Researcher

**Center for the Democratic Control of the Armed Forces
Geneva, Switzerland**

Institutionalisation of Security Risk Assessment Among Nations within the Black Sea Region

Thank you very much.

Yes, in a few minutes I am going to present you some leftovers from last year.

One year and two weeks back in time, I was here, in this building, at the same conference, last year, and I was presenting almost the same topic like institutionalization of risk assessment in the Greater Black Sea Area. And this time my presentation depicts a little bit what I was saying last year: **the NATO initiative called “Defense Institution Building”**. One of its goals and requirements is to institutionalize in the world of nations in NATO and its partner nations, the practice of **doing security risk assessment**. And the basis of this is to look at how effective the governments are in the process of assessing the risks with clearness and to develop requirements and capabilities to counter those risks.

In previous terms, there was some reference to **security documents**, like general Degeratu mentioned the *NATO Strategic Concept* and the *European Union’s Security Strategy* and the *United States Security Strategy*. And those are documents which are functional for these organizations to develop their own capabilities to cope with threats and risks they face as they perceive them to their security.

Now, around the Greater Black Sea Area I will discuss a sort of sentimental security policy analysis. That means we discuss what happened one hundred years ago that might influence our behavior today. It seems that what happened influences some visions of the future that are counting not like a sound grand policy or grand strategy of the nations in the region, but sort of personal ambition of state leaders and so on and so forth.

And for that reason in the Greater Black Sea Area, **institutionalization** – which means putting an order in

the way the risks are formalized, are expressed in documents and especially are followed by concrete actions to develop capacities and capabilities to counter those risks – is very important.

First of all, Georgia started in 2005 and then in 2006 to develop its first strategic documents, which represent the institutionalized framework to develop risk assessment and especially to develop forces for that. And it got this right, I mean the first document they ever wrote, under a new law which was called the “Law for Defense Planning”, which was very similar to the Romanian Law of Defense Planning. The difference between the Romanian law and the Georgian law, even some people in Romania have been sent there to advise the Georgians on that, is that Georgians actually were the ones who wrote the documents. We handed them in the law, but we did not do it for them, as provided by the law. And this was for a very good reason, because the law had to be amended after Romania joined NATO and joining NATO changed very much the security environment and also the institutionalized behavior in Romania towards security. But in Georgia they had the law, they had the first documents, which in my opinion are a little bit poetic. In the beginning, with a lot of help from NATO and from other nations, the Georgians accepted a lot of advice on how to draw these documents. The problem is they have the *National Security Concept* as a fundamental document. They had that threat assessment national documents and started in October 2005 and they had it in 2006, in 2007, and then they had an actual long term strategy. And they had the *Strategic Defense Review*. The problem with the Strategic Defense Review is that it was designed to be a civilian document. Unlike the other documents, these

were public. They were educating a lot. These officials and friends in Georgia were all making a civilian document, which actually is a document that starts a process of developing capabilities and forces mirroring the threat assessment in public documents. Why make this document secret? And they found a way, at the beginning of 2008, in January 2008, to make a version of the document – I am not saying that it was ours – that actually triggered the publication of the *National Defense Review*, but it was sanitized, some of the secrets found in it were taken out and it was published in January 2008, as a standalone document. And that was very well received by the international community.

What I am trying to say here is that you need threat assessment. People are looking at you, Georgia, as a nation. And really, believe that when you say that Russia is a threat or not, well, you mean it. It is not just a cozy discussion in a bar or in a coffee shop. It is just a reunion and you are taking into account the developing of your nation's own forces.

Now, in the case of Georgia we had some mix-ups, let us put it this way. For example, the *National Security Concept*, the Georgians say that the presence of the Russian Federation's troops in Georgia, in the Balkan region is no longer a direct threat to Georgia. Ok, it is a problem, but not a threat. But two months later, in the *Military Strategy*, Georgia says Russia's troops are still a threat, that the presence of Russian bases in Georgia is still a threat. Now, this creates confusions. And at that time in 2004, in 2006, the Georgians were looking for the *Strategic Defense Review* to see actually what was happening, which of those two positions was the right one.

Especially there should be a *sequence* between these documents. There is a main policy document, like a national security concept and then the military strategy should drive its knowledge and its attitude from this concept. In 2007, the threat assessment document is not far away from what we saw in the strategy before that. The document says that aggression against Georgia is unlikely in the foreseeable future and that the threats to Georgia's security relate to the threats associated to separatist regions - of course - and things like these. And from this assessment were drawn some key political assumptions and some key military assumptions. And the basic idea is that in public documents Georgia says it cannot see, at least in the short term, any other way of addressing its problem with the separatist regions than by peaceful means.

And instead of bonding, the villages in Georgia are shown by separatist forces in all the invasion of military operations within Georgia, without eventually solving the conflict. That was the main official vision. What happened is that the *Strategic Defense Review* is saying that the forces, even if it was in agreement with the Russian forces until 2008, all these forces will be withdrawn from the regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. It was very likely that some Russian forces will remain in these regions. And Russia will come up with ways of keeping those forces there, regardless of the agreements being signed. Now **what did the government of Georgia do? They forgot about these strategic documents! They forgot about their own defense planning structure! They forgot about their institutionalization and responded as Russia wanted them to respond, because on the other side, Russia has no actual institutionalization of risk assessment! The Russian**

risk assessments are made by the president and by the prime minister. And they are coming on to the idea that this is a risk, this is a threat. We are going to do that. The National Security Strategy dates from 2002 and it hasn't yet been approved by the Duma. So they do not have institutionalization and they can afford to act as they want.

Now when you have a nation like Georgia, where there is a lot of effort, and also not only Georgia, but the international community and Romania and other nations are helping Georgia to institutionalize the security risk assessment, **I was puzzled in August 2008 to see that actually Georgia played the Russian act – in war, of course. That is, instead of keeping their institutionalized risk assessment and saying “we do not have a military solution to this problem, we really want to internationalize the situation, Georgia wants to bring the West on our side” – but of course they knew from the beginning that the West would not fight a war for Georgia – instead of doing all those things, they played the Russian act! They responded to it with military force, an unprepared and inadequate military force and the rest. And for what they did, they offered the Russians their first war victory in half a century. What they did is that they put Russia on the map of international security again, because they were unimportant before that. They put again in discussion the possibility that Russia will get their own interest with the use of military force, which was unlikely before August 2008.**

So, altogether I think that having a risk assessment institutionalization of security in general and of defense

in particular is very important for the region. And it is very important in terms of dialogue among nations. Now, I made this analysis as a member of the public, as an informed member of the public. I am not part of the Romanian government doing this analysis. And I can tell you I am not encouraging my government, present here, to support the government of Georgia in the pursuit, again, of departure from their own legislation and from their own strategic documents. And that is my point of view.

• **Maj-gen. (r) Mihail E. Ionescu - Chairman**

Thank you so much, Hari, for this point of view. Thank you for underlining that you are representing a nongovernmental association. But in a way it seems to me it is also close to other governments. You know about the Romanian government, but this organization is close to another government.

So now I would kindly ask Șerban Pavelescu, who had been instrumental in organizing this meeting to present his paper, but Șerban, please, keep it short.

Șerban Pavelescu

Senior Researcher

**Institute for Political Studies of Defense and Military History
Bucharest, Romania**

**A Typology of the Security Environment's Evolution
in the Greater Black Sea Area after the Cold War**

*Ladies and Gentlemen,
Esteemed audience,*

The security environment of the Wider Black Sea Region has a special place within the evolutions witnessed by the security environment and the system of international relations in the post-Cold War period. During the post-war years the region was – at the level of regional geopolitical unity – the illustration of the partition and balance supposed by the bipolar logic that structured the system of international relations. At the end of the Cold War, the region suffered an ample transformation of its valences. The almost perfect balance and partition of the spheres of influence, the coherence and predictability of the picture of risks and threats to security were replaced by profound transformations with a rapid and, most of the times, unpredictable processuality. An entire series of risk factors considered obsolete, archaic in the discussion over the region's security balance are powerfully being manifest, imposing themselves as certitudes of any applied analysis of the assessment of region's state of security and its possible evolutions. Moreover, this region, through the conflictual Balkan and Caucasus focuses – still open and with an extremely volatile evolution potential –, as well as through the other conventional and non-conventional risk factors present in the region, have an effect on the European general security architecture, with serious consequences upon its structuring, stability and predictability.

In this context, we will try – without claiming to exhaust the subject – to analyze the main characteristics of the Wider Black Sea Area security environment, the main trends of its historical evolution in the post-Cold War period, as well as to identify several explanatory causes of these evolutions.

Esteemed audience,

Chronologically, the evolution of the regional security environment associated with the geopolitical unity constituted by the Wider Black Sea Region witnessed two major stages. The breaking points that separate these stages are the end of the Cold War (1989-1991); the 1999 NATO's intervention in Yugoslavia; the 2008, Georgian crisis.

Unlike what is going on in the rest of the European continent and not only, in the Wider Black Sea Region the end of the Cold War represents a long, conflictual and extremely expensive process in terms of human lives and material losses. If for the others, Westerners or Central-Europeans, the period represents a point of reconsidering the military policies and collecting the peace dividends, for the states located in the region under discussion the period is – also given the dissolutive processes that took place in Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union – one of instability and unpredictability, of resurgence of certain traditional risk factors, such as the military one. It is also a period of powerful emergence of new so-called non-conventional risks. The Balkan, Transdnestrrian, Chechen and South Caucasian conflict focuses are the points of instability that structure this dark picture of the risk factors to the national and international security. Moreover, **the strategic resources of the region, especially the energy ones, as well its important geo-strategic position within the European security architecture, make as this region and the evolutions of its security environment one of the important factors in determining the course and polarity of the European security.**

In this context, when talking about the regional security environment one could mention at least **two logics of action that are manifest and structuring, two distinct visions on**

regional and national security, on risk factors, threats and their potentiality, as well as on the ways to follow in counteracting them and achieving a certain level of balance and coherence in the field of regional security. Geographically, the states of the region are divided into at least three distinct groups: in the North and West of the region, the group of ex-communist states, Romania and Bulgaria; connected to those, in the West and South of the region, the group of „old” NATO member states (Greece and Turkey); in the East and in the North of the region (the ex-Soviet space). The connection spaces between the mentioned groups are marked through the presence and manifestation, in a violent form, of the already mentioned Yugoslav and ex-Soviet conflict focuses.

These breaking lines are being materialized in two analytic-explicative logics of the security environment and of its defining coordinates. On the one side, we have to deal with a vision on the national and regional security that also uses the substantiation of the foreign, security and national defense policies, which are analytical terms inherited from the post-war period. A classical approach of the regional security problems prevail, with all the consequences derived from it – the favoring of certain risk factors of military type and of an approach of the problems in terms of force balance and spheres of influence. On the other side, we have the opposite, modern vision on security, which makes of it a part of the equation to be solved within the major reconfiguration suffered by the security environment and the system of international relations in its entirety at the end of the Cold War. In this context, the risk factors and threats to national and international security are arranged on a hierarchical structure depending on the evolutive processes

taking place at the level of the international relations system. Therefore, **the evolutions of the regional security environment are connected to and interdependent with those of the European and international security environment as a whole.**

This difference of analysis, perception and logic of action is also present and is structuring the way in which the states of the region relate to and act by relating to the evolutions of the security environment in the area. From this point of view, **the ex-Soviet space is singled out, being dominated, at least for this first decade, by the Russian Federation, by the discursive and logic of action promoted by this power of the region.** The main characteristics of this situation are: the conceiving of the security environment and the system of international relations in the classical terms of balance of forces and the prevalence of the military factor in structuring international relations; the emergence and perpetuation, through the interested intervention of the former colonial power as a peacekeeping force, of certain „frozen” conflict focuses; the measures undertaken by Moscow to delimit, structure and dominate an exclusive sphere of influence related to the ex-Soviet space; the use of ethnic-territorial configuration, as well as of certain economic factors (the configuration of the energy resources routes, the configuration of the energy-consumer economic structures inherited by the successor states, as well as their dependency on the imports from the Russian market for sustaining the infrastructure and economic production) for promoting the above highlighted interests; the structuring and development of competing poles of power within the space under discussion (we have in view here Ukraine in particular).

To this first group the ex-communist states are adjoined. During this period, they were experiencing a long and difficult process of transition aiming at establishing democratic political regimes and viable market economies. **Marked in a first phase by the dissolution of the security and economic structures that dominated the region** (the Warsaw Pact and CAER), blaming to the full the effects of the conflict situations in the proximity of their borders, as well as the costs of the transition, **these states would cross through a gradual transition process from a classical vision of conceiving their national and regional security to a modern one, completely connected to the way it is structured at the level of the international community.** The process aims at and thoroughly reflects the evolutions experienced by the current processes of political, social and economic reconstruction in these countries. Undertaking the option for European and Euro-Atlantic integration, the objectives and criteria that are to be achieved during the reform processes, which are imposed by this option, will play a key role in the future evolution of the region.

As a consequence of the existence of two visions on national security and its risk factors and of inherent developed action lines in the context of the relevant evolutions of the regional and international security environment, **we can emphasize at least three different dynamics concerning regional and sub-regional cooperation and collaboration initiatives in the field of security and behind.** Depending on the involvement of the international community in managing and resolving outbreaks of crisis in the region, which could be more or less active, the recorded developments are quasi-opposed.

On the one hand, in the Balkans, the immediate vicinity of conflicting developments and the direct impact on European and Euro-Atlantic security led to a direct involvement of NATO and the European Union in the management and resolution of successive crisis in the former Yugoslavia space. This process contributed also to a redefinition of the missions and goals of the security institutions in question, taking into account the new challenges to be met. Beginning in the years 1991-1992 the process is far from being completed. However it is obvious the impact of the direct and active intervention by the above mentioned international security institutions on the containment and resolving of the crises.

On the other hand, the state of affairs and developments are quite different for the conflicting situations in the ex-Soviet space, due to some considerations that cover a wide range of motivations from geographical distance separating the outbreak of the crisis by the European and Euro-Atlantic security space, to a desire not to displease Russia who has indicated this region as an area of interest since the beginning of the 90 ("close proximity"). Involving most of the time an active intervention of the Russian state in the conflict, the situations of crisis in this area have evolved in a manner different from those of the ex-Yugoslav space.

Logic actionable assisted in this case is a classic one that consists of the imposition of a cessation of the conflict and ensuring conditions for negotiating a political settlement by involving a peacekeeping force. The favorite institutional framework was that of the OSCE. This way a hybrid solution has been reached that perpetuated an abnormal state of things

favoring the “freezing” of conflict situations and blocking any way to resolve them.

Moreover, **the exclusive use of a peacekeeping force consisting of Russian (former Soviet) military units represented from a retrospective view a factor of imbalance and tension rather than one of disengagement**, given their perception as forces of occupation and as a factor maintaining the confrontational situations. Perpetuation of these cases had serious consequences on the regional and sub-regional security environment through the proliferation, associated with these outbreaks, of classic and non-conventional risk factors of different nature from smuggling and trafficking of all kinds to terrorism.

In parallel with these developments, as an expression of security deficit and the need to counter the security risks in the Greater Black Sea Area, **numerous initiatives for cooperation and collaboration have been developed in many fields at regional and sub-regional levels in the post-Cold war years.** If the regional ones such as the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) or BLACKSEAFOR had limited success, **the dynamics of cooperation initiatives at sub-regional level seems to be more important especially in the Balkan area.** Development of initiatives for cooperation in the political, military and security fields in the ex-Soviet space, other than those associated with the CIS (the structure of cooperation and collaboration imposed by Moscow in the ex-Soviet space in the early '90), as well as and the involvement of countries from this space in sub-regional cooperation initiatives outside the area in question are relatively slow and late. Maximum point of these efforts is the establishment and work (despite all the specific differences that can be invoked) of GUAM and the demarches for access to the Membership Action Plan by states such as Georgia and

Ukraine. Moscow's reaction and the recent Georgian crisis show to what extent such a development is contrary to the interests of the Russian state and to what extent this state is willing to defend what it considers to be its legitimate interests in the region.

Ladies and gentlemen,

At the end of this very short presentation trying to trace the major lines of evolution of the security environment circumscribed to the Greater Black Sea Area, as well as the related main points of interest, **a first finding concerns the importance in determining and structuring the developments in question brought by the visions on national and regional security of the states throughout the region.** The conceptual mechanism invoked and used when articulating the defense and national security policies has a direct impact on the states conduct in foreign policy actions and on ways and means of action they decide to use for meeting their security needs.

Another factor that determines the operation and structuring of the regional security environment is the variable dimension of the international community involvement in managing and resolving outbreaks of crisis in the region. Variable geometry of this involvement and their perpetuation in the region represent one of the determining factors in supporting and affirming of risk factors that are considered as exceeding of relevance in the international security environment and their interference with factors reaffirming their relevance at this level.

Given the different approaches (either overbid or under – operation), the way of structuring and functioning of the regional and sub-regional cooperation initiatives is another variable with a decisive role in structuring and functioning of the regional security environment.

The processes of European and Euro-Atlantic integration, the *European Neighborhood Policy* promoted by the European Union and the cooperative structures and the processes of institutional reform involved by the constituent frames of the *Partnership for Peace* (PfP) and the *Membership Action Plan* (MAP) are meant to be another factor with major impact on systemic stability and consistency of the regional security environment.

• **Maj-gen. (r) Mihail E. Ionescu - Chairman**

To present her paper, *“The Impact of the Russian Federation’s New Approach to Regional Policy in the Greater Black Sea Area”*, also connected as you have already imagined with the Georgian war last August, Simona Soare, junior researcher with the *Institute for Political Studies and Military History*.

Simona, you have the floor. Simona, by the way, is not only a member of my institute, but also she is the Executive Director of the *Centre of East-European and Asian Studies*, where is also Alexandru Coita of the new journal I mentioned earlier.

Please, Simona.

Simona Soare

Junior Researcher

**Institute for Political Studies of Defense and Military History
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The Impact of the Russian Federation's New Approach to Regional Policy In the Greater Black Sea Area

Thank you, general Ionescu.

*Ladies and gentlemen,
Distinguished guests,*

First of all, please allow me to welcome you all once again on the part of the organizers and wish a very successful conference!

I would like to start off by saying that the ideas and opinions pertaining to this presentation are entirely my own and they do not reflect in any way the Romanian government's policies or beliefs.

Also, this analysis is a sectorial one and aims at selectively exploring a series of variables and thus it should not be interpreted as a comprehensive one.

This having been said, please allow me to start by saying that **Russia has traditionally been seen as a threat to regional and national security by the majority of the states now comprising the Greater Black Sea Area** – and this is no coincidence. In fact, most of these states are minor powers

that have neither the capabilities nor the soft power necessary to confront Russian influence in the region. During the Cold War, most of them found themselves behind the Iron Curtain and this was a less than comfortable position – as events like 1956 or 1968 remind us. Even before the Cold War, the fate and security of these minor regional powers has been dependent upon their ability to attract the participation and interest of other continental major powers in this particular area: France, Germany, Austria-Hungary and Great Britain.

In the aftermath of the Cold War, the situation seemed to rewind to the pre-World War II era, but Russia's nearly chronic weakness, political, economic and military, as well as its withdrawal from high politics at the systemic level lead to a decrease in its perception as a regional threat.

Nowadays, though, Russia is increasingly seen as an authoritarian, unpredictable and highly aggressive great power. This has lead to a comeback of regional fears concerning Russian regional behavior particularly after the war in Georgia in August 2008. There are three main reasons why Russia is perceived as an aggressor rather than a regional partner by most states in the Greater Black Sea Area:

a. First, Russia has a historical tradition of authoritarian rule that has been consolidated by the fact that it needed to keep effective political control over a huge portion of territory stretching on two continents as well as a large diversity of ethic and religious populations; Russia's "rolling back of democracy", however, in the process of creating a truly "sovereign democracy" is increasingly seen as a regional threat

by the new democracies now pertaining to NATO and the European Union, those seeking membership in these organizations or those that one way or another cooperate with them – through the Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) or the European Neighborhood Political Instrument (ENPI);

b. Secondly, **Russia has and still does perceive itself as a great power – seeking a seat at the table of a *condominium* of systemic great powers and seeking to have its sphere of influence over the former Soviet republics thus reconfirmed internationally.** This is highly threatening because as Russia reaffirms its status of great power, not only is it likely to seek to **delimitate an exclusive sphere of influence**, but its regional behavior is increasingly more aggressive and its political stance more confrontational; last but not least, Russia has proven quite able to use asymmetrical political weapons – such as its massive energy resources – as a primary political resource in reasserting its great power status. All in all, **Russia has become increasingly unpredictable and aggressive in regional and international politics.**

c. Thirdly, **Russia has a historical tendency of using military means as a way of countering security issues.** Progressively Russia disengaged from major international regimes which affect its regional behavior and constitute the focus of major worry for most regional states. Of course, this is the case with the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE) which Russia left in December 2007 (presumably for only 1 year) – leaving room for speculation that the war in Georgia was in fact a planned Russian aggression. This is particularly problematic because of the existence of other several frozen conflicts in the region –

which makes everyone wonder whether Russia will be able or willing to restrain from further military action elsewhere;

Determining whether Russia continues to be a threat to regional security is in fact a function of the current regional security environment whose main features are:

a. **Divided between the democracies members of the European Union and NATO – emphasizing democracy, cooperation, the rule of law, opened market economy, human rights, etc; and the former soviet republics – new democracies either aspiring to become members of the European Union and NATO or cooperating with the latter in different formats such as the ENPI or the IPAP;** Russia is seen as a threat to the political security of these new regimes given its historical tendency to prefer Russian-oriented and friendly regimes in the states within its *“near abroad”*;

b. **Going through a double transition: a systemic power transition (from unipolarism to emerging multipolarism) and a regional-level transition (from unbalanced to a more balanced multipolarism);**

c. **Though dominated by non-conventional, asymmetrical security issues, the security environment is plagued with fears of the re-emergence of regional conventional military confrontations fueled by Russia’s seemingly reckless series of threats to use military force against both regional states (Georgia, Ukraine) and external states (Poland and the Czech Republic);**

d. Despite Russia having drawn a line to as far as it will tolerate American and NATO presence in its own backyard, **the European Union and NATO have been resilient to draw their own line as to how far they will tolerate Russian aggression.** Rather, the new Obama administration is likely to adopt a more conciliatory policy towards Russia, whereas the European allies (Germany and France in particular) are interested in attracting Russia into a community of rules and effective multilateralism (that is increasingly criticized as effective appeasement);

Turning now to the Russian foreign policy in the Greater Black Sea Area, I should like to mention a few of the main characteristics of it as well as its implementation:

1. First of all, **this is no comprehensive, coherent policy; rather, we are speaking of different foreign policy positions towards different sub-systems within the Greater Black Sea Area** (which the Russian Federation itself does not recognize as an independent security region):

a. **there is a very clear foreign policy of the Russian Federation towards its most inner circle of neighbors, the “near abroad”, or the CSI countries;** but even between these, there are three main categories of states:

1. Ukraine – which is largely considered to be a geopolitical milestone for Russian security;
2. The Republic of Moldova;
3. The South Caucasus states – which continue to be seen as a Russian sphere of influence that needs to be preserved (mainly in an authoritarian manner that inspires fear in them);

b. there is a very clear foreign policy of Russia towards Turkey, which is largely seen as a *partner* in the Black Sea Area due to the conservative nature of the position they are presumed to share on the Montreaux Convention (1936) as well as the presence of other third party troops in the region;

c. there is no clearly delimited foreign policy (at least at the bilateral level) towards the countries in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe now part of the European Union and NATO: Romania and Bulgaria (and indeed much of central and Eastern Europe, too). In fact, the Russian policy towards these countries is actually mediated on the bilateral level by Russian relations with continental powers like Germany, France and Italy. Though the idea of developing a bilateral basis for foreign policy towards these countries was entertained by Moscow in 2008, the Kremlin remains apprehensive in its relations with these states which it finds to suffer from Russo-phobia (and this severely limits the extent of any type of positive feedback that a clear foreign policy effort towards them would entail).

2. Russian foreign policy is very goal-oriented at present – and its main aim is international recognition of the Russian Federation as “*one of the influential centers in the modern world*”, accounting for “*strong positions of authority in the world community*” that are consistent with the “*increased role of the country in international affairs, its greater responsibility for global developments and related possibilities to participate in the implementation of the international agenda, as well as in its development*” (Russia’s 2000 Foreign Policy Concept); hence, **the Russian foreign policy is perceived and implemented in a classical, pre-World War I type of tradition based on a**

very Euro-centric idea of a *condominium of powers* that share responsibility and say in world affairs.

To a certain extent, this is both a blessing and a curse:

- On the one hand, this is possibly beneficial, because as actors in the Greater Black Sea Area, **NATO and the European Union could balance more effectively Russian influence and aggression in the region;**

- On the other hand, though, **both NATO and the European Union have very different strategic priorities at present:** for the European Union, the *Eastern Dimension* is not a strategic priority in terms of foreign direct investment (FDI), in terms of political and strategic commitment (the Mediterranean is and it is likely to remain so for the foreseeable future – especially with French, Italian, Spanish and German backing; also expansion in the Western Balkans is favored over that in the East; the Swedish-Polish *Eastern Partnership* will probably be implemented in 2009, and to a certain extent will balance the European foreign policy, but it is not likely to become a strategic priority); for NATO, there is a tendency to think in terms of “*priorities*” and not the need to “*satisfy everybody*”. Hence, while the Eastern dimension would appear to be a priority, with the Alliance’s eastward expansion, it is not a clear strategic priority as are for instance the redefinition of the Alliance’s *Strategic Concept* and the completion of its expansion in the Western Balkans. Even if there is a strong interest in NATO in the eastward expansion, it is so on a selective basis;

3. Having itself become convinced of its own “*strengthening*”, Russia can nowadays aspire to a more independent foreign

policy – as opposed to the 1990s when due to its domestic weakness and its dependence upon Western help and assistance its foreign policy could not afford to be at odds with the priorities of its main donors: Europe and the US; however, **Russia has constantly confused size with greatness in the aftermath the Cold War and largely managed to develop a complex of inferiority and humiliation which acts as an *escalating factor* in exacerbating Russian reactions to strategic developments in its neighborhood** (case in point: regional frozen conflicts, fierce opposition to any eastern NATO enlargement, etc). Moreover, the **Russian political elite** (the Putin administration) **has created large expectations of power, world authority and legitimacy, as well as the responsibilities of great power while fundamentally lacking the resources to drive this effort!** This is indeed a paradox that Russia has created all these expectations of being a great power while itself struggling to maintain this status;

4. **Russian foreign policy in the Greater Black Sea Area is increasingly using “*hard power*” instruments as a means to complement and boost Russian “*soft power*” in the region** – but also as a means of regional balancing of the United States;

5. **Russian newly acquired identity as an “*energy superpower*” is dependent upon Moscow’s ability to reassert and maintain its sphere of influence in the South Caucasus and Central Asia**, because this is where most of the oil and gas for its foreign exports come; moreover, the South Caucasus is strategically important for Russia because it represents a strategic front in defending Russian security and territorial integrity;

Therefore, one can expect in the short-term that:

- **The Russian foreign policy in the region will mostly be affected in terms of the FDI that pours from Russia into regional states** (this includes lower prices offered by Russian companies for the purchase/building of strategic energy infrastructure, exploitation rights, etc). Since in states like Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Armenia or even Romania there is a large number of Russian companies on the market, there is a strong possibility that these states will feel the recession in Russian FDI;

- With the sharp decrease in oil prices, **it is likely that Russian policy towards the European Union will become more relaxed** as a consequence of Russian need to sell its gas;

- The latter is likely to lead to stronger oppositions with the European Union, between Western and Eastern members of the Union and a stronger pressure for the development of a common foreign policy position towards Russia;

One of the most important aspects of discussing Russian foreign policy in the Greater Black Sea Area is the **military factor**.

- Russian foreign policy during the Cold War period used the military as the main instrument of its foreign policy and as the basis of its status as systemic superpower;

- In the post-Cold War era, however, Russia's military weakness became more than apparent. Its poorly-trained Army inherited from the former USSR was too large and unfitted for the new

security risks and threats that post-Soviet Russia had to face. Moreover, its scattering across Russia reflected not the Kremlin's strategic interests, vulnerabilities and threats, but the necessity to keep the huge military apparatus alive. Moreover, with the drastic cuts of the federal budget, the military was under-funded, under-supplied and under-trained;

- Since 2000, though, and with the Putin administration's determination to re-instate Russia as a systemic great power, Russian military power has been increasingly the topic of speculation:

- a. on the one hand, speculations had it that with all the oil money pouring into Russia, the Kremlin would finance its military instrument and bring it up to the standards of the 21st century military great power; increasingly this seemed not to be the case since 2002. **Russian defense budgets have been rising steadily since 2000 (as was the country's economy), but this failed to reflect in increased military effectiveness and power projection capabilities of the Russian Army;**

- b. on the other hand, most military analysts, particularly in the West, tended to interpret the Russian military as a virtually useless, obsolete and aging instrument. They stressed the fact that **Russia had very limited power projection capabilities and aside from the nuclear arsenal – which it itself was aging – was very weak conventionally.** Thus, most of them argued in favor of a tougher stance of other great powers in relation to the Russian Federation – which has helped fuel a sense of shame and humiliation in both Russian public opinion and political leadership.

- Nowadays, it is largely recognized that **Russia is indeed a regional military power**. But in particular in the aftermath of the War in Georgia, the Russian leadership itself recognized the problems that still impact upon the Russian military capabilities. In its post-war speech, **president Medvedev committed to a 30 percent increase in the defense budget for the 2008-2011 period, starting this very year**. Obviously, with the massive economic recession determined by the world financial crisis, this is not a realistic expectation from the Federal Budget which has been loosing approximately 60 billion USD daily with the decrease in the price of energy commodities to less than half the amount of May 2008. **But the re-instatement of Russia's military power on a systemic level will continue to drive policy-making in the Kremlin in the mid-term** and the extent to which Russia will be successful in its attempt will impact heavily on Russia's engagement with and commitment towards international and/or regional cooperative mechanisms.

- The poor conditions in the military, together with the poor paycheck drove many young Russians to choose other carrier paths. **In its attempt to switch to a professional army, Russia is facing a growing demographic deficit which is unprepared to tackle to this very day**. The situation regarding the quality of training and education of the Russian soldiers has improved slightly over the past few years, but this will continue to be a major concern for Russian armed forces in the near future as well.

- Secondly, **some 73 percent of the Russian military equipment is old, requires extensive personnel for its**

maintenance and is extremely expensive in terms of fuel. This makes the Russian army a relatively sluggish force – in opposition to the Western forces that emphasize expeditionary, highly mobile and flexible troops. The Georgian conflict shows as many mistakes as it does successes on the side of the Russian army – starting with the their net losses in the battles and ending with the huge costs of the entire operation (that runs into a couple hundred millions dollars for nearly 2 months of military campaign).

- **Thirdly, with Russia's self-perception of "strengthening" also came the acknowledgement that a truly effective military reform** (and indeed a comprehensive security sector reform) **was needed**; the Kremlin, both under president Putin and president Medvedev committed large amounts of money to this endeavor. But with Russia being struck so hard by the world financial crisis, there is a very good possibility that **this will reflect in further delay of the needed reform, hence leading to another possibly 5-year gap in Russian military development**;

- **The huge costs associated with the war in Georgia will drive Kremlin to think twice about its potential decisions to use military force in the region in the context of the current international financial-economic crisis**; the high costs of the deployable Russian troops are likely to **act as a restrainer of Russian hard power actions in the region in the short-term**;

- **Perhaps one of the most significant aspects of the impact of the world financial-economic crisis on the Russian economy is its influence on the military complex**

which finds itself in a poor shape, chronically lacking hi-tech production lines and R&D facilities; moreover, most companies in the complex have been reunited in state-owned corporations aiming at controlling their activity, their revenues and rewarding obedient political clients. Investments developing the military complex's technological infrastructure are frail and largely dependent upon foreign contracts; with the slowing down of activity in the military sector (both domestic and foreign), it is likely that these companies will follow what has been dimmed a dangerous trend for Russian military independence: switching to civilian production!

- **This may not lead all in all to a decrease in Russia's confrontational posture or its coercive regional stance;** rather, a renewed perception of weakness, combined with a perception of a sense of exploitation by other powers of its vulnerable position will trigger an increase in Russian regional aggression as well as a rapid escalation of any potential conflict (which is seen as fueled by outside, rival powers);

- **Regional hotspots such as frozen conflicts or regime disagreements will continue to be the object of Russian foreign policy speculation as a means of reconfirming a regional dominant status,** but this will happen to a lesser extent during a time when Russia needs FDI more than ever to keep on track with economic development. Policies that risk alienating European partners will be avoided or pursued with low intensity – such as to confirm, but not reinforce the European Union continental powers' perception of Russia as a *“difficult, yet necessary partner”*.

Conclusions

1. Russian foreign policy at the bilateral level is likely to be remain mainly absent in the coming years as it has been so far – particularly while Russia attempts to get the other great powers to recognize it as a fellow great power;

2. Russia's foreign policy towards the Greater Black Sea Area will continue to be a coercive one, though it will increasingly tend to rely on military power as partner enhancer as its economic weakness accentuates; it is actually a matter of how the European partners manage to attract Russia into an effective partnership that will shape Russian policy towards the region – to the extent that the European Union will continue to see the Greater Black Sea Area as a “*second-rank priority*”, Russia will feel much freer in implementing coercive diplomacy upon regional states;

3. Russian security will increasingly be perceived as a function of its nuclear arsenal being used in actual effective deterrence or in the threat of the rapid escalation of any conflict to the nuclear stage;

4. NATO's eastward expansion during this time of crisis is likely to be perceived by Moscow as an exploitation of its weakness and thus exacerbate its aggressiveness in the region – for which region the allies should be prepared to both counter and prevent this renewed aggression;

Ladies and gentlemen,

Thank you for your attention and if you have any questions I would be more than happy to answer them!

Major General (ret) Mihail E. Ionescu, Ph.D.

Director

**Institute for Political Studies of Defense and Military History
Bucharest, Romania**

The Regional Security Environment in the Aftermath of the Russian-Georgian Conflict

Ladies and gentlemen,

Dear guests,

As you know, the first issue regards the fact that the Georgian war is the first frozen conflict in the Greater Black Sea Area which had been unfrozen recently by violent means. There are some questions raised here – who had the initiative, which has been tackled by Nika and Hari; whether Russia has been aware of the fact that this war would have global and regional implications and my answer is “yes”; and what kind of international answer had been to the Russian actions by the European Union, NATO, the United States of America and other powers, including the Asian powers (because we have witnessed also an interest by Japan and China to the events in this region).

Also we have discussed about some peculiar traits or features of the Georgian crisis, why Russia had selected August 2008 for this war, prior to the negotiations of the strategic partnership with the European Union, during the French presidency of the union, during the Olympic Games, and so on and so forth. We have also discussed what arguments Russia raised in its own defense.

The third issue concerns the global implications of the Georgian war which has been also touched upon here. Russia, as a matter of fact, had connected these events here, in the region, without the development with the missile shield in Poland and Czech Republic, with the Conventional Forces Treaty in Europe (CFE), and also to the Helsinki Act, which, as a matter of fact, is about the situation of borders in the region. **And the recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia has proved that Russia has become a kind of revolutionary power in Europe and on the international scene. Russia is no longer an adept of the status-quo in the world, after Georgia's war.**

Also, another conclusion is about the evolutions in the Great Black Sea Area, and I have listed some.

And also the last one, and now I am ending up my presentation, there are some preliminary conclusions, namely that **we are in a different new political and strategic situation in the Greater Black Sea Area, in comparison with the period prior to Georgia's war.** So, we are confronted, and here I am close to what professor Malița said, **we are confronted now and we will be confronted on the short term with a fluid and unpredictable evolution here, in the region.** Russia had proved it is decided to stop further NATO enlargement in the area and we are facing a short period of turmoil, as professor Malița said, in which both Russia and the West will have to decide on which track they would be engaged: confrontation or cooperation?

There are different signs of it and in September 2008, after the war in August, this financial, global, financial

crisis, and global economic recession intervened which greatly affects the Greater Black Sea Area in terms of military power needed in order to confront different contingencies during this period of time. That is why professor Malița said that it is necessary to revive the disarmament approach. For sure, this is very important, because **otherwise a kind of security dilemma would develop in the region**, a security dilemma which would apply to every actor in the region.

But anyway, due to the fact that the European Union is a physical presence now in the Greater Black Sea Area, using civil monitors, for sure, in the Caucasus area, and due to the fact that we have already witnessed the use of hard power in the region, **the European Union is called to strengthen the *European Security and Defense Policy* (ESDP), namely its military branch, in order to be a real actor in this region.** And I mean being a real international actor, **because having civilian envoys and monitors is not sufficient for applying a real mediating role in the region.**

Thank you for your attention!

Questions and answers

• Maj-gen. (r) Mihail E. Ionescu – Chairman

This is all I will say and now I am calling you to raise questions and comments to whatever has been said here. You have the floor.

Who would like to take the floor first?

We have another 15 minutes of questions and answers. Colonel Repciuc, please introduce yourself in the beginning.

• **Col. Teodor Repciuc, *General Directorate for Defense Intelligence***

Thank you very much.

I am Colonel Teodor Repciuc. I worked here for 20 years, in the *Institute for Political Studies of Defense and Military History* and after that I fulfilled my job as defense attaché in Denmark, Finland and Sweden and now I am working at the *General Directorate for Defense Intelligence*, heading a structure dealing with security studies.

I am very curious, of course, which could be the most important steps to be made by the international community, by Russia or by Georgia, in order to normalize the social life in Georgia, in order to normalize the security situation in the Caucasus area. And I think this could be not a direct question to Mr. Chitadze or to other persons, this could be a rhetorical question.

Thank you very much.

• **Maj-gen. (r) Mihail E. Ionescu – Chairman**

Please, dear guests and panelists,

We will collect questions and after that the panelists would answer and they would make comments and so on. Comments, if you would like.

Please, general Orzeață.

• **Lt-gen. Mihail Orzeață – *Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Romanian Armed Forces***

I have some questions, but I am not happy because Simona Soare is not here, because I wanted to ask her. Because I think some of the assumptions she made need to be proved. For

instance, she said sometimes that Russia is just a regional power and is very important to me to know what are the criteria based on which she drew this conclusion.

Anyway, the most important thing I want to say is that I, as a military person, I can tell you that we, the military, know better than the majority of the civilians what is the difference between using power, hard power, let us say, and using soft power. And I am in favor of using soft power and I think this time will come.

I was happy to say that this is more a dream, but I am sure it will be soon our time. And why is that? Because on many occasions politicians and decision makers decide to send the military to solve some of the problems which are not for the military to solve. Because we are there to fight, not to solve problems such as economic, social and some others, which are practically the majority of the causes for some conflicts today.

But anyway, it is easy to send the military, because we are ready to do anything we must, follow orders and, of course, sometimes, we need to be punished because we followed orders. Anyway, this is just a comment, which is not very important.

But again, about some of the conclusions made here... Simona, if you are kind to tell me. Do you know what is the GDP of Russia right now? And do you know what is the rank of this GDP in the world? Considering the others. And also, how can you prove that Russia has no military power better than being a regional power? How do you compare Russia with the others? I am not a fan of Russia, but I think it is not wise to go for extremes. Because right now Russia is somehow down, but if you recall, if you read the speech of, well one of the last speeches of Putin as president, he said that they are not in favor of using military force in international relations. They are going to go for economic reasons, but, of course, they are going to protect their interest.

As many others do, because this is normal for any country. So, why do you consider Russia like a potential enemy? Because, this is my feeling after your presentation. Thank you very much.

Thank you very much.

• **Maj-gen. (r) Mihail E. Ionescu – Chairman**

Thank you, general Orzeată.

Stanislav Secrieru, representing the *Center for East European and Asian Studies*, is next.

Please, Stanislav.

• **Stanislav Secrieru – *Center for East-European and Asian Studies***

Actually, I would like to continue the topic which has been opened on the Russian military power and actually I would like to comment and ask my colleague, Simona, some questions.

First, I would disagree that the Russian military performed badly in the Georgian war, because in comparison with the latest offensive, the major offensive in Chechnya, the Russian Army performed much better this time and by this I mean they proved at least capabilities. And I am referring here to deploying very fast Ivanova and Scop vision. I am not referring to 58 ANI, which actually was close to submersion Bora. Rather, I am referring here to the fact that the Russians seemed to have no problems with logistics and ammunition, as it happened in Chechnya. Of course, they lost between 5-8 aircrafts, which is not permissible. But over all, the performance was much better in comparison with Chechnya.

I would disagree that Russia soft power is in decline, at least in the former Soviet space. Because if you look, for example, to poles in Ukraine after the war half of the population thinks that

Georgia is to blame and half of the population thinks that Russia is to blame. And if you look at Putin's ratings in Ukraine or Moldova, it is much higher than those of President Voronin and President Iușcenko. And, of course, I should have mentioned here all the mass-media, Russian mass-media penetration and how they contribute to opinion formation in this republics and all the Russian foundations which contribute to this situation.

In the case of Russian military capabilities and all the stuff about budget, now I do not think it is really a problem of money. It is a problem of how you manage this money. For example, Russia's Defense Minister recognized that the biggest problem now is the mismanagement of money. So, it is not a problem of money, but how you deal with this, all these flows and how you manage to spend it efficiently in order to get the ammunition or equipment you need.

Second reason why it is not a problem of money is that it is a problem of human resources in the Russian military industry. For example, the medium age of people declared in this industry is around 60 and no new generation is coming after this one.

And the last point is about competition and cooperation between Russia and the West. I think it is not black or white. It is not competition or cooperation. I think we have to deal with both of them in the next 20 years, at least. I think the West needs a new strategy, which will adapt to these new conditions, because the problem is that we cannot compete under Russian rules of realpolitik and the West will not impose its own rules in the former Soviet space.

Thank you.

• **Maj-gen. (r) Mihail Ionescu – Chairman**

Detlef, please introduce yourself, because you know better.

• **Detlef Puhl – *French Ministry of Defense, France***

I will have the opportunity, later on, to do that more extensively. I am of German nationality and I am working for the French Ministry of Defense and I have been engaged in some Black Sea Area issues for quite a while.

I just wanted to start my intervention with a reflection on what I have been hearing this morning and I am intrigued by the many descriptions of this conflict between Georgia and Russia. Of course, this has changed many of the assumptions that we had just a few years ago and I wonder whether, when talking about these frozen conflicts, we should not think back at the time of the Cold War. Is frozen conflict not something like the Cold War? And thinking in these terms, should we not come back to some of the strategies and philosophies that we had applied during the Cold War? And I think we, as the West, if I may say so, successfully applied them during the Cold War – namely, confidence building, disarmament or armaments regulations, cooperation with Russia, etc. Even a Russia that we think is not behaving in the way which we wish it to behave, we still have to cooperate with it. Faster and quicker than we thought, I believe, the question of what will our relation with Russia be, is of utmost importance for all of us - for NATO, for the European Union, for each of our nations. And maybe at the time that we thought that we have won over them, that everything is finished, that we are the victors and that the Yeltsin period is, you know, over, that we are on our way to great and eternal punishment. Maybe that was too short an interphase of our relationship.

I am not advocating any situation which we would gain by considering the Russians to be adversaries or enemies. Far from that! But should we not think of our strengths as soft powers, that we have been building up during the time of the Cold War,

or the backup of hard power, though emphasizing our soft power as the convincing argument? And should that not be some of the issues that we should pursue more than trying to figure out what we can do to leverage our military hard power? Maybe we have, as the West, put too much emphasis on hard power issues the last 10 years, as well.

So, these are all kinds of things that go through my mind when I listen to these presentations and to the assumptions that are being made in this area. And when we start thinking about the future of cooperation in the Greater Black Sea Area, I think we might take a look back and see what has worked and what might be applicable to the future, as well.

• **Maj-gen. (r) Mihail Ionescu – Chairman**

We have mentioned here some magic words: the Cold War and we have discussed this summer a lot about it. We, I mean the international press had discussed about and the politicians about the revival, about a new Cold War. You have mentioned confidence building, you have mentioned disarmament process, and you have mentioned some magic words. Cooperation is really important. Now, we have two questions. We, the audience have two questions for Simona. Firstly, why you are considering Russia as a regional power and secondly why you are considering the money being everything in terms of military power?

• **Simona Soare – *Institute for Political Studies of Defense and Military History***

Well, first of all, thank you for the interesting questions. I would like to answer first of all to general Orzeață. The main reason why I think Russia is a regional power is that it doesn't have sufficient global power projection capabilities. Prime Minister Putin says "we are putting back the strategic patrols".

But the strategic bombers they are sending on these patrols don't carry armed nuclear weapons – as they used to during the Cold War. So, this works more like a symbol of the power projection capabilities that the former USSR used to have not necessarily as a credible deterrent for today's capabilities. Moreover, the Russian blue sea fleet is descript in all honesty whereas new naval platforms are incomplete or yet unoperable.

Detlef Puhl mentioned here the Cold War and how effective we were on pursuing policies with Russia. I completely agree with his point of view, that we need to emphasize less hard power and focus more on soft power. However, I just don't find his point in disagreement with my own. Effective use of soft power relies on a very good mechanism of threat assessment. It also relies on knowing exactly what or who generates threats to national or regional security and acting on it to prevent or counter them according to a well-mapped out strategy. The two, soft and hard power aren't incompatible. They work best when used in concert. Acknowledging Russia as a threat doesn't necessarily equate conflict with Russia. But it gives us the advantage of cloosung a mixt of policies towards Russia.

As for Russia's GDP, it ranked seventh in 2006. And I think it has been rising to sixth place in the world now [2008]. But the problem isn't how high it ranks, but how sustainable is it? Sure, we can trip on numbers, but power – all the more so soft power – is not about net numbers. It's about how to use your power resources – whatever they may be – to make it sustainable in the mid- and long-term. We have seen the Russian Federation going through 5-6-7 percent annual increase of their GDP since 2000. But so has the price of oil and gas and armament. Is it sustainable this GDP annual increase if we calculate Russian GDP based on half the price of oil and gas as some international analysts predict will happen later on in 2009? We should be

asking ourselves this question and we should take into consideration what this potential for instability in Russia does to our use of soft power beyond anything else.

Besides, take into consideration that Russia has not attracted much FDI into the development of the energy sector which continues to be highly underdeveloped. Somebody was quoting earlier the *Global Trends 2025* report. This is one of the issues that the Americans are putting on the table as well. They say Russia's power may increase in the mid-to long-term, but that Moscow will continue to depend on the rise of commodity prices, particularly on the rise of gas and oil prices. So, while looking at numbers alone helps, it is rather simplistic and incomplete source of information for the decision - making process.

Now about Stanislav's question. I agree with Stanislav. I agree that money is not everything, but the issue here was not whether money is the issue, but how well spent are they. In this sense, my conclusion is no different than what he has argued. Mismanagement of funds is a huge problem in Russia's security sector. Well, this is an internal problem of the Russian Federation, if you'd like, that it has high corruption in the defense sector, or that the presidential administration thinks they need to give some sorts of, you know, benefits to the people that came into power, to keep themselves where there are. This is their problem! Or so it would appear. In fact, it is our problem as well, because with the lack of transparency of Russia's government, in this era of uncertainty there just is very little way of knowing what Moscow's intentions are and how internal phenomena will spill over into neighboring states in the Greater Black Sea Area. The fact that they have such a high level of corruption in the defense sector is a vulnerability, which they should be assessing and managing much better than they are.

As an observer it is my problem to observe, not to tell them "you have a problem and, you know, you should be spending money so much more effectively, because you are not being efficient at all." The fact that they are not efficient in terms of security spending reflects badly on their limited power capabilities.

At the same time though, I would like to emphasize that a Russia with limited capabilities and high domestic vulnerabilities is no less of a security risk and threat to the Greater Black Sea Area than a very strong and assertive Russia. Mr. Puhl said earlier we have to cooperate with Russia whether we agree with its behavior or not. Granted, that is true. We, the states in the region, and Europe and NATO in fact, cannot afford a weak, unstable, corruption-driven Russia. We cannot afford a half-failed Russian Federation in our midst. We should recognize this and also acknowledge that recognizing this threat does not mean necessarily a conflicting relationship with Russia. Rather it could better help us focus on the resources we should employ in getting Russia to abide by international rules and norms and behave both predictably and responsibly in the region and beyond. It will essentially help us be innovative in our mix of policies to Russia so as to allow for high efficiency as well as a flexible foreign and security policy. We cannot have a partner in Russia if Moscow is managing a half-failed state!

Thank you very much!

• **Maj-gen. (r) Mihail Ionescu – Chairman**

Thank you, Simona.

It seems to me that Nika wants to add something. But one minute, Nika, please. Sorry. Because it is another magic word. Coffee!

• **Nika Chitadze – *International and Security Research Center, Georgia***

Thank you.

With regard to how the problem and new security environment in the Greater Black Sea Area should be made. First of all, in my point of view, it is necessary, of course, the establishment of a new security environment inside of Georgia, for avoiding in the future the war with the Russian Federation, because Russia could not implement its final goal, to occupy the whole territory of Georgia.

In this regard, in my point of view, what is necessary is the involvement of a peacekeeping operation, perhaps the European Union's Rapid Reaction Force. Because the European Union started this in 2005, to implement its peacekeeping operation in Bosnia, in Macedonia. Because today there are new monitors on the territory of Georgia, who have no right to use military, weapons, etc. But in my point of view, these international forces first of all are there to protect the people, the infrastructure inside of Georgia.

Secondly, with regard to how the conflict inside of Georgia should be solved, in my point of view the process should be developed like the so-called Cyprus scenario: that Georgia should be developed economically, develop democratic institutions, somehow to satisfy the standards of the European Union and in this regard, maybe Georgia will become attractive for the separatist regions, for the inhabitants of separatist regions, South Ossetia and Abkhazia. We know, in the case of Cyprus, for example, during the referendum which was held in 2004, that about 70 percent of the population from the Turkish part, the separatist region of Cyprus, supported the idea of the reunification of Cyprus.

Thirdly, it is very important to join NATO, for both Georgia and Ukraine. And also, one of the most important issues is the successful implementation of the economic and energy projects in the Greater Black Sea Area, such as Nabucco, for example. And also, it is very important to develop trade relations between the Black Sea states.

And one of the important factors in my point of view is also weakening of Russia. Because, for example, what was the cause of the victory of the Western democratic society and the West in general, in the Cold War? It was the weakening of the USSR, the Soviet Russia at the end of 80s, when the price of oil decreased. Russia was forced to sign an agreement with the United States at that time. So, weakening Russia is one of the most important issues.

The GDP of Russia, as I know, is one, previously calculated in American dollars, in 2000, was \$200 billion. But after the rise of its GDP by 7 percent per year, it is now approximately of \$1 trillion. But at the same time, we should take into consideration that it is 13 times smaller than the American GDP. \$13 trillion is the GDP of the United States of America.

I hope, if a new war emerges, that Russia will lose.
Thanks.

• **Maj-gen. (r) Mihail Ionescu – Chairman**
General Degeratu has a question.

• **Lt-gen. Constantin Degeratu – *Presidential Administration, Romania***

It is a question, not a rhetorical one, for sure, for my friend, for our debates. If last year, when Mr. Putin, then president of

Russia, said that Russia will point their missile against the countries which are accepting military bases on their territory, or missile shield on their territory, we called this diplomatically the return to the Cold War rhetoric. This year, after the Russian aggression in Georgia, NATO decided its policy toward Russia. No business, as usual, yes? Business as usual was partnership. If it is not business as usual, it is no partnership, yes? If it is no partnership, we will try to call cooperation, if this cooperation looks like the Cold War? Confrontation we do not like! What kind of relation we can have with Russia? No business as usual, no partnership, no confrontation, no cooperation! This is the question for discussion.

• **Maj-gen. (r) Mihail Ionescu – Chairman**

Thank you very much for your comments and questions. This is all we have time for now.

PANEL 2

Regional Institutional Security Architecture in the Greater Black Sea Region

- **Detlef Puhl, Ph.D.** (French Ministry of Defense, France) – **Chairman**

Ladies and gentlemen,

My name is Detlef Puhl. I work with the French Ministry of Defense. This is a little bit of a function that I have and it is probably not for this reason that general Ionescu has invited me to come to this conference, but because we have been together in the engagement on the *Greater Black Sea Area Working Group* at the *Partnership for Peace Consortium of Military Academies and Security Institutes*. I think that maybe it is in this quality that he has invited me to come and later on speak to you. Now I have the great pleasure of presiding over this session, which is probably the most difficult one, because it is before lunch that we have to kind of figure out how we squeeze all these into one and a half hours and I have four people on my list, who are asked to present something to you and I just will not lose very much time before giving the floor to general Teodor Frunzeti, PhD. I have not seen him, but I understand he has sent somebody instead to give us a presentation. Please, you have the floor.

General Teodor Frunzeti, Ph.D.

Chief of Land Forces Staff

Bucharest, Romania

**The Strategic Value of the Wider Black Sea Area
within the European Architecture**

*Ladies and gentlemen,
Distinguished guests,*

I am lieutenant-colonel Banu. I am here representing General Frunzeti. I am honored to be here.

First of all, I want to present General Frunzeti's apologies because he could not attend this meeting due to a change in his agenda for this day. I had to present three issues. However, I want to refer only to the second and third issues, namely the course of action to promote security, stability and peace in the Greater Black Sea Area and the military dimension of the security process within the Greater Black Sea Area from the perspective of general Frunzeti's ideas.

So, as a border state of the European Union, and as a member of NATO in this region, **Romania has a major interest in having neighbors who are stable, democratic and thriving states, because only these are capable of maintaining peace and good understanding among them, of creating priorities to regional communities, of having a predictable behavior in the field of security, of building a climate of security, stability and security in the Greater Black Sea**

Area which represents a distinct course of action of this strategy. And Romania wishes to become a *dynamic vector of democracy, security, stability and economical prosperity* in the Greater Black Sea Area.

Subordinated to this interest, the strategic objective of our country is determined by the special importance of the vicinity with Europe, the Middle East and Central Asia, **the geopolitical region of the Black Sea being an area of significant transit of energetic resources.** Far from being considered just a buffer area, the Greater Black Sea Area has a strategic importance, situated on the corridor that connects the Euro-Atlantic community to the Middle East, the Caspian region and Central Asia. **From the energy point of view, the Black Sea Area is the main transit area of the rather important resource for the energy that Europe uses.**

From the security challenges point of view, the region is a mirror of the global new risks and threats, as well as a dangerous fire range, where they can be tested. Characterized by an important *democratic deficit* and *inability of the sovereign states to fully exercise their attributions*, **the Black Sea region is the richest part of Europe, probably one of the densest on Earth in separatist conflicts and tense circumstances.** The border criminal activity, taking place both on land and sea, being connected to the international terrorism group, supported by separatist regime, and the illegal presence of foreign troops on the territory of the new democracy, is a reality in the region that has to be faced. **Fighting against these risks and threats is the primary responsibility of the states located in the vicinity of the Black Sea. They**

must be, first of all, aware of the existence of these hazards and try to develop internal, external security policy, able to neutralize the negative phenomena within their own borders, and withhold from supporting them in any way. **The countries in the vicinity of the Black Sea need to cooperate in an active and efficient way to promote actions, meant to increase the level of trust in the region, to act in good faith and fulfill their obligation of decreasing or reducing the number of conventional weapons and to withdraw the military forces which are stationed illegally on the territory of the other states.**

According to this point of view, it becomes necessary to **activity promote a European and Euro-Atlantic strategy for the Black Sea region.** Explaining your responsibilities in stabilizing and reconstructing the region, consolidating the present and increasing the contribution of both the North Atlantic Alliance and the Partnership for Peace program in what concerns democracy, peace and security support, as well as the presence of civil American operation capacity in the region, represent factors capable of contributing to the establishment of a strategy of this type.

In this context, Romania has the following priorities:

- Harmonizing and improving the ongoing institutional cooperation processes;
- Preventing the hegemony competition or temptation;
- Establishing a new dialogue in cooperation framework, in which all the interested democratic states and organizations should take part.

In order to promote these initiatives, Romania has to fully cooperate with the countries located in the vicinity of the Black Sea – Bulgaria and Georgia, the Russian Federation, Turkey and Ukraine – with neighbor states, as well as with several states that are part of the Euro-Atlantic community. Simultaneously, **Romania has to actively support the process of building in this area a Euro-region capable of facilitating the cooperation with all the European member states, to encourage the development of the energy and transport infrastructure, and to support commerce, investments and market economy mechanisms.**

This type of strategy requires a set of standard behavior, principles, rules and regulations, in accordance with the interest of the people, communities and states in the area, with the security interest of the Euro-Atlantic community and with the international right laws. The set of principles, rules and regulations could contain issues regarding:

- The refusal of acknowledgement and encouragement of separatist regimes;
- Counterterrorism and other associated activities;
- The withdrawal of foreign troops illegally stationed within different enclaves, ammunition, weapons and explosive;
- Evacuation under international control;
- The extermination of paramilitary formations that were set up by the separatist regime on the territory of separatist regions.

In order to promote these principles, **Romania wants to be involved directly in the peaceful mediation of conflicts and disputes, within the strategy of proximity, not only**

through national actions, but also at international level with the purpose of promoting democracy.

Simultaneously, it is necessary to protect the environment, to use the potential and to establish the multiple function of the eco system in the Danube-Black Sea area. Similarly, special programs should be developed to increase national and regional monitoring and fast response capabilities to prevent and counteract against security risk, emerging from the sea area, creating an international dimension for the security process of the area, consisting of a mechanism which can have a beneficial effect on the stability and peace in the area.

Romania and its Army, as a partner in the peace and stability process in the Greater Black Sea Area, must be engaged in the process by improving these bilateral/multilateral relations, to prevent conventional and unconventional risk, to promote transatlantic values and security standards, to ensure interoperability within crisis management, cooperate in securing borderlines, to manage civilian emergencies, etc. Simultaneously, this frame also contains the activities in which our Army must take part together with the armies of the other states in the area, in order to increase the mutual and reciprocal trust level. The action in this group focuses on the implementation of Partnership for Peace treaty regarding weapons control, contacts and, at all levels, the enforcement of *Open-Sky* agreements, improving our surveillance, including air surveillance of national territories on a mutual basis, in order to increase the trust and transparency regarding the military operations.

In order to achieve a feasible cooperation pattern in this area, it is necessary that our country actively participates in the reunion of the defense ministries of South Eastern Europe and its military structure sibling, which represent a combat mechanism against asymmetric risks and threats and to increase political and military trust and solve crisis situations, to take part in different stability or support operation under areas of wishes of Europe and NATO and the European Union organizations. This leads to the participation of some structures with siblings in the area of the mission in Afghanistan. Since February 2006, Romania has been bringing a major contribution to this force in Afghanistan. Our army, together with the armies of the neighbor countries and those of the countries in the vicinity of the Black Sea participates in a reunion on the occasion of an exercise that took place within the group of the neighbor forces, *Blackseafor*, a regional element for the development of the cooperation and interoperability between the military forces of the Black Sea area.

Moreover, securing the area implies increasing the role of cooperation and regional security structures, *Blackseafor*, *SeaBrig*, GUAM, which in collaboration with the international structures – the European Union, NATO, the United Nations – must ensure the accomplishment of a real and efficient regional security structure as a part of the European and global security design.

The Northern, Eastern and South Eastern borders of our community represent the Eastern border of the European Union, which implies the obligation regarding security, the region representing a surveillance area and early-warning in order to

protect the strategic security interest of the European Union. This made the implementation of the monitoring, surveillance and control of the Black Sea system necessary, in order to accomplish electronic and visual surveillance of the low sea in our area, in order to permanently be in touch with the naval, electronic and air force situation in the seaside of our country. This system complies both with the needs of the minister of defense and of other administration structures, with the purpose of improving surveillance, to serve Romania, NATO and the European Union's interest and being at the same time an important component within the national system against terrorism.

So, in conclusion, general Frunzeti thinks that **the many-variables dynamic in the Greater Black Sea Area and the giant areas like the Mediterranean Sea and the Greater Middle East and Central Asia, which cannot be always predicted and which imply innovated action and solution, can only possibly be solved by permanent cooperation and collaboration.** The specific feature of this area requires new strategy patterns to achieve military cooperation, accomplish some coalition, asserting functional solidarities and consolidating initiatives, integrating Asia to create some operational instrument, effective in the fight against terrorism represent one of these patterns.

The differences between the actors in the Greater Black Sea Area are not an important obstacle in the way of the stabilization efforts, as long as none of these, can control by themselves the complex security process in this area.

These were the assumptions and considerations made by general Frunzeti.

Thank you.

• **Detlef Puhl – Chairman**

Thank you very much, colonel. Yes, indeed, succeeding in speeding the presentation up by at least one third of the time – of the 15 minutes allotted to you, your presentation barely covered 10 minutes – that is wonderful!

I now call upon Diana Ananyan from Armenia. You have another 15 minutes to present us with the view of the security system in South Caucasus.

Diana Ananyan

Researcher
Center for Strategic Analysis SPECTRUM
Yerevan, Armenia

Changes in the security system of the South Caucasus

Thank you very much.

I am very pleased to be here and very honored to present some views from that region to this distinguished auditorium. So, I will get right on to that with your permission.

• **Detlef Puhl – Chairman**

Excuse me. Would you just simply present yourself very shortly, so that people know who you are?

Of course!

Ladies and gentlemen,

My name is Diana Ananyan. I am from Armenia and I work with the *Center for Strategic Analysis Spectrum*. I had the pleasure and the privilege to be here in Romania for the senior exam, a master course, which was run by Mr. Secăreș's *NATO Security Studies Centre* and I also took part in the last year's conference also on Black Sea security. So it is very important for me to be here now, as well.

So, the recent developments in Georgia, the five day war have changed a lot in the Caucasus, in South Caucasus area. The guest from Georgia presented the Georgian perspective and so, I would not repeat what he said, but I will only add two words. He said that Georgia is dramatically important in terms of pipelines, and before that, before the war, it actually almost did not influence the economic situation of Georgia, and since then there will be some problems with some other. Excuse me just a second. Two arms of conflict had almost no influence on the economic situation of Georgia and was not a problem for using its territory and the exit to the Black Sea for energy transit ways and transportation corridors. Moreover, the absence of diplomatic relations between Armenia and Turkey, and Armenia and Azerbaijan gave out preferences to Georgia as practically the only discussed way for the transportation of energy resources and regional transport communication. Change of government in Georgia, in 2003 and the first step of Mr. Saakashvili such as pointing that corruption performs an oriented democratization of the country and intentions of NATO accession and development

of the relations with the European Union were very much supported by the West, so as a result of all that, in spite of two unresolved conflicts on its territory, **Georgia was given a kind of a card blanche and the general impression was that resolving the conflict is not the top concern on the program of the new Georgian government and that of external actors.**

At the same time, it was obvious that, given the situation in Georgia, it also could not go on under those conditions for a long time and could not benefit for long time from the political and economic outcomes of that situation. Also, given that Georgia had enacted a provocative model of behavior in relations with Russia which brought on an open military confrontation between Russia and Georgia, **as a result Georgia lost strategically important Abkhazia and South Ossetia and Russia gained two more tools to be present in the region and to manipulate those somehow. So, the result of five day war, was that Georgia indeed did not only lose territories, but also probably has to start from the position of a failed state and really has a long way to go until it is, it becomes a predictable and democratic country.**

First of all, they will need to be very careful and go all the way with keeping in mind the unstable political situation and also the zones of complete settlement of Armenian and other populations in Georgia, and the possibility of the recognition of its transit, of reconciliation of its transit capabilities to the suppliers and customers of the energy resources.

And there is another problem that Georgia is probably going to face, namely that I do not think that humanitarian aid in donations to Georgia after that war will be long-term; they will continue for a long time. So, most likely it will be a challenge for Georgians at some point, on the account of their own economic capability and given that they are facing a lot of problems with unemployed people. And Russia recently said that the economic situation is going to be a problem, probably.

For Azerbaijan, the resolution of the conflict in Abkhazia and South Ossetia in that way, and the recognition of the separate republics' independence by Russia, was actually an interesting point because they will have to stand by themselves. **It became obvious for them that the Euro-Atlantic institutions are not yet ready to direct participation and resolution of ethno-political conflicts in the former Soviet space and that, in case there is any military action in Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, this will also have to be carried out solely by Azerbaijan, and this is again going to be a challenge for its economy and society.** And since the importance of Georgia for the regional affairs dropped significantly after those events, Azerbaijan could actually take advantage of this, in case it performs some democratic reforms, since the West is obviously very much interested in a partnership with Azerbaijan. And besides, searches for new ways of energy resources supply from the Caspian can require from Azerbaijan more flexibility in relations with Russia, Iran, as well as actors like Kazakhstan and other Central Asian countries, as they could come to the scene. And besides, **Azerbaijan will have to continue carrying out very balanced relations between Russia and United States and yet probably will have to**

show there are more dispositions to Western values in the way they do things.

For Armenia, there was a lot of change that the Russia-Georgia war brought. First of all, it is the loss of opportunity to use the transit route which was going through Georgia and Russia, which caused losses of \$670 mil. for the period between August and October 2008. Moreover, the acknowledgement of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia by Russia influenced the process of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict resolution. Moscow became very active during this period. And during his visit to Yerevan, Mr. Medvedev proposed to hold a trilateral meeting at the level of presidents of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Russia, in order to give some new push to the negotiation process and that meeting was carried out in Moscow.

Given the new security strategy of the US after the democrats won the elections, it is probably going to be according to what they were claiming during the pre-election campaigns, they will lower the level of military action, of the use of military force in the region. And the European Union is also going to probably review its positions, because old European Union member countries were not also very active in this war and for them it was a signal that Russia is growing more powerful. So, probably they are not going to be very interested in this area which will decrease the interest of the European Union member states in it. And there were the natural interests of Russia and Turkey and certainly Iran, that now are coming to surface.

After the Georgian-Russian war, Turkey and Russia are switching from enlarged economic cooperation to *strategic*

partnership in political sphere. As a result, **all three states of the region, especially Georgia and Azerbaijan, can find themselves in a trap because they are not acting cooperatively based on neutral, mutual acceptable trust. This might be a problem in defending their national interest.**

At the same time there was a very strong position coming from Russia, through the president of the Russian Federation, who, addressing the National Assembly – this State of the Union address was published the day after the US presidential elections – proposed the creation of a new global security architecture. This proposal does definitely not mean, besides the readiness to take some steps, that Russia is ready to let other global actors in its own geo-strategic sphere of interest: *“we have things to be proud of, we have things to love and there are things to defend and go to aims, so that is why we will not retrieve in the Caucasus”*, the Russian president declared. In conclusion, **the changes that will take place are not in the means of balance of power but rather in that of the relations between great powers, and in this equation the best interest of Turkey will be the cooperation with Russia.**

Thank you.

• **Detlef Puhl – Chairman**

Thank you very much, Diana.

Now, I would like to ask Tetiana Starodub from Ukraine to give her presentation. Could you also, please, say a few words about yourself first?

Thank you.

Tetiana Starodub, Ph.D.

Researcher

**National Institute of Institutional Security Problems
Kiev, Ukraine**

**Processes of Regional Security and Cooperation
System Institution-Building in the Greater Black Sea Area**

Dear Chairman,

Thank you very much, for the invitation to this conference.

Dear participants,

Taking into consideration the above mentioned provisions and ideas of other participants, I would like to present the process of regional security and cooperation system, institution building in the Wider Black Sea Area and the position of Ukraine, concerning this process. So, starting from the '90s of the last century, the Greater Black Sea Area has been passing through the formation of relatively autonomous systems of international cooperation in the sphere of security. The interaction processes of institutionalization have been continued up till now.

Security problems take a central place in the cooperation of countries in the region. Security cooperation in the Greater Black Sea Area is an important factor of developing some regional structures and a common frame of regional identity. The Greater Black Sea Area states consider that it is possible to solve the majority of security problems only in this multilateral interaction format respecting activity frames such as regional forums or separate international organizations. So, the following features

characterize the security dimension of cooperation in the Greater Black Sea Area.

The first: states in this region, besides Russia, have similar defining approaches for threats that allow elaborating a common strategy for the whole region, concerning determination, prevention and reprehension of threats. This is true for both the perspectives of the respective states and for the perspective of the region.

The second: the role of traditional threats, inter-states conflicts, demilitarization, and conflict in the South Caucasus has a significant impact on elaborating common policy oriented strategies. Security of the Greater Black Sea Area depends on two leveled threats: international and intrastate. In this regard, the states of the Southern Caucasus region are at the very center of instability. So, keeping in mind the great variety of common problems, with countries of Southern Caucasus uprising, one could point out the following: weakness of state's institutions in all the countries, domination of ethnic nationalism and lack of democratic traditions in economic and political culture. Also, deep social and economic problems, separatism, human traffic, drugs traffic and illegal trade. Another common problem is the impact of influential geopolitical powers interest – the United States of America, the European Union and the North-Atlantic Treaty Organization – in the region. In the meantime, regional structures are weakened to solve security issues in the region.

The Greater Black Sea Area is a part of the European security space and because of emergence of new crisis between the West and the East, it represents a region of potential conflict. In the region, there are many institutions which would like to implement

the old cooperation module vision. Institutions in the region are competing for influence and functions in their nations' region. It is hard to determine a country or a group of countries, which are capable to be the security cooperation center. So, we can speak about the absence of co-interaction in the security sphere, of, for example, coal mines in Ukraine. Georgia's initiatives or proposing old approaches by Turkey, Russia, Romania, Ukraine, on regional cooperation are not enough to create a code of security interaction. In spite of aggravation of Turkey's contradictions, Turkey is successful in playing the leading role in the process of cooperation in the region.

Another factor continues to help influence the development of political interaction. Bear in mind that Caspian oil and gas resources are estimated to be the second largest in the world, transport roads of the Black Sea will undoubtedly attract the attention of Russia and the European Union, which might lead to the new divergences and contradictions. The European and Euro-Atlantic integration for countries of the Greater Black Sea Area is a structural process. The aim here is the implementation of strategic stocks concerning strength and regional security. In consequence, supporting democratic reforms in the new independent states by the European Union and NATO, active participation in the works of such regional structures as GUAM and Community of Democratic Choice, will lead to the formation of democracy and that will play a key role in ensuring security of the Greater Black Sea Area, and, after that, a first integration to the European security space.

For the deepening integration process and creation of effective mechanisms of regional institutional structures interactions in

the Greater Black Sea Area, it is necessary to take a number measures. Firstly, encouraging the dialogue between countries and institutions of the region on issues concerning using mechanisms of early prevention, analyzing and neutralization of threats. Secondly: to create preconditions for the creation in the regional community of the Greater Black Sea Area of an integral part of the European security space. It is important for Ukraine to suggest its own approach to the matter of cooperation in the region. For example, our institute, the National Institute of International Security Problems which I represent in this event, is now working on elaborating a foreign regional strategy of the Ukraine. To be more specific, we try to determine the main mechanisms and instruments needed to realize our state foreign policy. This strategy in the future will contain such measures which were taken with the aim of enhancing the integration process in the Greater Black Sea Area. And these measures are as follows. First of all, the continued activity directed on transformation of such a structure as the Community of Democratic Choice into a competent international organization, which could be not only a right forum of exchange for many points of view, but also an effective regional institution. The aim of this is to ensure political and energy security in the region.

Secondly, to elaborate programs or measures concerning further participation of the Ukraine in the activity of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization, taking into account the results of Ukrainian chairmanship in this organization, from November 2007 until April 2008.

Thirdly, to involve such measures to the content of the program, elaborating a priorities system, in relations with states

from the region, in the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Forum. Also, continuing work in order to perfect the Ukrainian legislative base, on the issues of interstate and regional cooperation. The result will be the elaboration and passing of a law on the main grounds of foreign regional policy of Ukraine. Such a policy in the region will motivate the realization of exploring and extraction of energy sources projects at the Black Sea shore and at the same time the development of roads infrastructure in the Black Sea ports.

Intensifying the preparation of projects in the field of energy, energy keeping, financial sector and other is the aim of fostering stable economic development of the country and taking into account share of Ukraine in the collective investment fund of the Black Sea Trade and Development Bank. Also, of great importance is the leader rotation in Ukraine. By taking out measures directed on strengthening dialogue of the Black Sea Trade and Development Bank with other financial institutions of international and European level, we aim the co-financing of regional and inter-regional projects, first of all energy and transport orientation projects. In addition to the program, Ukraine is planning to elaborate the main document of concepts which should contain a complex approach that envisage formatting a system of interaction of regional structures in South Eastern Europe, with the aim of resolving issues in a field of politics and security. During this elaboration, it is necessary to concentrate the attention of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation member states as a process of implementing the provisions of recommendation, which is called *“Regional dimension of stability and security prospect for the Black Sea economic cooperation region”*.

The necessity of strengthening national and regional resources concerning security and stability production is underlined. Therefore it is needed to strengthen bilateral and multilateral cooperation by information extension and establishing a more close working contact with the European Union etc. In the above mentioned documents, it is invested to envisage the Ukrainian view at the mechanism of realizing the Black Sea economic cooperation organization involvement into a complex settlement, which should include the following components.

Involving the Parliament Assembly of the Black Sea economic cooperation in the process of monitoring and organization of democratic elections in the territories where conflict is present. Granting economic assistance, adjusting interaction with the United Nations in the sphere of conflict settlement, realization of cooperation projects with the European Union on issues related to conflict settlement, in the frames of implementing European Commissions *Black Sea Synergy* document, the *European Union's Initiative for Cooperation* in the region, then a new report by the Black Sea Economic Cooperation member states, provision of a number of documents on issues of cooperation in the sphere of combating organized crime. For example, the agreement among the governments of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation, through which participating states on cooperation in combating crime, in particular in its organized forms and the additional protocol to the agreement among the governments of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation participating states and cooperation in combating crime, in particular in its organized form.

It is necessary uniting the efforts and elaborate Black Sea Economic Cooperation organization and Organization for Democracy and Economic Development GUAM common strategy on combating challenges and threats to security in the area of the Black Sea basin. During elaborating this strategy, it is necessary to pay significant attention to researching the European Union's experience in the field of fighting crime, and with this aim to create the Black Sea Economic Cooperation or the GUAM coordination council at the level of the working groups. This activity will be aimed at supporting prominent interaction between appropriate bodies of both organizations.

During the elaboration of complex approaches, which provides a formatting system of interaction of the regional structures of South Eastern Europe aimed to resolving issues in geopolitics and security, it is important to determine forms by which consultations can be carried out between the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization and the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Council of Europe, the United Nations Commission on Economic Issues for Europe, the European Commissions and the European Council, NATO, the Commonwealth of Independent States' Executive Committee and also other relevant international regional and sub regional organizations of political, economical and security orientation. Consultations should be carried out also with leading financial institutions with the purpose of possible financial insurant realization of political and security measures in the frames of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation, in compliance with the agreement dated by the 2nd of October 1998.

Another important aspect is the adjustment of the information system and the documentation exchange between

the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization and the institutions of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and other international organizations with the purpose of separation of powers in the field of insuring security and stability in the region. We see a new model of regional security with the first development of interaction between research centers on issues of regional security aiming at the realization of a new economic dimension. It is necessary to post in a framework of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation and create a region of free movement of good service and capitals and to pay a special attention to the issue of stimulating economic contacts. Here is some information about plans and recommendations from Ukraine for intensifying the energy cooperation in energy sphere and cooperation in the equality sphere.

So, last but not least, I would like to say that it is important to include to the problems some measures which are directed on institutional reformation of such organization as the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization. Concerning Audit GUAM: the Ukraine plans to suggest its own approach on formatting the system of regional security in the frames of Audit GUAM because it is rectified in charter. In conclusion, it is very important in the context of the Greater Black Sea Area and for countries which are members of the Audit GUAM to sign such agreements between Audit GUAM and Serbian or between Audit GUAM and NATO, on issues which are connected with security, economy, interactions on economic issues and political issues. We think that implementing proposed measures and initiating those suggested by Ukraine will force not only the development of the Greater Black Sea Area and the construction of the new module of regional security, but create

a new condition for building new institutions within the architecture of the Greater Black Sea Area and it will force them to create a sphere, an area of stability and security in the Black Sea, or better said in the Greater Black Sea Area.

Thank you.

• **Detlef Puhl – Chairman**

Thank you very much.

I know that there is a lot of ground to cover in all of these contributions and it is very difficult to do that. More than that, it is also a challenge for all of us to think about this and to reflect on it, in order to make our own contributions later on, in the questions and answers period.

But I still have two persons on my list. Unfortunately I do not see Vladimir Nikolov yet. So, we are going to listen first to Iulian Chifu. Could you please say a few words about yourself first?

Iulian Chifu

Director
Conflict Prevention and Early Warning Center
Bucharest, Romania

**Rationalization of European Policies
in the Greater Black Sea Region**

Good morning.

Ladies and gentlemen,

My name is Iulian Chifu. I am a professor at the *National School for Political and Administrative Studies*. I am also the director of the *Conflict Prevention and Early Warning Center* in Bucharest.

I will try to squeeze in the 15 minutes type of security assessment, so I will touch the global crises which are impacting on the region, the crisis of the main actors, the Russian-Georgian war with some lessons learned, problems with the countries in the region and finally the European Union's initiatives for the region. The Greater Black Sea Area can be associated in those times with a few words, as you can really imagine, by reading at least the newspapers, on certainty, turbulence, revisionism and crisis. This situation and the ongoing events are showing us more and more the uncomfortable position and the feeling of a big part of the states and citizens in the region, especially for those situated between the NATO-European Union border and Russia's border, which are considered to be stable.

I will present a few points about the global crisis which had impact in the region. I think that the first one that we are facing is a democracy crisis, especially in the new European Union-NATO member states, but also in the consecrated democracies, with the sweeping towels populism, extreme bureaucratic governance, without political guidance, low level of leadership, mediocrity, so governance with the eyes on the media, or the eyes on the port.

The second international crisis is linked to the economy and finance. Not directly to the market economy, but to the credits and to the derived financial products, the lack of transparency

and regulations of such products, that arrived to be bought everywhere in the world. I think that now we are facing the end of a period when we used to live better, at least on the work that we are going to do in the next year, or that our sons are going to do in the future, see the system of 50 years credit in the United States.

The third international global crisis we are facing now is the crisis of the international relations, or, if you want, of the international law, as we know it. We are seeing more and more revisionism in this matter, as a proposal to hold a new European conference, a security conference or even a global one, and moving from the existing system of check and balances through sovereignty and right of self determination of the nations to something else. For instance we know that the minister of foreign affairs of the Russian Federation, Sergey Lavrov, president Medvedev, the French president, Nicolas Sarkozy, as well as the former president of the Parliamentary Assembly of the OSCE, Adrian Severin, now Euro-parliamentarian, supports a new deal of security for the enlarged European region.

I think that this is an innovative idea at the end of the day, but we have to be careful about choosing the moment of such discussions. Also we cannot go to square one only after solving the existing problem, according to the existing rule and I am talking about two cases, Kosovo and Georgia. We cannot move to new commitments as long as we have not reached the commitments already in place, so new rules should be set after finding a suitable solution to Kosovo and Georgia. Some points about the problems of the main actors in the region, which are involved in the region. I will begin with Russia. Russia, who in

my opinion has a crisis, I could call it the crisis of self defining or discontent of the actual status. It helps at the international level. This is also about the schizophrenia of being both a status-quo actor, a policeman in the post-Soviet space, and the revisionist actor, putting into question the borders, putting into question the existing system of security.

At the same time, Russia has been one of the biggest losers of the financial and economic crisis, linked to the price of oil, which fell after the financial crisis broke in the region in September, as well as the credit and outflows of investors after the August Russian war in Georgia. I will come back about the lesson learned from the Russian-Georgian war. This harms specially the investment projects of Russia, as well as the budgetary provisions and the expenses of the budget. Combined with the needs of replacing the military capabilities that end their life until 2020, and the political will to invest more in the military, this led to a substantial deficit of resources versus political will and revisionist expectation of Russia.

The US has its own problems. The financial and economic crisis hits first the US; the election period catches the US during the Russian-Georgian war, with limited capacity of intervening, with a lean back president, but also with a new elected president that has to prepare his administration and to deal in the first place with the domestic issues of his country. NATO is now in a capability gap, one that we can easily see in Afghanistan. It is also a period where it rethinks its territorial defense in relation with expeditionary forces. The European Union and NATO member states are now in a position of deciding to finance a credible defense and security for Europe, including a bigger and

stable share of budgets allocation for military capabilities, for reshaping the military personnel, and for preparing the army for all the required range of military operation that would enable them to leave the caveats in some of the missions where they are participating. **The European Union is still in an organizational crisis.** After the old enlargement fatigue, the now deepening of integration crisis appeared, with the rejection of the constitutional treaty and then with the rejection of the Lisbon Treaty by Ireland, we already saw, Sweden rectifying, we are expecting the Czech Republic to rectify the treaty and after all in the Russian-Georgian war, the French presidency succeeded in taking the lead for the European Union, with the reserves that we can have about the way the presidency relies with the capabilities, expertise and advices of the council of the Commission, as well with the reserves that we can have about the form and content of the six point agreement and on the implementation capabilities used. But the European Union has had a window of opportunity to enter in the conflict resolution in the Caucasus and it took it. It took this window of opportunity due to president's Sarkozy's intervention in cutting the deal of the ceasefire, but also to the courage of the minister of the foreign affairs of France who went with president Sarkozy in Gory.

We all saw this movement of bravery and I am really sure that this is an important step forward for redesigning the SDP and its mission in the region. I would like to make some points about the Russian-Georgian war. It is not even worth searching for an answer to the question *"who shot first?"* South Ossetia was under Russian responsibility in terms of peace keeping and we had their outside, their volunteers from Northern Caucasus,

the Kazakhs, the separatist militias and the so called peace keepers of Russia's Special Forces which entered the war, shot and killed Georgian ethnics and Georgian citizens. After that we even have the regular troops of Russia entering Georgian territory. So, one add on.

As a conclusion we had Russian citizens with weapons of all kinds in a territory under Russian responsibility, in terms of peace-keeping, territory under Georgian sovereignty. These Russian citizens with weapons begin to kill Georgian citizens. There is this information about the Sarkozy-Putin meeting in Moscow. They confirmed the fact that the target was the elected president of Georgia that Vladimir Putin wanted as his personal Saddam Hussein executed in a public place, I will not quote how. And we are talking about the legitimate president of a sovereign nation of Georgia. There is no chief of state in the world who, knowing that he has to choose between living, fleeing his country or/and letting enduring in times of war, or being killed by the Russian special forces, would not react in defending himself in one way or another. Russia's invasion to Georgia was by no means, and I want to underline this, a victory for Russia, not even a military one. This does not mean that Russia was the loser of the war. We have seen the destruction on Georgia's territory. The number of forces used, the lack of interoperability between different types of forces, in spite of the previous coordination exercises in the Northern Caucasus, the lack of air coverage of the troops, the chaotic search for Georgian forces in South Ossetia, as well as the military losses, the airplanes put down by the Georgian artillery, the casualties supported by, from a tiny army, when, 2000 of its best troops were in Iraq, do not forget about this, all prove that Russia is far from being able to claim a victory.

If we have to analyze the results of the crisis, this is also a disaster for Russia. No business, as usual within the G7. I can remind you that we have seen two or three meetings since August, and none Russia wanted. Even though Mr. Rogosin is searching around to establishing some kind of meetings involving Russia. And even the European Union under the French presidency has been in the same situation, no business as usual, for almost three months. No recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia by the partners in Commonwealth of Independent States and the Collective Security Treaty Organization. On the contrary, a draft presented by the Chinese quite condemned the recognition of these two regions of Georgia. The financial and economic costs are also dramatic, due also to the effects of the global financial crisis. The stock market is at less than 50 percent, comparing to August 7, huge spending from the national bank for maintaining the currency, destabilizing fund under the threat of disappearance and to be spent in less than a few months, and last but not least an oil price under \$50 a barrel. I can remind you that the budget of Russia, which is a prudent one, has been evaluated at the level of \$75 per barrel.

The most dramatic change was the one when the European Union, the United States and the international community as a whole, all realized that Russia does not want to be a democratic country, so that with Russia the only type of relations are the professional ones, economic and trade relations, but nothing more. Russia arrived at the level of USSR before Perestroika, in terms of relations. Moreover there are huge concerns about the form in which the revised version of the security strategy of the European Union will include and reflect Russia in terms of a threat perception of the European Union member states.

We will see this revision in beginning of December. After the last developments, the attacks on the European Union monitors searching for proofs in a killing case in Georgia, the European Security and Defense Policy mission, the European Union monitoring mission, it is called, should be trained some and equipped with weapons and with a suitable mandate that would enable them to defend themselves and to take some security responsibilities in the region. What is also very important in the decision of the foreign affairs ministerial of NATO in the beginning of December, the reunion which could not grant any membership action plan to a destroyed country with a dismantled army, but to issue a much more important and a stronger category commitment linked to the security of both Georgia and Ukraine.

What should be stated here is the fact that Russia should not expect less European Union, but also less America and less NATO direct involvement in the region, when it threatens a sovereign state and its legally elected president. We have also some problems and issues of the states in the region and I will pass very quickly about the so called transit countries, which are linked to the European Union's security, energy security. In the case of Georgia, we are now in a stabilization and reconstruction gap, but the most important for Georgia is to keep its right of sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence. And we are also facing in the near future a social and political crisis, consequent with the debate of the Russian-Georgian war. Ukraine has a situation of chaotic policies, even if this would be a proof of democracy. The lack of stability harms the NATO and the European Union's perspective of Ukraine and this can be designed

as an unpredictable state in the region, including for its, or for the future of its strategic orientation. Democratic mechanisms are used at their limits, institutional instability is there, and political confrontation used all the means. This is not a good file for negotiating with the European Union and the North-Atlantic Treaty Organization.

The Republic of Moldova still has two problems: the Transnistrian issue and a wishful thinking of a quick solution in the region that led to political costs, the partners left aside in the process but also the costs of the changing of the de-facto format into one plus two under the Russian unique leadership. The deadlock is there already, with the requests of accepting an indefinite presence of the Russian troops, in the eastern districts of the Republic of Moldova and the reshaped Kazakh troop plan of the reintegration, with more limited sovereignty versus territorial integrity deal. The right of veto to any decision that is related to security and foreign policy by the separatist leaders and moreover, besides this we have problems in the democratic reform process, because if in one side the Transnistrian issue is interesting, is referring to less than 3 percent of people interesting, more than 70 percent, between 70 and 80 percent are supporting the European integration, which was put aside for the sake of revengeful territorial integration and I think that this is making a continuous blockage. It is also – we are facing in the Republic of Moldova a propaganda and counter product with fetishism linked to neutrality, which is not a security solution – a security guarantee for the country. In the case of Azerbaijan, we have to pass through democratic reforms to improving the human rights record and to a credible opposition and balanced policies.

On the other hand, for moving forward to a relation with the European Union we need Azerbaijan to enter the WTO. If we are taking the European Union's projects in the Wider Black Sea region and this is my last point, we have on one side the eastern dimension of the *European Neighborhood Policy*, which is reflected by the Action Plan and it is a bilateral relation between the European Union and everyone of these states, Republic of Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. We have the *Black Sea Synergy*, which is a regional approach, involving the countries in the region in a cooperative effort, including Russia and Turkey. We have the Eastern European partnership, the new proposal by Sweden and Poland, which should be presented in March next year. This has a regional approach, the sense of community together with EU countries, this proposal is expected to have more important security matters component, including the European Security and Defense Policy, justice and home affairs and energy security provisions. We have the Black Sea-Euro region which is involving a leadership at the level of regions and local authorities, and we have the *Black Sea Forum*, which has three dimensions, involving not only authorities, but also local representatives and NGOs in the region. So, as one can see we have a lot of projects.

The most important of them is to find a way of cooperation and complementarity between them, to harmonize them, to avoid duplication and to give coherence to these projects' consistency. As you may know, we are now facing the new generation of action plans; we already faced the negotiations with Ukraine. In what concerns the Republic of Moldova, there is a reflection period, but it will end with the same type of agreement, more

or less. And in the funding relations of the Council of the EU on the 1st of September, we have seen pieces of the same type of commitment towards Georgia, this would include a deep sea trade agreement, moving to a common, even a custom union or common market, if those countries can accept and can take the commitments needed, commitments like institution building and so on. These are the liberalization agreements, leading to a visa free regime. It is also linked to the capacity, institutional, administrative and costs effective capacity of those countries (energy community) which can be a kind of energy chart plus agreement between the European Union and the transit states, observing the rules of competition. Also, from my point of view, I think that the European Union should move to a kind of Thessaloniki type of commitments, toward the transit countries, Republic of Moldova, Ukraine, Armenia and Azerbaijan, Georgia. Georgia and Azerbaijan, are already granting their perspective to join the European Union. It is already there. We have seen that Ukraine has been granted the status of being a European state, which is the first step to meet the Copenhagen criteria. I have to oppose the fact that the relations and addressing Russia in the eastern neighborhood is not possible as long as the trans-Atlantic cooperation is not at its highest stages and this is a very feasible thesis in cooperating between Euro-Atlantic and European policies after the new elections in US. The second condition is the complementarity and multiplication between the European Union and the North-Atlantic Treaty Organization's policies in the regions, so not only Trans-Atlantic and European, but also between the European Union and the United States.

Thank you very much!

• **Detlef Puhl – Chairman**

Thank you very much, Mr. Chifu! And so we are at the end of the presentations and you would read us a little message from Vladimir Nikolov from Sofia. I invited Vladimir Nikolov, representing the Rakovsky Military Academy, National Defense University in Sofia, and just one hour ago he sent me a letter from general Georgiev, who is the head of the National Defense University, wishing success to our meeting here and Nikolov apologizing that he is not able to come. I do not know if due to the fact that the Commandant allowed him to tell, to come, but anyway it is a gesture which I have considered to be known also by you. So the Commandant of the National Defense University in Sofia, Rakovsky University, had commended our undertaking here.

Thank you.

Questions and answers

• **Detlef Puhl – Chairman**

This should give us enough motivation to enter into a very engaged discussion. Nika is the first one.

• **Nika Chitadze – *International and Security Research Center, Georgia***

Thank you very much.

With your permission, I would like to make some comments on this very interesting and attractive presentation trying to be as short as possible. With regard to the behavior of Georgia,

as my Armenian colleague mentioned here about, when Saakashvili was elected as the president of Georgia, he has visited neither Brussels nor Washington, first of all he has visited Moscow and after this he always tried to improve the relationship between Russian Federation and Georgia. For example, he established the control of Pankisi Gorge and he mentioned for several times about the importance of this relation and the organization of business forums, etc, etc. But Russia itself deteriorated this situation because of the foreign policy priorities of Georgia. When Georgia in 2004 started the more close cooperation with NATO, in the framework of IPAP, Individual Partnership Action Plan, it was a priority of a sovereign country, subject of international law and the main purpose of Russia was to punish one of the countries inside of the CIS and, by this way, to show to the other countries of CIS that in case that some of them will watch towards the West instead of the North, they will be punished. Georgia was one of the examples, somehow to stress the geopolitical imprudence of Russian Federation, of Russian Federation's post-Soviet space. And with regard to other issues, my close friend and colleague, Tetiana mentioned some of these prospects of regional cooperation and institutes. From my point of view, with regard to BSEC, we compare BSEC against GUAM, for example. Yes, GUAM has more perspective for the development instead of BSEC. In case of BSEC, for example, organization that was founded in 1992, the question arises how the cooperation should be developed when the border between Armenia and Azerbaijan is closed, border between Georgia and Russia is closed and accordingly Russia also has the opportunity to contact from ground with Armenia. The border between Armenia and Turkey is closed. In my point of view, with regard to GUAM, it has more perspective

because all four countries have the same view, the same priorities and foreign policy priorities. Decreasing geopolitical influence of Russia, conflict resolution by peaceful means and to be involved in Euro-Asia transport corridors is another argument here. In this case foreign policy and national security priorities of all four countries of GUAM coincide with each other in comparison with BSEC, where the four foreign policy and national security priorities of the member countries differ from each other. And one might somehow compare the case of Kosovo with the case of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, because for example, Russian political elite authorities, for several times mentioned that if the West recognized the independence of Kosovo, why it is impossible to recognize the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. But they forget that it's a huge difference between Kosovo and Abkhazia. Because in the case of Kosovo, since 2000 the UN administration were on the territories of Kosovo and all the elections which were organized on central or municipal level were recognized by the international community. Furthermore, in case of Kosovo, Kosovars and Albanians were under suffer of the Milosevic regime and of course, the settled authorities of Serbia. Sorry again for my long speech.

Thank you!

• **Detlef Puhl – Chairman**

No, thank you very much! I mean there are big questions at stake, so we should really be able to express the different positions that are on the table.

General, please.

• **Maj-gen. Mihail Ionescu – *Institute for Political Studies of Defense and Military History, Romania***

I am in favor of action against talking, because I am a military man. I am still a military man, but also I know that we killed the good cooperation without talking. Anyhow, because there were some ideas which were delivered here, I just want to ask Tetiana about the practical solutions for strengthening cooperation bilaterally and multilaterally between states within this region. Why some of the officials consider some of their neighbors as being enemies? And also, this is a question, not a curiosity: What is the purpose of your country, because you noticed even Mr. Chifu said something about unpredictability and even strategic instability? Are you going to join NATO and the European Union? Or to be part of GUAM, to be part of an economic unique space and so on?

• **Tetiana Starodub – *National Institute of Institutional Security Problems, Ukraine***

Thank you for mentioning these issues.

The purpose, of our country's common foreign policy is directed to joining NATO and the European Union, but they have some problems with influence of our domestic situation on realization of priorities of foreign policy and we have foreign regional policy. And first of all we have some problems with finding this reform of different structures in the military sphere of our country. We have some problems with full implementation of annual target plan in 2008 because some tasks will not be realized during this target plan. And now our country recognized that the possibility to receive the membership action plan on December is not possible for Ukraine because of our internal problems. We also have problems with Germany and France because these two countries have their own vision on possible membership of our country in NATO and the European Union.

More than that France and Germany will never have contradictions with Russia, over such a small country as Ukraine. For example, some energy projects are more important to Germany as the interest of having the Ukraine in the European Union. In conclusion, our country has to develop a foreign policy on a regional level and one on a global level. On the regional level, Ukraine is trying to be a partner, to develop regional integration policies in the frames of Audit GUAM, Black Sea Economic Cooperation and, for example, such structures as Community of Democratic Choice. But this process of cooperation in the frames of regional structures are considered by Ukraine as a possibility to develop stable economy and to realize some social economic reforms in Ukraine, to develop trans-border cooperation with the aim to join the European economic and security space. Because we recognize that we need to create a space of stability in the Greater Black Sea Area so that the Greater Black Sea Area can be an integral part of the European economic and security space, so after that, our country and other countries of the region, have the possibility to join to the economic and security space which will open the possibility to be a member of the European Union and NATO. So, the regional policy and the foreign regional policy are an important part of our common foreign policy and such mechanisms as GUAM, as the Community of Democratic Choice or as other mechanisms of our foreign policy, are used to intensify regional process with the aim of being more strong and to be ready to join the European Union and NATO. About the first issue concerning the enemies of the state, I think that, for example, the Black Sea Economic Operation is the best forum to extend by thought, for example, between such states as Russia and Georgia. If you know, prepare another forum to debate relations between Russia and Georgia, I think

that it is impossible, because they have, we should have such organizations as the Black Sea Economic Cooperation for example, and use this organization as a forum of extended by thought. Initiatives such as the Black Sea Forum and Black Sea Harmony are structures that we can use as a possible initiative to force the climate and necessity conditions for future dialogue in the security sphere. And I think it is these structures, as *Blackseafor* and *Black Sea Harmony* are the mechanisms of supporting security in the Black Sea Area. Concluding, I think that the interaction between the European Union and the Black Sea Economic Cooperation not only in the economic sphere but also in the security sphere will be a future mechanism of resolving some problems in the region.

• **Detlef Puhl – Chairman**

Thank you very much. Sure, Mr. Chifu, you have the floor!

• **Iulian Chifu – *Conflict Prevention and Early Warning Center, Romania***

Sorry, I have to intervene.

First of all, concerning the BSEC: look at the outputs of BSEC. It does not mean that it is not a useful organization, but the means and the level where the BSEC can act is very restricted, including in economic terms, not talking about security terms. We do not need to invent security institutions, when we already have them. We have OSCE, which is the largest organization, and we have NATO, with our security institutions which are dealing with the region. This is comparable with the new proposal of Russia on a new type of association, I do not know how it will be named because this is not yet decided. So, let us not invent facts, where there are not. *Blackseafor* is just a force

and Black Sea Harmony is just an operation, it is not a structure, it is not institutionalized. In what refers to making small organizations in terms of kindergarten, like the GUAM is, I do not know all the types of such organizations, but if I recall right there was such a theoretical approach and even a practical one developed by the European Union, after the Visegrad Group. I am referring to the *Southeastern European Cooperation Process*, which was designed to make the states that once were fighting in between, or the states that want to join the European Union first of all to learn to cooperate in an international framework. What is brought from the lessons learned, for instance, from Visegrad Group, is the fact that if we are developing a kind of common market in the local region, it would be more complicated to integrate those, or, if you want, the costs will be more important to integrate those states into a bigger institution like the European Union. So, this is proved to be a not so good step forward. We will have with the European Union the framework, the European Union neighborhood policy, which gives access to the internal market of the European Union, but this is proportionate to the reforms, to the norms and institutions built at the level of those states. Also, I think that this is a good mechanism. In the security part, we do not have any type of alternatives, we have the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, which is still an institution with its limits, but with its role in the region, and are NATO ways, the world that it has in for the member states and also for department states, including the states that were already on the line. Now, about France and Germany, which are putting more emphasize on the energetic programs, let us say, and cultivate a more visible or strong relation to Russia. I can tell you that maybe some years ago I could have the same type of impression, but at this moment, what are the common projects

that France has with Russia? The answer is nothing. France is depending on the Sonatrach. For France having projects with Russia is very good. For Germany the interest is concerning the North Stream. For the moment being, we are in a very difficult situation. There is no money for investments, no resource, and no agreement for the Baltic States oil. More than that there is a lack of resource in all the states of the region, and I mean along the sea, for putting down the pipelines. So, we are talking about the kind of project that exists only on paper, and not in real terms. On the other hand, it is not to forget that it was the German chancellor who appeared near President Medvedev in Soci, and who contradicted him, supporting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia. It was the French president who cuts the deal about blocking this so far, blocking the road towards Tbilisi and the BTCBT, so I think that we do not have to blame France and Germany for not granting membership action plan to Ukraine, since you also realize, and with all us, that Ukraine is not prepared yet. We have full members that are still concerned that Ukraine is not prepared to enter that Membership Action Plan, which means that we are going to revise the situation now in December, we are going to revise it after the next summit. Concerning Georgia and Ukraine: both are going to be NATO members. It is the Thessaloniki type of commitment, which has no precedent. Romania in Madrid did not get this type of commitment that would state its future NATO membership. I think this is a good guarantee and I mentioned in my paper, I think that this is an important point for you to follow, the fact that at the ministerial of the NATO, Mr. Hoop Schaffer, said that there will be a very clear statement involving a type of NATO commitment to the security of Ukraine and

Georgia. So, I think that we have to, somehow, nuance the position poles. France and Germany, these are important states, these are members of NATO and the European Union. Do not forget that France will become full member of the military, structure coming back as a full member of the integrated military staff. This is what a democratic organization means, where Ireland can block a treaty, where, Lithuania can block negotiations. This is democracy. We have to respect the position of France and Germany.

• **Detlef Puhl – Chairman**

Ambassador, please!

• **Ambassador Nicolae Micu – *EURISC Foundation, Romania***

Thank you very much.

Let me add a few words to the very interesting debate which has taken place so far. First of all, I thank Mr. Ionescu, for the wisdom of choosing this annual conference, such an interesting subject within the problems that the Greater Black Sea Area is facing. During the morning debate, several speakers noticed that the problems which we face in the Greater Black Sea Area, which is an integral part of Europe, are also problems for all Europeans to consider. Those problems are of the nature of the world in which we live today, and they cannot be solved otherwise than by political and diplomatic means as you said, Mr. Chairman, by “soft power” policies. Normally, the stability and the security of a given region is first of all, the matter and the responsibility of the countries of that particular region. And the countries of this region, for the first time in history, succeeded in getting together in the beginning of the ‘90s, and have been trying to

develop a cooperative attitude and cooperative relationship between them. And in today's world cooperation equals very much stability and security, because you cannot build security in a region which is split between hostile groups. Cooperation in areas of mutual interest creates mutual confidence and longer bases of mutual confidence one can discuss and try to find solutions to every problem, however difficult it may be. Now, when we think of other actors who could play a role, substantive role in the region, we cannot omit this very visible fact, that, for a number of years, the European Union has been heavily involved in the region, because it is part of Europe, the situation here has a direct effect on the stability and the security of the continent as a whole. If there is peace in this region, then Europe can focus its efforts and capacities on playing that role of a global actor. The European Union is present here through this *Black Sea Synergy*, which is an agreement between the Black Sea Economic Cooperation and the European Union. More than being a simple agreement it is an institutional arrangement. It was launched in Kiev, in February this year and it was formulated and adopted by the European Union last year, after the admission of Romania and Bulgaria, when the European Union became a reality of the Black Sea. The European Union is present through other parallel, but complementary initiatives, like the ones mentioned by Professor Chifu, of the *European Neighborhood Policy*, which is growing more substantive, and through a strategic partnership with Russia. It is part of the efforts to make the region stable and make Europe secure. And then, the European Union is present in the region through the negotiation for the membership of Turkey. It is also present through that process of stabilization and association in the Balkans. It would be very important also to look into the future and see how the

various problems can be approached. Certainly we had a very unfortunate development last summer, which canceled many of the advances made during recent years, but our purpose is not to portion blame and to see who started and who is guiltier than the other. Our basic task is to see how, in the given situation we can overcome those difficulties, which intervened and how we can build a future for the Black Sea region and for Europe, for that matter. And that future can be built only through a cooperative relationship between all countries of the region, including Russia, including Turkey, including Romania and the European Union and countries from the region. Romania, for example, who is somewhere in the middle, having good relations with all countries, can do more to overcome the impasse in which we find ourselves.

• **Detlef Puhl – Chairman**

Thank you, Ambassador. Please.

• **Radu Cucută – *Center for East European and Asian Studies, Romania***

My name is Radu Cucută; I am a Ph. D. candidate with the *National School for Political and Administrative Studies*. I am also a member of the *Center for East European and Asian Studies* and I wanted to say something in regard to Mr. Chifu's recent intervention regarding the reluctance of Germany and France of accepting the prospect of a Ukrainian bid for European Union or NATO membership. First of all, I strongly object to reducing aspects of international relations and external policy to energy issues. The international reality is far more complex and French and German motives, behind the reluctance to accept or to perceive Ukraine as a future member of the European Union or

the North-Atlantic Treaty Organization, I believe cannot be reduced solely to the energy problem. For example, the rising tide of Europe skepticism, the questions whether the European Union has over-extended itself in 2004 and in 2007 are, I believe, decent answers that might explain the reluctance of German, French and not only German and French political decision makers, who, after all, are responsible in front of their own electorates.

Thank you!

• **Detlef Puhl – Chairman**

Thank you. Mihail.

• **Maj-gen. Mihail Ionescu – *Institute for Political Studies of Defense and Military History, Romania***

Firstly, we know this phrase: *“we need two to dance”*. So what we need is cooperation, cooperation and again cooperation. But we will have to take into account if others would use for cooperating guns and tanks. It is very important. Or, after using guns and tanks they are saying *“we would like to cooperate and we would like to reformulate the entire architecture in Europe and for that we are proposing that and that”*. Again those kinds of things have to be taken into account. So, this is the first point. The second point, I would be a little bit more optimistic about the importance of the network of institutions here in the area and as a matter of fact everywhere. It seems to me that having more institutions would increase our capability to promote cooperation, either bilaterally or multilaterally. For example, immediately after Georgia's war, it was a Turkish initiative of a platform in South Caucasus. But here, we would have to take care, that such institutions are not destined to keep up a certain

region as a region reserved to somebody. This is necessary to promote not only inclusiveness, namely bringing in such kind of institution the locals, so respecting the principle of ownership, but at the same time promoting the openness of this kind of institution. For sure, now NATO and the European Union could say *"wait a minute, I am part of this region, so whenever I would like I could be part of Blackseafor, Black Sea Harmony, and BSEC and so on, because now, via Romania and Bulgaria, the European Union and NATO are part of these areas."* That is very important for the initiator of such institutions which had in mind that in this way they are preserving the closeness or the lack of transparency. Speaking about this very important issue of the *Membership Action Plan*, you know that being included in the European Union and, more than that, in NATO is not a technical problem. More than that, in absents of a political decision, not even Germany would have become a NATO member in the '50s, or why not, Romania and Bulgaria becoming NATO and European Union members. So, it is a political decision. It does not matter, the *Membership Action Plan* or other plans, because already we have a commitment of NATO. And commitment of NATO as in the Bucharest Summit statement, that Ukraine and Georgia would become NATO members, is a warning to anybody who would consider that they would have a say in such kind of decision. It does not matter that somebody would try to create Ruthenia's Republic, or we have now South Ossetia because it is a political decision which had been already taken and it is up to NATO. To decide that is an internal process of NATO and European Union. So, we would have to consider the *Membership Action Plan* or European Union membership process for the countries in the region who have expressed their round. In this

light, it is not a technical problem, but it is rather a political decision problem. This is my opinion, Iulian.

Thank you!

• **Iulian Chifu – *Conflict Prevention and Early Warning Center, Romania***

General, there is no problem with that. I fully support your opinion, as the opinions of our younger, our young friend. I was just commenting on the presentation which was tackling the fact that Germany and France are blocking because of energy contracts, that is all. I can agree about the multitude or the number of, on the other hand I am also one of the persons who are supporting the fact that France and Germany, by all means, will be a part of the decision, at the end of the day. So, quarrelling a response in Germany is not the way to do it. First of all, it is the technical part that general Ionescu underscored, and we are far from having the technical part solved, and second one is the political one. Technical problem is not an issue, but the political decision is. If the technical problem would be an issue, perhaps a lot of NATO and European Union members would not have been members today. And I have also a little observation to the Ambassador, who was assuming the fact that the synergies of an agreement could be between the European Union and BSEC is not the case. The Black Sea Synergy is a policy of the European Union, where the BSEC is mentioned as a partner, but no money and no policies are done through the BSEC in the region. It is a policy that is done by the European Union, so it is just for the sake of the clarity.

Thank you very much!

• **Detlef Puhl – Chairman**

Thank you.

I would agree with what both of you said, that is, the question of whether or not Ukraine and Georgia will become NATO members is decided. It is in the communiqué. You will become members. The question in which conditions will they become members. That is a political question. And the German and French governments have declared all along that both countries are not ready yet, because they have to contribute to the security of all NATO members, and, at this point in time, they do not contribute to it. They have to not only receive security guarantees, they have to deliver something. And both countries, right now, are not in the position to do that. And the reasons have been mentioned, the conditions within those countries are not, at this point in time, sufficient to really guarantee that both countries contribute to the security of NATO. And I must also agree that it has to be seen also in the context of the integration fatigue, because it is linked to the question of *“do they belong to the European context?”* And there it is obviously even more difficult for the rest of the Union to commit to that, because we are struggling with *“what are we, who are we, the European Union? What are we supposed to be in the future?”* And we are digesting the most recent enlargements and we are disgusted, as we have seen, in the different consultations, this also has to be taken into consideration. I would now like to close this session, first with thanking the panelists for the contributions, and the discussants for the contribution to this very important debate, which will, of course, continue. I would like to point your attention now to two points that, I believe, have not been sufficiently addressed by the discussion, not by the contributors have expressed them, but I believe they deserve still more

consideration and these are: we talked a lot about the changes that have been brought about by the conflict between Georgia and Russia. We still need to consider more deeply, the still frozen conflicts in Nagorno-Karabakh and Moldova. Because I think that these are things that might come up very quickly and that we, as a community of nations, European Union, NATO, have to be able to deal with very quickly. And we have to ask ourselves the question: do the structures that we are talking about, can they help in any way to solve the problem? I know that our governments have been working for this for a long time, there are groups, friends of Georgia, friends of Azerbaijan and Armenia and so forth, efforts to solve the frozen conflicts, but they have not succeeded so far. And they have been going on for a long time. So, there is reason for us to ask ourselves: do we have to do something different? Because, just continuing efforts that lead nowhere does not make very much sense. So, I would just like to mention this at the end of this morning's discussion and maybe for reflection, later on.

This gives me the opportunity to invite you now for lunch. We will meet again at three o'clock in this room.

Thank you very much!

PANEL 3

NATO and EU Enlargement in the Greater Black Sea Area

- **Hariton Bucur-Marcu, Ph.D.** (The Center for Democratic Control of the Armed Forces, Romania) – **Chairman**

May I start the panel on non-conventional security issues in the Greater Black Sea Area?

Excuse me!

We speak about NATO and then the enlargement in the Greater Black Sea Area. And by the end of this session, one hour and a half, two hours from now, we have to come up with an understanding, what NATO and European Union are thinking about the Greater Black Sea Area as expanding their own memberships here, which is, of course, very appealing for some nations, that have on their security agenda NATO membership.

Without any further ado, I am going to give the floor to Detlef Puhl. He has already been introduced to you. He has already been a successful moderator before me and before lunch, so without any further ado I will give him the floor.

Ottfried Puhl, Ph.D.

**French Ministry of Defense
Paris, France**

**The EU and the Greater Black Sea Region
(the ESDP Dimension)**

Thank you, Hari.

It seems that my good friend, General Ionescu, chose to give me the very hardest part of this conference.

First, I had to rush you through the debate before lunch, which you could not wait to get to, and now I have the pleasure of talking to you after lunch, when you really want to take a nap, I guess. Now, we talked a lot about structures and institutions, before lunch, about the security structure in the Black Sea Area and we realized, I believe, that there is this and that, but it is not very coherent. In fact, there is no security structure at all, I think, in what we call now the Greater Black Sea Area, which has not been perceived as such until very few years ago. And which is still not perceived as such by all. And let us be frank, the concept of the Greater Black Sea Area, is foremost an intellectual concept, a political concept, thought by strategic thinkers, with great support from the United States. And that is what life to it and keeps it alive, because there is money coming from the other side of the pond, but this is also what keeps it from growing to adulthood, from living an active life. In consequence, serious players in the region refuse to adapt it or to support it, just because of what I earlier stretched. So, this is my first remark, at the very beginning.

Whenever we talk about the issue of security in this region, defined as a region, we encounter the very fundamental problem that the premise is not at all bought into by all. Now, when I was asked to talk about this issue in the context of an ESDP dimension, I thought I had a problem, because, again, there is really not very much to talk about. The Greater Black Sea Area is not a term used in the context of the European Union. And only last year, 2007, has the European Union attained, therefore, the community logic, as an initiative, complementary, explicitly, complementary to the European Union neighborhood policy, to the enlargement policy for Turkey and to the strategic partnership with Russia. All these frameworks that I was just talking about basically deal with the enhancement of cooperation, not with security and defense, although, as you know, the European Neighborhood policy figures in the European security strategy in 2003 as does the partnership with Russia.

But how little does this have to do with security policy; you can see when you look at the report on the first year of implementation of the Black Sea synergy, which was presented by the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament in June of this year. The Commission's tasks covered the following areas: environment, merit type policy and fisheries, energy, transport, managing movement and improving security, research, science and education networks, employment and social affairs, trade, democracy, respect for human rights and good governance, finally the frozen conflicts, cross border cooperation of civil society assistance.

Now, only very few of these topics deal with security issues, and could therefore be part of the SDP. Unfortunately, the

breakthrough for the SDP in this context, for the region, came with the war in Georgia, in August and the monitoring mission in Transnistria can be attributed to the SDP as well. So let me offer you some thoughts of mine on the issue. They are my personal thoughts, they do not, in any way, reflect any position defined by my ministry, which is, as I repeat, the French Ministry of Defense.

Security risks and threats in the region can be categorized, in my opinion, into three levels of concern, of reflection and of potential action. At the first level there are a number of very practical, down to earth risks and threats for the region as a whole. And these are basically environmental challenges: position of the sea and threats from the sea, like floods, risks for fish and fishery activities and risks from and for traffic at sea and along the coastlines. All these are, as you can easily see, addressed in the Black Sea Synergy Program. They are common to the whole region by nature. They are not or hardly caused by or subject to political action. And at the same time, though, they can best be addressed by political action in the form of cooperation among the countries of the region. And, of course, as we have discussed before, cooperation does not exist out of the blue. Cooperation needs engagement and engagement needs confidence in your partners. So, organizing cooperation in these very practical, yet relevant issues, can serve two purposes, at the same time: it can and should help solve the problem that you are confronted with, but it can and should also contribute to the building and strengthening of confidence. So, setting rules and procedures, creating structures to monitor and eventually actively prevent or find solutions to pollution in the Black Sea is something that not only helps preserve the Black Sea envir-

onment, common to all bordering states, it also can establish the reflex, the habits of working together, thereby creating or strengthening confidence in the other, thereby enhancing security as a whole.

The same is true for managing risks caused by or for traffic going on through the Black Sea and its region, or for all activities around fish. In this sense the European Union's *Black Sea Synergy* is addressing security issues and can play a vital part in the creation of security architecture in and for the region. But in a formal sense, this is not what you would call the ESDP dimension. It is the front yard of that ESDP dimension. And the better it looks, the nicer the flowers are, the easier it will be to attract partners to enter that dimension, the ESDP dimension and make it a good place to be, for there are, at a second level, a number of political strategic risks and threats which need to be addressed.

Lines of transportation of gas and oil are potentially subject to that risks, and secondly, the unstable neighborhood that we discussed about this morning represents a constant threat to security. A lot of Europe's needs in gas and oil transit through the Black Sea Region, be it in pipelines or be it on ships. And so the control of the water ways, of the ports and of the Bosphorus, as well as of the pipelines is of the utmost importance to the economic well being, not only of the bordering countries, but of the whole of Europe. That control can, of course, partly be done through technical means, but it may also need means of enforcement and like for any kind of use of force, need clear rules according to which such use of force might be authorized. How it may be used. You need to communicate its use, in order

not to create a situation of conflict with others. In short, the organization of security for the lines of transportation is best being done, again, in a cooperative manner among the countries of the region, which, again, need confidence, rules and structures. This way, you can also prevent any risk of blackmailing, that some countries are afraid of, or even subject to.

The immediate neighborhood of the Black Sea and indeed, the Black Sea Region itself, still is a very unstable area. We talked about this all morning. Of course, we have to think about the war between Georgia and Russia, we talked about that, but there is also the war between Armenia and Azerbaijan, over Nagorno-Karabakh, which is only on hold. There is insurgence and insurgents and terrorism in the Caucasus regions of Russia proper, I am talking of Chechnya, Dagestan, Ingushetia, there is open separatism in Moldova, and potential, maybe hidden separatism in Ukraine, talking about the Crimea, there is contention of the status of the Caspian Sea, where the region borders Iran, and the neighborhood is far from being stable, and there are other neighbors, who are not stable either, which is Iraq, Syria and all Central Asia. And here, the strategic situation of the Black Sea is part of the power game. That is guerilla war, more or less openly. There is a power game between Russia and the United States, which has become obvious since President Putin's speech at the Munich security conference in 2007. Applied to the Greater Black Sea Area, this means Moscow says stop to any further NATO expansion, to further US influence in the area, Russia is back to the game of zones of influence. While, we have to be frank, the United States is in for this game to, so that they can secure and/or gain influence in the Caucasus,

through Georgia and Azerbaijan, or in Central Asia, through Kazakhstan, or in Ukraine. There is the power game between Russia and Ukraine. That has to do, in my eyes, with Russia's power game with the US, both countries struggle over their influence in Ukraine. It has to do with history, of course to. It has to do with the nationality issues within the state of Ukraine; it has to do with the Crimea and the economic influence of Russian interests in the Ukraine. And I believe, further, there is also a power game between Russia and Turkey, two roughly equal powers in the region. I think we should never forget that. These two countries are equal powers in the region. For the time being, they are united in their refusal to let outside powers play a major role, meaning mainly the United States. They reunited on that, which is a rather unusual situation in history, when you look at Russian-Turkish relations.

So, these are the hard topic threats and risks, which clearly fall in the ESDP dimension. But they are not created in the Black Sea context, but in different other contexts. The ESDP mission in Georgia clearly is linked to the war with Russia. The ESDP mission at the Moldavian-Ukrainian border is linked to the Transnistria issue. The High Representative, the Special Representative for the South Caucasus, Mr. Peter Semmeby is a Swedish diplomat, and for Central Asia and the Georgia conflict which is, who is Pia Morrell, a French diplomat. Or in the case of Moldova we have Mr. Kalman Mizsei, a Hungarian diplomat. These representatives are clearly without any explicit link to the Black Sea. They are there, they are present, but there is no link to the Black Sea. So, the European Union and its ESDP is present in the region, but does not take part in the power game. Maybe that is not the European Union's role, to take part in the power game. But maybe it will have to adapt such a role.

This question, I believe, should give a lot of thinkers and strategists and politicians in the European Union plenty of opportunities to think and to publish. I think that really is a very fundamental point of concern. Does the European Union have to become part of the power game? This would change the European Union as an institution very much, because, I have come to the third level, there are some over arching risks and threats concerning the region, which have to be seen differently from the above mentioned issues. And these are risks, may turn into conflicts, and threats may turn into action. And secondly, if the countries of the region do not build confidence, if they do not develop cooperation, this may happen. So, the power games I was talking about are risky. Because nobody knows which factors drive the actors to act or to not act in a certain way. A risk may seem calculable and turn out not to be. Can, for example, a possible risk from the situation of the Crimea possibly in 2017 or before, when the Russian fleet is supposed to leave, can that risk be contained or not? I do not think we can be sure about that. Can the frozen conflict about Nagorno-Karabakh be solved or not? There have been talks recently, and there are constant efforts by many countries, but they have not come to a conclusion. How long can the situation in Transnistria remain the way it is? There is a great potential for conflicts in the region to erupt, if the countries do not work on their relationship with each other, if they do not engage into confidence building activities; if they do not work on the quality of their own governments.

The European Union framework of the *Black Sea Synergy* and of the *European Neighborhood Policy* are both designed to have a long term impact on the partners, in favor of addressing

risks and threats at this level. But this is not the European Security and Defense Policy either, in a formal sense. We, obviously, have to deal here with the fundamental question of the link between the ESDP and the rest of the European Union's activities. We have to talk about the link between pillars two and one. That is a very different problem, I know, but I am mentioning it here, because we have to be aware of it, it has a lot to do with whether or not the European Union can be effective and credible in its actions in the region. More is needed than just the execution of a number of projects, however ambitious they are.

The Black Sea still is not a strategic entity, I believe, by no means. The most recent summit declarations of the European Union-Russia Summit, or of the European Union-Ukraine Summit, simply do not mention the Black Sea. It is absent! So, to me this means that the European Security and Defense Policy dimension needs to include the development of a strategic perception of the Greater Black Sea Area, as a relevant strategic entity. Given the countries concerned, this problem is an impossible task, because the power games will not stop. And the European Union will have to become a real player in this game, which it's not, at least not yet. And it could and should do so, what it can do best, namely become a player. Namely with organizing cooperation, building structures, setting rules, starting with the very practical issues I was talking about. This is the European Union's major success. In a way this is going back to the functionalist model of European integration, back to the '50s and '60s, which has proven its value, after all. It is in this sense that I would like to see the ESDP dimension to the Black Sea region, offering, providing, creating the framework

for change, for moving together. True, it is an old method and it takes a long and constant effort to do it. But it has proven to be white, it has proven successful, for the European integration and for overcoming the Cold War. So, why not try that again? Why not try to do again, in different ways, of course, what has worked before? I can only encourage each and every one to adopt a model of success.

Thank you very much.

• **Hariton Bucur-Marcu – Chairman**

It was quite an enlightening way of looking into the European Union as a general approach on ESDP perspective in the Greater Black Sea Area.

Now, since it is time to look at the *Black Sea Synergy* as a main vehicle for the European integration, and this task is covered by a distinguished speaker, Ambassador Nicolae Micu. He is coming from the *EURISC Foundation*, which is one of the prestigious NGOs in Romania. He also is Editor-in-Chief of this foundation's publication.

Without any further ado, Ambassador, you have the floor!

Ambassador Nicolae Micu

EURISC Foundation Bucharest, Romania

**The Black Sea Synergy as the Main Vehicle
for European Integration**

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have thought of this subject, to speak about here, today, because it appears to me that the development which has taken place during the last two years in the Black Sea is in a sense a intensification of the European Union in the area. This offers probably the greatest hope for the future of this region. Because for the last 16 years, before the European Union became effectively involved in the efforts to stabilize the region, the countries of those areas have been trying within their own, smaller organization, to promote such a process, of increasing cooperation, which will bring, in case of a successful cooperation, will bring with it great mutual confidence between the participating countries, and so it would be easier it of thought in a favorable atmosphere to try to deal with more complex political issues of the areas, like frozen conflicts, relations between countries and so on.

Certainly, it was realized from the outset that we could deal with very a complex area, an area inhabited by a dozen of countries, of different sizes, from big powers to very, very small countries, of different countries at different levels of development, Turkey and Greece, more advanced, countries of different historical cultures and traditions, different languages. So, it was, in a way, amazing that such countries, to an observer, could come together and start a dialogue.

But as I said, the complexities of the area is such that the process has not been easy, in addition to those differences, certainly the competitions among some of the great and greater powers of the area, like Turkey, Russia and the Ukraine. Another issue that we have to discuss is the underdevelopment in the region. Most of the countries of the area are in a process of

transition, economically much less developed, and where you have underdevelopment, you have instability.

Organized crime is one of the phenomena which have developed in the area lately. And this is one of those major security risks in our era. So the phenomenon can only be controlled by cooperative effort of the countries of the area, with eventual assistance from outside. The European Union is very much interested in limiting this phenomenon, in preventing its expansion, because it will affect everybody in Europe and beyond it. And then you have the frozen conflict. What happened in Georgia indicates the need for doing whatever possible to take care of them, because in the case of Georgia we found out that an untreated sickness can explode over night and affect not only the region, but it would affect instantly the totality of the international relations. Conclusively, if there is a lesson to be drawn from that unfortunate case that took part last summer, this lesson would be an invitation to everybody to intensify efforts to find solutions to the Georgian conflict, which remains an unsettled problem, but also to Nagorno-Karabakh, to Transnistria and to other potential conflicts from the area. It affects the quality or the position of this region as a vital corridor of communication generally, between Europe and a major area of economic and strategic interest, as the Middle East, Central Asia and the Caspian. It is certainly vital for Europe, in the sense of energy transport from the sources in the Middle East and Central Asia to the continent, and one fundamental condition for that transport to be secure is to ensure first the stability of the region because that transport will not have a future if the region remains troubled with conflicts and wars.

I mentioned an initiative this morning, the *Black Sea Synergy*. Certainly, it is a European Union initiative, but the formulation of this framework of cooperation between the Black Sea countries and the European Union came as a result of lengthy consultations between the Black Sea countries and the European Union, it dates back to 2005. The question of cooperation with the European Union was a special item on the agenda of the foreign ministers of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation in Chisinau, Republic of Moldavia. And there, the initiative of several countries, including Romania, a special declaration was adopted, an appeal to the European Union to consider this fact, that it is in the interest of all the Europeans and the European Union to get more substantively involved in the Black Sea region cooperation, because some of the priorities of those countries, in the activity within the organization, like the infrastructures, energy, transport, communication infrastructure, like the protection of environment, controlling the organized crime in its large sense, including terrorism and trafficking of all sorts, such questions like frozen conflicts, those are questions which are of interest, of major interest, not only for the countries of the region, but for Europe, as a whole. So, it was a special declaration, adopted by the foreign ministers of the Black Sea countries, addressed to the European Union, asking the European Union to formulate a Black Sea dimension, a pointing dimension of the European Union's eastern policy, like the northern dimension. In the meantime, the *National Center for Black Sea Studies*, which is a BSEC component, in Athens, formulated a concept, which was discussed, sent to the European Union, discussed on the basis of it the European Union came with the *Black Sea Synergy*.

This is one aspect, and the second, that concept was discussed as a joint meeting of the foreign ministers of the European Union countries and of the Black Sea countries, at a special meeting in Kiev. And they agreed that they welcomed and agreed on this framework of cooperation, *Black Sea Synergy*. It is in this sense I said that it is also a sort of institutional arrangement between the two organizations. And now, the fact that the European Union is there, participating in programs, but we are still at the beginning, it will be more in the future, is a very hopeful factor for the region, because the European Union there comes with its political influence, with its economic capacities, and I think the Black Sea synergy is a necessary balancing element in the region. Now, with Russia, which gains more and more confidence, it is to be expected that they will more active in the future in international problems, then the presence of the European Union in the Black Sea, together with the countries of the region, will balance the situation there, because the Russian Federation certainly has also a fundamental interest in maintaining and developing a special relationship with the rest of Europe, with the European Union, first, and the successful intervention of the French president in Georgia in the name of the European Union's presidencies had an effect. Also, it is not an European Security and Defense Policy arrangement, but it is the intervention, in that case, worked and probably the European Union would have been the only instance which could have an effective intervention, and the proof was that Russians had to listen to that and within an unusually short time, the hostilities stopped and then, with some difficulties, the necessary withdrawals took place. Certainly, the European Union will have a saying; they can do much on the question of seeing how other

frozen conflicts can be settled. Again, no other intervention can be as effective as the European Unions.

Maybe NATO shows us now that it is present in the area. Also, I think that, as I look at this paper, they have main events planned for the period of international seminars. There are three mentioned, which deal with history, with the substance of the problems, the conceptual definitions of the Greater Black Sea Area, evolution of the regional security environment after the end of Cold War history. Maybe the forth discussion would be around different possible approaches to coping with the challenges in the Greater Black Sea Area. How can they given the experience, how can they better the approach in the future. And one last remark, several speakers underlined the fact that the problems of the area are mainly treatable through negotiations, political and diplomatic efforts. We had at these meetings certainly representatives from the Ministry of Defense. I think when we speak of the stability, security and cooperation of the Greater Black Sea Area, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs should be represented, one way or another.

Thank you.

• **Hariton Bucur-Marcu – Chairman**

Thank you very much indeed!

Now, the idea of NATO and European Union enlargement in the region of the Black Sea is not a new one. It was debated for a while. But the conflict in August this year made a lot of people to revisit this idea of NATO and the European Union enlargement in the Black Sea area, and

Professor Vasile Secăreș is going to elaborate a little bit on this idea of revisiting this enlargement after the Georgian war. Professor, you have the floor.

Vasile Secăreș, Ph.D.

Professor

**National School for Political Studies and Public Administration
Bucharest, Romania**

**NATO and EU Enlargement Revisited:
the Georgian War**

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I think we are already lagging behind the schedule with this session, so I would like to discuss only some conclusions, based on a larger presentation dealing with the impact of the Georgian war on NATO and the European Union's presence in the Greater Black Sea Area.

My first remark in this context would be that NATO and European Union's enlargement was and still is not only an instrument or a way to secure the wave of democracy, sweeping across East Europe, or to promote stability and prosperity in the region, but also a geopolitical process, a policy, having political, economic, security and military dimensions, generating a new geopolitical map of South Eastern Europe, especially geopolitical region in the making, and we have the concept of the Wider Black Sea Area, and establishing a new geopolitical frontier, the frontier of the Euro-Atlantic community.

My second remark is the fact that the dual enlargement of NATO and the European Union is creating a new strategic and security agenda, based on a new strategic and security reality in South East Europe. Again, reality captured by this new concept, Greater Black Sea Area. And my conclusion is that this region forms the hub of an emerging geo-strategic and geo-economic system, that stretch from the core of Europe to Central Asia and Afghanistan.

My third point is that the communities of security analysts, the strategic community is developing a very clear conclusion in the early 2000, namely the fact that the reshaping of the Greater Black Sea Area is a competitive process. More exactly, clash of competitive interest, of strategic positions and objectives, of political, military and economic actions. This reshaping is taking place in the field, based on real actions in the near abroad, in the former Soviet space and in the neighboring countries.

My forth point is that starting with the early 2000, especially after the NATO Summit in Prague in 2002, and the decision of 2004, NATO and the European Union, what I would call the institutional West, are facing a clear political, strategic and security necessity, namely to anchor the Greater Black Sea Area, especially the South Caucasus to the Euro-Atlantic system of security and to develop coherent policies in order to reach this target. I will not enter into the details, but in the larger presentation I developed the arguments and the elements of this necessity for the Euro-Atlantic community.

My fifth remark is the fact that in the context of this changing environment, the Euro-Atlantic policy makers are not really

prepared to deal with the implication of the dual enlargement of NATO and the European Union, or with the consequences of an ongoing geopolitical revolution in South East Europe. Let me mention only a few components of this lack of preparedness, of this lack of decision and effort. There is no clear concept on the new geopolitical front here in the Euro-Atlantic community, in NATO and in the European Union. Secondly, the Istanbul and the Bucharest Summits of NATO failed to outline a blueprint for the new eastward enlargement of the alliance. The same characterization is valid for the European Union and at this moment no clear vision, we have no clear vision of the Union on the geopolitical definition of the European Union. I am afraid that this is not only enlargement fatigue. It is not only enlargement fatigue in NATO and or in the European Union, but a lack of vision, a lack of a sense of direction and a lack of strategic coherence.

Let me mention also the fact that there is no such thing like a concerted Euro-Atlantic political strategy in the Wider Black Sea area. And finally, no efforts to initiate a long overdue transformation of conflict management in the Wider Black Sea area have been made, starting from Transnistria to Nagorno-Karabakh. Let me be more specific in this context with some elements, connected especially to the impact of the Georgian war. I said almost twenty years after the collapse of communism; the West did not emerge with a clear image and approach of the South Caucasus. Especially we have to mention the lack of a coherent vision on the requirement of these new frontiers or of these possible new frontiers of the Euro-Atlantic community. And this lack of vision has a result mixed signals, mixed messages to the countries of the region. I mention also the fact that was

no approach to conflict resolution and no initiative on regional post conflict reconstruction. Of course, we have the initiative of the European Union, as far as the reconstruction of Georgia is concerned. But Russia's presence, the situation before the Georgian war, and I would dare to say this is also the situation after the Georgian war, Russia has a de facto monopoly on peace keeping in the entire region of South Caucasus, preventing its Euro-Atlantic integration. This monopoly is a power and a geopolitical capability for Russia.

Even in spring [2008], during the Bucharest Summit of NATO, it was very clear that NATO was sending weak messages toward Russia and also toward the region, as far as the future Euro-Atlantic integration of this region is concerned. Not to mention important American versus European, and intra-NATO and intra-European Union divisions and different positions towards Russia. Let me also quote Vladimir Socor, who was mentioning that after the Bucharest Summit, we were witnessing Russian military threats and economic and transportation blockades, in the context of, or in contest with the, with overall Western passivity. There were signs of Moscow retaliatory moves in South Ossetia and Abkhazia - a sort of Kosovo independence impact. Russian pressures followed especially after NATO's consideration of Georgia's Membership Action Plan at the Summit. The Russian invasion in Georgia, I will not deal with the consequences or the characterization of the Georgia decision to use military force.

My friend, Hari Bucur, presented in detail the consequences of this unfortunate decision and I would address only NATO and European Union's actions and their consequences. So, I see the

Russian invasion as a clear show of a new power position, an example, a very good example of power politics. And the Russians' first move after the war was the recognizing the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, in defiance of the West. Even more, Moscow said it would maintain more than twice the prior number of troops in the region, and foreign minister Lavrov said that Russian troops will stay for long in the region. I see the NATO reaction and the European Union's reaction as rather weak reactions to the Russian invasion. Of course, secretary general of NATO, Schaffer, said that as long as Russian troops remain in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, NATO will be forced to suspend the NATO-Russia council. But Schaffer made no comment on when Georgia would be invited to join NATO. And this transitional period would have very important consequences, political and psychological and cultural consequences.

Let me mention also the fact that the idea of NATO ambassadors to go to Georgia was not to send a clear message on the alliance's intentions on the future of South Caucasus, but simply to underline that Russia has no right to veto Georgia's future, I mean the Euro-Atlantic future. And I see it, this message, as a weaker message.

Let me mention also the fact that the European Union's reaction was again sending mix signals to Russia and to the region. Of course, the European foreign ministers meeting was sort of, was seen as an instrument to intensify pressure on Russia to withdraw its troops from Georgia. The European plan to send at least 200 peacekeepers and also to offer money for reconstruction and the appointment of Ambassador Pierre Morel as a European Union Special Envoy for Georgia, are important

elements. But the peace deal broken by the European Union allowed Russia to maintain troops inside the breakaway regions, in a violation of Georgia's territorial integrity. The European Union's peacekeepers remain in the area just outside South Ossetia and Abkhazia, preventing them from monitoring Russia. And let me mention only the fact that the European Union hopes they will have access to this areas eventually. That is why a lot of analysis and other comments on this subject, including in France, or mentioning the fact that this peace plan was very favorable for Russia, *Le Nouvel Observateur* was mentioning at that moment that *"L'Europe accepte, par la voie du president francais, le demembrement de la Georgie, risquant ainsi de precipiter la Russie vers des nouvelles aventures militaires dans son ex-empire."*

I would mention also the fact that only one day after the European Union-Russia Summit, Prime Minister Putin announced an agreement with Uzbekistan to build a new gas route for the gas supplies from Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Again, this is a conjunction between the military instruments and economic and energy instruments. So, let me finalize my intervention with some conclusions. I would say that the new security front here, of the Euro-Atlantic community has no meaning without bold and coherent policies of NATO and the European Union in this region. The weak or passive attitude of the institutional west will encourage even more risky behavior of Russia in the future. And that is because the West has accepted the Russian *"fait accompli"*. The Georgian war has exposed a deep division US versus Europe and within NATO, over how to respond to a newly assertive Russia. Those whom we saw in Bucharest, they have hardened.

Let me mention that some European Union member countries have argued that the Georgian war could have led to a military confrontation with Russia, if Georgia had already been in the alliance. It could have not. Avoiding instead the Russian invasion and, of course, the Georgian initial decision. Let me remind you that this spring, more exactly in May 2008, the European Union failed to have a common position at the UN on the Georgian resolution concerning the right of expulses to return to Georgia's Abkhazia region, results of Russian operations of ethnic cleansing in 1993. The Georgian war shows the negative impact of a strategic decoupling of Europe and the United States.

This kind of strategic decoupling would endanger the Euro-Atlantic community and I think that NATO and the European Union should develop a great deal of institutional innovation, in order to facilitate more coordinated security policies on the new Euro-Atlantic frontier. The United States and Europe must define at least some components of a strategic vision and some wide lines on the present reshaping of the geopolitical map and the stages of the Greater Black Sea area. At this moment, Russia managed to maintain the so called controlled instability. It managed to continue its old policy of *"divide et impera"*, and of direct military involvement in South Caucasus, preventing a real dynamic of regional cooperation and Euro-Atlantic integration.

I am especially concerned of the fact that NATO failed to adopt a proactive or even preemptive approach and to perform its role as a cooperative security system, able to promote or to restore stability in areas on its referee. You may remember that during the '90s, there was a huge debate on this concept of cooperative security system as a modern form for NATO transfor-

mation, an important debate for the necessity for NATO to adopt a proactive or even a preemptive approach in the realm of security. Let me finish my intervention by saying that, if at a political level, the center, the center of the international system, more exactly the Euro-Atlantic community failed to adopt a proactive and a decisive attitude as far as this reshaping of the geopolitical map is concerned, the globalization had a very clear answer to this fact. I have in mind the fact that after the Georgian war, the new Russian president, Medvedev, was shocked to see that the monetary, the stock markets in Russia collapsed; the foreign investment reacted in a very decisive way to the impact of the Georgian war.

So, I would say that it right time to develop, to restore the connection between the economic dimension or the economic level of the international system and the political and security dimensions or levels.

Thank you very much.

• **Hariton Bucur-Marcu – Chairman**

Thank you very much, Professor.

Now it is time not for discussions, not for a brake, not for coffee, but for Iulian Fota, who is Director of the *National Defense College* in Bucharest, to present his intervention on cooperation and complementarities in NATO and the European Union's policies, whatever those policies are, in the Greater Black Sea Area.

Iulian Feta

Director
National Defense College
Bucharest, Romania

**Cooperation and Complementarities in NATO
and the EU's Policies in the Greater Black Sea Area**

Thank you.

Maybe it is easier to say that there will be no enlargement for the next few years, and then to take a break. But I think that this will not solve the problem. So, I have a few ideas.

I will speak about the [NATO and the European Union] enlargement. First of all, I think that for the moment, the only enlargement on the table is the enlargement of NATO, because at least, if you read the paragraph from the NATO summit in a very optimistic way, NATO said that Georgia and Ukraine will be NATO members. NATO said neither when nor how Georgia and Ukraine will become NATO members. At least, when it comes to NATO, we have an enlargement in the Black Sea area on the table, or at least the idea of enlargement.

When it comes to the European Union, there is nothing relative to enlargement for the Greater Black Sea Area and I think that I have seen speculations that the *European Neighborhood Policy* was designed specially to avoid any kind of discussions about enlargement in the European Union, when it comes to the Greater Black Sea Area, which is a very interesting subject.

It is very important to discuss about the fact that the enlargement was a very useful, a very efficient tool for encouraging countries in Central Europe to promote reforms and to develop democratically and I think that for NATO and the European Union, the enlargement was the only efficient tool for promoting reforms. The question for the Black Sea will be if without enlargement, without a very credible open door policy of NATO and the European Union, democracy and market economy will be pushed forward in countries where we know that due to very particular historical and geopolitical, cultural reasons the reforms are moving forward very slowly.

So I think that it will be very important for NATO and the European Union to keep the enlargement on the agenda and to look for an opportunity to make countries believe that the enlargement is possible. Because enlargement is a very important tool, but on the other hand, if you look at the West today and where NATO and the European Union member countries are and what kind of problems they have on their own agenda, you will see that enlargement, not only in the Black Sea, but generally speaking, enlargement will have to fight to survive on the agenda, because, for the moment, there are some other very pressing issues related with the management of globalization.

The problem is that all the NATO and the European Union member countries, for the moment, are very much forced to deal with globalization, to find a way or solution to manage this globalization to manage the financial and economic crisis and to reshape, if not completely, at least partially the international situation built after the World War II.

The problem with the enlargement in the Greater Black Sea Area is that due to the fact that globalization is reaching a critical point, there are less and less resources for enlargement and there are more and more resources required to be focused on management of globalization and reshaping the international system.

So for the moment I think that enlargement will stay on the agenda for NATO and for the European Union, but it will not be one of the top priorities. I would like to say a few words about the patterns of previous enlargement, because it is very interesting how NATO and the European Union enlarge up to now. If you look at the previous enlargements, every enlargement started with NATO. Practically the countries were preparing to join the West and NATO was focused on very important, but very general reforms. Later on the European Union's enlargement came; this necessitated very deep reforms in fields of society, economics, and politics in Central European countries. So, always the first step was made by NATO, the next step was done by the European Union.

When it comes to the Black Sea, I think that this pattern should be discussed and I think that when it comes to the Greater Black Sea Area, this could be a solution for keeping the enlargement alive and on the table.

First of all, there is a very clear and tough reaction of Russia against NATO enlargement and I do not think that this Russian attitude will decline for the next few years, although on the medium and long term I do not think that Russia has enough resources to oppose the NATO enlargement, but for the next

two-three years Russia will be quite tough on not letting NATO to enlarge to the East, including using military force, if it is possible. Russia knows very well that, on the one hand US is military involved in already two very important wars, so, practically the US has no more military resources to be used, on the other hand Europeans are totally unable, you know, to challenge Russia militarily. There is no country in Europe, for the moment, able or having the capabilities to challenge Russia militarily. So, practically, NATO enlargement for the next two-three years will not be possible.

But when it comes to European Union enlargement, here I think, could be a possible solution for making everybody happy. On the one hand there are already countries in the Black Sea Area looking only for integration in the European Union, Moldova is one of them, on the other hand an enlarging of all Europe could be solution good enough for everybody to declare themselves satisfied. I would like to end, quoting two paragraphs from the very recently released the *"Global Trends 2025"* report of the *National Intelligence Council*. Very interesting, there is almost nothing about the NATO and European Union enlargement in this report, and we have here about 120 pages speaking about, analyzing the globalization and how this globalization can be managed. There is one paragraph, one page about the future of democracy, and I would like to quote only the title and one paragraph, so the title is *"Future of Democracy - backsliding more likely than another wave"*, so practically there are much more concerns on regress of democracy than having another wave of democratic development, including enlargement, and the report says that *"we remain optimistic about the long term prospects for greater democratization, but*

advances are likely to slow and globalization will subject many recently democratized countries, to increase social and economic pressure that could undermine liberal institutions."

So I think that when it comes to NATO and European Union enlargement, the progress will be slow. We will have progress, but it will be slow and I think that on the medium and long term good news is that Russia will not be able to stop enlargement, but on the short term they are in the position to have something to say. Why I say that on the medium and long term they are not able to stop enlargement? Because, if you look demographically at Russia, and economically their problems are increasing. Russia is going down demographically, the economy I do not think that they are as strong as it seems and they will have more than one problem, especially if the price for oil and gas will stay low. So, that is my intervention.

Thank you.

• **Hariton Bucur-Marcu - Chairman**

Thank you very much.

It is very kind of you to finish before the break.

Now, we have about four minutes of discussions. What we can do is to collect some big ideas on the table for the record. And then we may exchange some ideas during the coffee break. That means having some reaction to whatever ideas you may want to pass at this table. But before going there, I want to remind you that the European Union is not involved in the power game and is advised from this panel to go there. To have the European Union involved in the power game for the Black Sea area

and that is a very profound reflection on that. On the other hand, we are speaking about, *volens nolens* the next frontier of the Euro-Atlantic community, here. And that frontier should be in the old fashioned way of the basic model of modern society, which is a Roman Empire, because if the frontier is collapsing, the metropolis is collapsing. More than that we would like to see that the enlargement fatigue is not there yet, and the political masters will come up with a plan for the region, consistent with the mission of the people in the region. And, of course, the idea of the European Union first and NATO second in enlargement is also a very appealing idea, but we have to consider, as we said at this table that Georgians are about 70 percent in favor of joining NATO. Now, that is a good way of saying that NATO will have a case there. But at the same time we could wonder, out of a sociological point of view, what is the background of this option. This is one way of putting it. Another way of putting it, was like in Romania and other places in Eastern Europe. They said *"we are not able to govern ourselves. Let us have European Union, let us have NATO come down and govern with us. Then, our government, which is not totally responsive to Romanian and to the public options, would be, by necessity, responsible to a higher organization."* And that might be also the case, I do not know exactly which of those options might be behind the 75 percent. And if we have an answer to that, both also for Ukraine, then we may have an answer which comes first, European Union or NATO. Only 25 percent of Ukrainians vote for European Union and NATO membership.

Questions and answers

- **Hariton Bucur-Marcu – Chairman**

Let us have a round table impressions, comments, questions, with no answers yet.

Yes, please, identify yourself.

- **Marina Muscan – *National Defence University, Romania***

My name is Marina Muscan. I am a Ph. D. candidate at the *National Defense University “Carol I”*. I would like to make an intervention regarding your remark earlier about the power game, in which the European Union should or should not involve itself. According to the *Central Intelligence Agency*, the European Union's indicative of power is 9.54 or 9.57, so it should consider itself a power on a global level. So, it could become an important actor regarding the international policy. And it should involve itself in the power game in the region.

This is my personal opinion.

- **Hariton Bucur-Marcu – Chairman**

Thank you very much, Very, good opinion!

I would like to agree with my colleague, Detlef. The European Union is becoming a more and more active player. Not just in the region, but globally. Let us take into consideration that the GDP of the European Union, I mean all 27 countries, is \$16 trillion, which prevails the GDP of United States of America that is \$13 trillion. Furthermore, for example, most of the 60 percent of the foreign aid to developing countries is coming on the part of the European Union. More than that in the European Union, after the Amsterdam Summit, the Nice Summit and the

St. Malo Agreement, it was settled to start a new initiative, introducing the security and defense policy of the European Union and even a Constitution, which has not been adopted unfortunately yet, but it was taken into consideration the introduction of a new post, Minister of Defense of the European Union. Anyway, the involvement of the European Union in different peacekeeping operations, as I mentioned in Macedonia and Bosnia and even in Darfur, plays very important role in increasing the authority of the European Union. But with regard to the Greater Black Sea Area and the European Union's involvement in this region, especially in the Southern Caucasus it is necessary to have some common strategy, because most important factor which hampers somehow to formulate the common strategy in sphere of security. With regard to NATO, 77 percent of the Georgian society sustained during the referendum the enlargement. The main reason is of course, that Georgia would like to be protected from Russian Fédération, and in this case the main symbol of independence represents NATO.

Thank you.

• **Lucian Dîrdală – Mihail Kogălniceanu University, Romania**

My name is Lucian Dârdală. I teach International Relations at the Mihail Kogălniceanu University in Iași. I will put it as short as I can. Can the European Union really become a player in the Greater Black Sea Area, while keeping Turkey out?

• **Hariton Bucur-Marcu – Chairman**

That is a very valid question. Simona first and then Claudia.

• **Simona Soare – *Institute for Political Studies of Defense and Military History, Romania***

Thank you to the panelists for their interesting presentations!

I would very much like to ask you a couple of questions. My first question would be the following: it has become clear that the Eastern dimension, shall we say this generally, is not a priority either for the European Union, as we know, or for NATO. But what would you feel are the mechanisms that regional states, the Central and Eastern European states, members of these two organizations, should employ in raising awareness within NATO and the European Union, as such, towards the importance, the strategic importance of this region? This was my first question.

My second question has actually to do with the degree that the panelists think that regional states and Eastern states, in general have not really made up their mind about what kind of policy the Eastern dimension, either in NATO or in the European Union should be? Should it be a regional ownership oriented policy, where, you know, regional states just seek EU support or the European Union's institutional umbrella, or do they seek more active involvement of Brussels in the European Union, as an organization?

And thirdly, and this is a comment more than a question, I feel that, when discussing the issue of the Greater Black Sea Area, we are not really focusing on issues; we are mostly focusing on partners. We are searching partners, we are underlining series of issues we need to tackle, but we actually are searching for partners. And when doing so, we actually lose insight of these issues. And this whole process, whole diplomatic process, it is somewhat unfocused.

Thank you so much!

• **Hariton Bucur-Marcu – Chairman**

Now Claudia.

• **Claudia Sădean – EURISC Foundation, Romania**

My name is Claudia Sădean, Research fellow at the EURISC Foundation. I would like to link a few ideas that I have heard in your presentations.

One it is the quation of cooperation, engagement, creating confidence in your partners. The other one it is the problematic of critical infrastructure protection: Communications, transportation, energy, etc. In 2010 we will have the Olympic winter games in Soci, in Russia. The amounts that they have already invested for these Olympic Games is huge. In nede circumstance having not only investments of the Russian government, but also the Russian private companies investing in transportation and communication lines between Europe and Russia and abroad and Russia, they will, as well, control the Greater Black Sea Area. Maybe this could be a solution to involve the new economical elites in the region, the private sector, to focus on developing of the Area. I must remind you in this context that, until recently, we did not have direct flights to Bulgaria, who is our neighbor and also member state of the European Union, as well as to the other neighboring countries. How can we reach this confidence building and this level of understanding not only of the government level, but you also need of the other sectors of society as well, if you do not have these contact means.

Thank you.

PANEL 4

Non-Conventional Security Issues in the Greater Black Sea Area

- **Iulian FOTA** (National Defense College, Romania) -
Chairman

Ladies and gentlemen,

We have had a long day is in front of us talking about non-conventional security issues in the Greater Black Sea Area! Next we have a group of distinguished speakers. So we will listen with great interest to the presentations.

The first on the program of this session is Mr. Iqbal Hadjev, *"The pipeline geopolitical war in Caucasus (1991 to Nowadays)"*.

You have the floor.

Iqbal Hadjev, Ph.D.

Azerbaijan

The Pipeline Geopolitical War in Caucasus (1991 to Nowadays)

Thank you very much!

I heard a lot about the security problems in the Greater Black Sea Area, these days but I think that we cannot speak about the

Greater Black Sea Area if we do not speak about the Caspian Sea area. In much circumstances I would like to present the geopolitical situation in this area, from 1991 to nowadays.

At present, the struggle for influence in this area of the world, the former Soviet Caucasus has taken a special place within Russia's substantial foreign policy priorities. In fact, the region has become one of vital importance for economic and security interests, both regionally and globally. The independent states of the southern Caucasus - Azerbaijan and Georgia - grasping with the difficulties of rapid economical and social transition are searching for keys to independence, stability and development.

In the eyes of the world communities, the dominant issues in the Caucasus in recent years have been the violent conflicts that erupted in the region, during the final years of the Soviet Union and in the aftermath of its dissolution. In addition to the search for political solutions to the ongoing ethnic conflicts, the geopolitical complexities, oil and natural resources and economic politics in the Caspian basin are some of the most vital issues in the post-Soviet Caucasian region. Ethnic conflicts, humanitarian crisis, instability, these are serious problems in which the Caucasian states are becoming more and more involved. Many nations living in the Caucasian region are still trapped in horrific conflicts and have not found a lasting peace and stability. These conflicts, which until recently have devastated the Caucasus, took a heavy toll in terms of human lives. Many refugees still live in sordid conditions and there is the ever growing pressure to address this problem.

Since the end of the Cold War, the post Soviet Caucasus has emerged as a very important geo-strategic area where the

United States, Russia, Iran, Turkey and many other external countries experience conflict for influence and power. This factor, along with problematic relationships among the former Soviet states, produce continuing rivalry for control in the Caucasus, among the regional and great powers, and they have made geopolitical conditions unfavorable for new states' survival.

Between these states, there are three stages in the history of geopolitical developments in the Caucasus, since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The first stage is from 1991 to 1994, the second from 1994 to 2003 and the third stage is from 2003 to the present time. During the first stage, from 1991 to 1994, after the dismantling of the USSR and the ensuing emergence of new polities in the Caucasus area, the United States of America asserted itself as a prominent actor in the region. The newly emerged states - Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia - were confronted with the weight of the internal problems, generated by the disintegration of the USSR and the post-Soviet anarchy, as well as with problems related to the vulnerability of the geopolitical basis for independence.

Concerning the stability of the Caucasus, this area was strained by some serious ethnic conflicts in the region, such as wars that occurred in Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, to name just a few. In addition, the situation was further complicated by this so called "*oil geopolitics*". In so many ways, beside the geopolitical coalitions and the prospect of ethnic conflicts in the Caucasus area, due to the struggle to get a hold on the energetic sources in the region, the powers of the world began to assert considerable influence. Consequently, there has been noticed a certain tendency of amplification of the pro

Western drift of the Caucasus on the one side, as well as some easing of Russian influence, on the other side.

Since 1991, Western companies began to take rule openly in the region. With the coming to power of the Popular Front in May 1992, Azerbaijan has started to officially head towards the speeding up of the pro-Western oil strategy. Ever since this moment, the peace-keeping process and all diplomacy have come to manifest themselves as Baku expected, the geopolitical strategy, as well as oil power was used to overcome its dependence on Russia and leave an operative open space for the decision-making of the country's problems. By virtue of geographical closeness of the region to the world markets, the issue of the routes of transit for oil has become to hold a special value for Baku.

Consequently, in 1992, the *"pipeline geopolitical war"* began, and have captured the region as a whole. From all the theoretical possible expedient routes, the Northern through Russia, the Southern through Iran and the Western through Georgia or Turkey, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan project answered the aspirations of Baku, for a pro-Western strategy, as well for a more reliable strategic partnership with the USA and Turkey. More or less, such an alternative could have spoiled an opportunity for the political settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. In 1994, the United States of America and Russia observed a gentlemen's agreement. Conflicts were supervised by Moscow, while Washington confidently and actively supervised the oil issue. At the same time, Russia gradually tried to defend claim for a share of the Caspian oil, while the West was taking the initiative in the peace-making sphere. This situation prolonged until early 1994.

The second stage, from 1994 to 2003, began with an agreement on cease fire in the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, which was concluded in Bishkek, under the patronage of Moscow. At the same time in September 1994, Baku officially announced that an energy partnership had been concluded with some important oil companies. The signing ceremony with the Western companies also known as the signing of the *"contract of the century"*. A number of agreements followed, ones settling the peace-making terms and others creating the pre-conditions for the introduction of the United States of America and NATO in the region, while some other referred to the exclusive oil claims of the West. At that moment, it seemed that the geopolitical prospects of the Caucasus area were determined according to some independent plans of development. Russia carried out peacemaking missions, while the United States of America was very concerned.

However, first let me show that ever since this moment, the geopolitical processes in the Caucasus began to assert themselves as confrontational. Having fixed the peacemaking processes in the Caucasus, Russia openly began to oppose to all Western-backed pipelines with certain trajectories, while the West, in its turn, increased the endeavor to merge with a Western road for the Caspian oil as well as to limit Moscow's peacemaking missions. As a result, peacemaking and all diplomacy were placed in a very difficult geopolitical unit. Conflicts and pipelines became accompanied of the wider context that defines the geopolitical climate of the Caucasus. Soon, it became clear to all that the region was engaged in the geopolitical war under the formula *"all means are good for achieving the purpose"*. The West tried, in every possible way, to push aside Russia and impose in the

area its own model. As geopolitical comprehensible projects of pipelines were exposed, strangely enough, they provoked debates regarding the chosen routes. As a consequence, the Caucasus area remained tangled in the vicious circle generated by the geopolitical coalitions in the war game. Even nowadays, the climate in the region may be characterized as one of latent geopolitical confrontations, dominated by the United States of America and Russia. Meanwhile, the conflict of interest gradually increased, mobilizing Russia, Iran and Armenia, on the one side, and the United States together with Turkey, Azerbaijan and Georgia, on the other.

Nowadays, one may speak of about symbiotic connections between the map of conflicts and the map of routes. It is no longer a secret that all geopolitics exploits the symbiosis of conflicts and routes, while in some cases it provokes new hot beats for turmoil. The Northern route of transportation for the Caspian oil was at all times in the focus of attention due to the geopolitical weight of Russia in the Caucasus area. However, the Republic of Azerbaijan, by coordinating its priorities with the old strategy, has demonstrated heightened interest in the Western world. Naturally, this provoked sharp counter action on the part of Russia. But all Russian efforts to impose to its opponents as expedient the Northern route, Baku-Novorossiysk. The oil factor, not only was associated with the Chechen crises, but also provoked Moscow to war. More persistently, Russia intended to proceed to the transit of oil through+ that territory, without actually providing a viable solution for a long lasting peace in Chechnya. Its opponents refused to give way to the Kremlin's extensive claims to participate to the pipeline game,

their indirect message to Moscow being that the pipeline game was impossible, due to the Chechen conflict. Thus, in December 1994, there began a confrontation. Having increased the risk factor for the Northern route, the conflict in Chechnya essentially devalued Russian chances of transportation of the Caspian oil. The creation of the old partnership between Georgia and Azerbaijan has consolidated their strategic ties with the West. In this context, the Chechen problem represent only a detail, taking into account the overall oil transit in the Caucasus area.

During the third stage, from 2003 to the present time, under the conditions stated above, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan to Turkey has come to present a focus of attention for the West, as well as for Baku and Tbilisi. However this route is not at all stress free, as it bypassed a problematic area such as Nagorno-Karabakh region, as well as most Georgian Abkhazia. In addition to this, one should mention the Kurdish situation in Turkey.

In the West, besides the process of speeding up the plans for building the Baku-Ceyhan route, there has been noticed a tendency of interference between the oil and conflict factors. The peacemaking process was conditioned by the positioning of the problematic areas in the zone dominated by the oil game. Thus, peacemaking and all diplomacy passed through the formula "oil in exchange for the world". But, as far as Russia and Armenia were concerned, such an arrangement involving oil trade was considered unacceptable and therefore led to the tightening of their military partnership. However, despite the conflict potential in the area, the West consistently increased the geopolitical weight

it projected on the Baku-Ceyhan initiative and began acting on it. Now, the route is finished. Pro-Western oil strategy of Georgia and Azerbaijan led to the restriction of the role that Russia played in region. Baku and Tbilisi did not only elude the Russian sphere of influence, but also became contenders in the struggle for the route of transit of the energetic sources of the Caspian Sea and the geopolitical future of the Caucasus. Having in mind the developments of the past years, as well as Tehran and Moscow solidarity regarding the opposition to pro-Western oil policy of Baku, consequently one cannot easily imagine the transformation of Azerbaijan in the tampering for the West, especially regarding pro-NATO behavior.

Concluding with the matter, the Caucasus is a rather attractive location of geopolitical competition and an area of confrontation of interests, with actors ranging from an increasingly influential West to the weakened Russia and Iran. Given the density of conflicts and the intensity of geopolitical confrontations, the Caucasus is an area of increased risk. Bearing in mind USA presence in the region, in order for the Caucasus to become a tampering for the West, the area requires some military counterbalancing, as far as Iran is concerned and any other adjacent power. However, the geopolitical situation depends on the development of the South Ossetia and Abkhazia complex in Georgia, as well as on the evolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh situation. Over all, we can say that for the peaceful future, the region requires some strategic planning, as well as constant and peaceful policies in the region, on the account of Russia.

Thank you very much!

• **Iulian Fota - Chairman**

Thank you, sir!

Very interesting what you have said. When we speak of South Caucasus, you may consider the region as part of the Caspian Sea. So, we, the people from the Western part of the Greater Black Sea Area, we thought that South Caucasus, including Azerbaijan, is a part from this concept of Greater Black Sea Area, which is based on one simple fact: the area is what you consider part of Europe. Azerbaijan together with Armenia and Georgia have been members of this Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation from '90-'92.

Certainly, now we know that there is a tendency to also speak of a Black Sea-Caspian region, because now the area is becoming more and more in the center of attention because of this energy link, Europe-Caspian Sea-Central Asia. Now, oil diplomacy, the play of influence in the area all that is happening there. The same tendencies and the same struggle for influence has extended westward and if we speak of pipelines, oil and gas pipelines, certainly there is a connection: Caspian-Black Sea, then Black Sea-Central and Western Europe. And here you have the same kind of competition. You have the Russian pipelines - North Stream, South Stream - and the European Union's Nabucco, which would cross Central and Eastern Europe, also through Romania. There is, certainly, a logical competition. In fact, the Russians want most of the pipelines, if not all of them, to go through their territory, to be controlled by them. Countries in Western Europe and in Central and Eastern Europe also are very much concerned with finding alternatives to the Russian

sources, including alternative routes of transport. But there is also a verbal fight which does not facilitate the matter. When one speaks in Europe about Nabucco, it is always stressed that Nabucco is an alternative to the Russian gas pipelines. The truth of the matter is that now and in the future those pipelines, the Russians ones and the other alternatives, will remain to a large extent complementary "*by blindness*", because the needs of Western Europe will continue to grow and the existing corridors will be insufficient. Therefore, you need alternative or, let us put it this way, additional pipelines and it will be within the mentality of diversification of energy sources and of transit routes.

So, if you do not stress the idea of alternative, about how the European Union member states will become independent of that Russian control on energy, then that idea of alternative usually invites reactions and disputes, verbal disputes. If we call them complementary routes and sources of oil and gas for Europe, then we enter into the field of cooperation between all oil producing, transit countries and oil consuming.

That's all, thank you for listening!

The next speaker is Mr. Șerban Cioculescu who will talk about Romania's energy priorities and dilemmas in the Greater Black Sea region.

You have the floor, please.

Șerban Cioculescu

Senior Researcher
Institute for Political Studies of Defense and Military History
Bucharest, Romania

Romania's Energy Priorities and Dilemmas in the Greater Black Sea Region

Thank you very much.

Ladies and gentlemen,

I will try to deliver you a presentation of the current energy situation of Romania, especially concerning oil and gas resources, and to bring some ideas about the possible future of our energy situation.

Romania entered the 21st century as an industrialized and modernizing country with the clear prospect for the European Union and NATO membership. Now, our country is fully integrated into the family of European and Euro-Atlantic nations and for the first time in the modern history we are not threatened by a foreign and aggressive power from outside and the focus is not on military security but on economic development and the fight against the transnational asymmetric risks associated with globalization.

Today, the whole economic and social security still is dependent on the access to energy resources. Therefore, the Romanian decision-makers should clearly identify the main

priorities of the energy politics for the medium and long run but also try to solve the possible dilemmas which could damage the coherent strategic action in this realm.

In terms of geo-strategy, the Greater Black Sea Area is a strategically and economically important area, being a significant producing and a transit space, especially for the European Union and its member states. It is well known that the European Union is already one of the most important gas and oil consumers in the world and it is dependent on imports from outside. Bringing oil from the Middle East and Africa, gas from Russia, Algeria, the European Union has a major interest in developing its own energy projects in order to reduce its dependency from foreign countries.

It is well-known that European Union imports about 50-60 percent of its oil and gas from abroad, of which 25 percent comes from Russia. In the future, about 80 percent of the gas will be imported, with probably 40 percent from Russia! But within the European Union there are huge discrepancies among states which have resources and states which do not have and should rely only on exports or alternative sources.

Romania is not energetically independent, that's for sure! In 2007, about 50 percent of its necessary oil has been imported and 40 percent of the gas also came from abroad. About 7 million tones of oil are produced each year in Romania. This means \$4.5 billion at an estimated price of \$70 a barrel.

But Romania still has natural reserves which are reducing its dependency on foreign supplies. For example, about 60

percent of the gas which is annually consumed within our country is extracted here. Some experts consider Romania to be the energy-best endowed country from Central and Eastern Europe with reserves of near 600 millions barrels (more than 72 millions tones) of oil, about 185 billion cubic meters of natural gas and 540 million tons of coal. The oil and gas reserves are limited as amount and, after 1990 the domestic production was in permanent decline. If in 1976, the best year concerning domestic production, there were 14.7 million tones, in 2005 the figure was only 5.2 million tones. The domestic production of natural gas fell to about 12.5 billion cubic meters in 2005, which represented 71.4 percent from the total annual natural gas consumption.

Therefore, all the scientific assessments show that Romania will need to import more and more natural foreign gas and this is made crystal clear especially by the Government Project *"The Energy Policy of Romania between 2006-2009"*, which has been discussed by the *Supreme Council of National Defense*. Romania consumes annually about 17-18 billions cubic meters of gas and imports about 30-40 percent of it (approximately 12 billion from internal production and some 6 billion cubic meters per year imported from Russia). Romania will raise its consumption from about 18 billion in 2003 to perhaps 29 billion cubic meters in 2025 and the imports may rise to 50 percent. The proven reserves existing in Romania are expected to last for another 25-30 years at existing level of extraction, but this depend on the economic growth rates. Hydrocarbures nowadays cover about 63.5 percent from the primary energy consumption in Romania.

The participation in the building of multinational energy infrastructures raises the issue of the costs to be supported and

the expected benefits. Romania was scheduled, some years ago, to contribute with about 1800 millions to the Nabucco gas-pipeline but now, because Nabucco's price is estimated to about 8 billion Euros, not only 4.4 billion as one had announced previously, our burden sharing will be certainly increased. It is worth mentioning that 457 kilometers of this pipeline will be on Romanian territory. The Romanian company TransGaz Medias is involved in the project together with Botas (Turkey), BulgarGaz (Bulgaria), MOL (Hungary), OMV Austria and maybe Gas de France or a German company. Initially, Nabucco will most probably count only on the gas from Azerbaijan but one should not ignore Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, maybe also Iran, Egypt and Iraq. In the future, the building of the Constanta-Trieste oil pipeline will also involve a cost to be supported by Romania, but we all hope the benefits will later exceeds the costs.

Romania endorsed all the principles and goals which are contained within the Green paper – *"A European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy"* of the European Union and also those from the Black Sea Synergy document: diversification of resources, alternative solutions, reduction of the pollution levels, effectiveness, fair competition etc. The political leaders and public opinion favors the respect of the principles of the *European Energy Charter* by all the third countries which want to buy European infrastructures.

Regarding the relationship with Russia, the *European Energy Strategy* considers Russia as being an *"equal and essential partner"*, underlining the need to ensure a mutual, fair and equal access to energy infrastructures and markets. Russia is asked to sign the *Energy Charter Treaty*. The European Union officials do not want to endanger the relations with Russia, which is

already tensed after the 2006-2007 incidents (Moscow's quarrel with Poland and the Baltic states). In September 2007, the European Commission requested Members to adopt more restrictive measures against energy companies from third countries that do not grant the same facilities procurement infrastructure in the European Union member countries – the so-called "*Gasprom clause*". So third countries should provide market access to their energy resources similar to that offered by Europeans, otherwise they could be kept out of the game! Buyers of European foreign infrastructure must demonstrate that they have open markets of the distribution of gas and do not practice energy policies contrary to those of the European Union!

Concerning Russia, Bucharest recognizes that this is a very important partner but says that energy is and must remain a commodity, a commercial product, not an instrument of political pressure or blackmail. President Traian Băsescu also stated that Romania firmly supports the policy of separation of activities of transport energy from other activities in the field of energy extraction and processing (full ownership unbundling), being consistent principles and rules of competition in the internal energy market in the European Union and the neighborhood. The same opinion as our country is shared Great Britain, Ireland, Netherlands, Sweden and Spain, while countries that oppose the most vehement are Austria, Bulgaria, Germany, Greece, France, Estonia, Luxembourg and Slovakia. The first category adopt the arguments of the European Commission, which conforms to concentrate production capacity and sales giants firms, same energy make it difficult to market entry of new entrants and thus distorts competition. To maintain a place in the sectors of production and sale fear of violating property rights

and European firms such purchase by separate companies in third countries.

Priorities

- Access to unrestricted and cheaper resources of gas and oil from abroad
- Take part in the European Union's energy projects, but not ignoring other foreign offers if they are fair and transparent
- Taking advantage of the natural reserves existing within our country and avoiding the depletion by extreme exploitation
- Encourage the use of regenerable and less polluting resources (especially reducing the greenhouse gas emissions)
- Enhance the level of economic competitiveness and durable development
- Ensure the security of supplies – be they internal or external ones.
- To do the economy of energy consumption
- Identify alternative resources which are cheap enough, non-polluting and available in large supplies
- Restructure old-industries which are energy-wasting and with not satisfactory economic benefits
- The growth of GDP should not lead to similar increase in hydrocarbures consumption and other non-regenerable resources
- Enhance cooperation within South-East European Energy Community Treaty, signed in Athens in 2005 and whose goal is to establish a wide European energy market. Bulgaria, Romania.

Moldova, Turkey and Ukraine from the Greater Black Sea Area should work together with the Balkan states.

- Taking advantage of the European Union's energy projects – energy transportation corridors like the trans-Caspian-Black Sea pipeline, Nabucco etc.
- Avoid the useless waste of resources by repairing and modernizing the old infrastructures – to use European funds
- Building new infrastructures

Dilemmas

In the near future, the question if it's good to enhance domestic production at the risk of depletion of the domestic non-regenerable resources will be more and more asked.

We are European Union members, but we have to ask if we must rely mainly on the EU for energy full-fledged projects or to also find alternative partners among third states?

At this point, there is a possible conflict between the political and moral duty of solidarity with the European Union and, on the other side, be cautious and establish close links with countries like Russia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Iran etc? More concretely, we should know if it is right to put all cards on Nabucco project and dismiss South Stream pipeline as dangerous and non-viable. This is really a hard choice, but an inevitable one!

In October 2008, a *Gasprom* delegation visited Romania and it seems they have made some proposals about Romania taking part in the South Stream project. But our president and primed minister dismissed this offer and insisted on Nabucco as the main priority. So, even if one does not see a win/lose game

between the European Union and Russia for pipelines, there will be a hard economic, strategic, security choice. The Nabucco Consortium is on its way for launching the project, on the other side *Gasprom* still has problems with oil and gas companies from Bulgaria and Serbia, therefore the attention paid to Romania could have been a message to Sofia and Belgrade. *Gasprom* recently acknowledged that the big North Stream project is in danger of resting only a project, because the Baltic States and Poland would not allow this pipeline to cross their territorial sea!

In this context, should one consider the European Union and Russia as interdependent in the energy realm or is there in fact dependency. Materially there is interdependency because Russia could not change overnight the pipelines direction from the European Union to China, that's sure! But Europeans often perceive themselves as dependent while Russia seems stronger.

On the other side, it is a risky strategy to use imports from unstable and potentially hostile states, like some of the Greater Middle East states. This would create leverage for them in case of political conflict with Romania.

Another big question: should we use energy as a weapon or not? There is the dilemma of the future evolution of the world: geopolitics and geo-economics, predatory behavior versus cooperative one. Geopolitics, in the classical realist sense means competition, conflict, while geo-economics is about peaceful cooperation and trade. Romanian decision-makers do not want energy to be a weapon but if other countries take it like this, we could be forced to think and act in the same terms!

Concerning the costs of energy – should we agree to pay bigger prices or preferential prices and at what “geopolitical”

cost? It is tempting to make political compromises and get better prices but it may be too costly to do it on the long term! Decision-makers should be aware of this and put in balance the existing choices in order to serve the national interest.

Romania pays really high prices for Russian gas, which is delivered by two intermediary companies - *Wintershall* and *Imex Oil*, so would it be better to directly negotiate the price with *Gasprom*?

Russia wants to be the European Union's partner – should we allow Russians from *Gasprom* to take part in the building of Mărgineni gas storage, an infrastructure of more than \$300 million? Could common energy projects with Russia create a too strong leverage for the Russians?

In a volatile environment like that of energy, we need some strong repairs to give us a feeling of security. Should we trust NATO's proposed project to become an energy security provider? It should be feasible and non-provocative, it has to be credible. No one should ignore the risk of energy wars between regional block and players in case of too rigid security commitments to defend energy assets and resources.

But what about the possibility of restricted access to energy by supplying-states? Russia wants to create a gas cartel with Qatar and Iran, possibly also with Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan. How to react to this? It's possible that the European Union put pressure on this states not to joint Russia or to offer them other economic opportunities. But the outcome is not sure in the end!

Two scenarios:

a. scenario of expensive and diminishing energy resources, while the population will grow.

b. scenario of cheap and easy-access energy while the population will be stagnant or declining

Romania is a Black Sea bordering state – does this mean an energy-favorite country? Geographically it's true, but geopolitically there could be problems.

Conclusion and Recommendations

- In the future, to rely mostly on easily-available foreign supplies
- Support the European Union in its energy global strategy
- Romania should insist to put energy issue high on the European Union agenda when drafting the new *European Union Security Strategy* and a special mention for the Black Sea-Caucasus region
- To build a ring of Black Sea-Caucasus energy stake holders under the European Union's authority
- The energy dimension – to be more visible in the *European Neighborhood Policy*.
- Not to use energy as weapon with the partners that do the same
- Be prepared both for win-win and win-lose game but rightly selecting the partners
- Avoid the complete exhaustion of the domestic reserves and build underground gas reserves (stocks)
- Favor the alternative non-polluting resources but not to hang only on nuclear-atomic energy (dangerous)
- Being flexible and rational about NATO's scenario of becoming a guardian of the pipelines (Lugar hypothesis)
- Use the position of Black Sea border-country as an asset not as a liability

- Reducing the size in national gross product (NGP) of the heavy industries and other huge energy-consumers, developing the IT industry and other industries and services that do not rely on huge gas, oil and coal consumption.

- Encourage electricity production through little and modern nuclear centrals and water-power

- Limiting the size of energy-intensive industry which give national economy not enough added-value products and produces pollution.

Romania's energy future

- The European Union member and geo-economic player

- Developed, democratic and modern country

- A country relying on top technologies and export of huge added-value products

- A good correlation between high economic growth rate and energy consumption.

Thank you very much for your attention.

• Iulian Fota - Chairman

Thank you!

Thank you for the excellent presentation on the priority goals and dilemmas of Romania in the energy field and thank you for the reflections you have presented on various dilemmas we are confronted with – among them questions like whether the European Union and Russia could live in a relationship of interdependence or dependence, should the energy be used as a weapon or as a tool of cooperation,

whether gas storage in Romania is advisable or not, and several other questions. I think we would need a good part of the night to think about those questions and eventually have some responses tomorrow!

Thank you.

The next speaker is Mr. Dumitru Mânzărari from the Republic of Moldova which will present a paper on *"The Changing Nature of Interstate Aggression in the post-Soviet Area and its Effects on the Secessionist Conflicts in Georgia and Moldova"*.

You have the floor, sir.

Dumitru Mânzărari

Researcher

IDIS-Viitorul

Chişinău, Republic of Moldova

**The changing nature of Inter-state aggression
in the post-Soviet Area and its effects
on the Secessionist Conflicts in Georgia and Moldova**

It is a little bit difficult to be one of the last speakers, not at least because half of the audience has escaped already (laughs).

Here is my presentation for today.

I actually decided to put on the screen mostly a couple of representative quotes that will support the whole idea that I am going to present.

I will start with a quote from Gareth Evans, the former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Australia and the Chairman of the *International Crisis Group*. It was written in 1994, when we had the euphoria of lasting peace and, it is obviously, this reflects a Western perspective, which is, although increasingly shared worldwide, that war is a tool of foreign policy and this is far from being entirely discarded. While many in the Muslim world have disapproved the United States' campaign in Iraq in 2003, a significant number of these people assess rocket strikes against the Israel territory as legitimate. And this is true also for the Russian public, they condemn the campaign of NATO in Yugoslavia, and at the same time they whole heartedly supported the Russian invasion of Georgia! Likewise, a large part of the public in the western countries considers legitimate the NATO operations against Milosevic's Yugoslavia and the NATO campaign in Afghanistan. Even bigger numbers of people in the West are supportive of this so called responsibility to protect principle.

Therefore, the clear change in the perception of war in the world, even though is partly explained by worldwide flourishing civilized values, is mostly related to the aversion of the weak against the strong, as well as the tendency to support the side we consider to be virtuous and right. Partly, it has to do with the repugnance existing all over the world against what is perceived as the unilateral foreign policy of the United States. The military violence against other state actors is hard to justify in a world where the society does not see imminent global threats.

On the other hand, the worldwide attitude towards war has changed after the end of the bi-polar confrontation, which was marked by the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Before that,

living with a feeling of permanent threat made the world perceived war differently. As a satiated banker on the Wall Street is not able to fully comprehend the famine in Africa (although this may have changed recently), similarly, the citizens of the Western countries that do not envisage any foreign invasion cannot grasp the intricacies surrounding the security of the countries, which Russia treats as its own backyard.

Nevertheless, the increasingly registered reluctance in the world towards war as immoral and inhuman act is not solely a post Cold War syndrome. Its roots go back in time to the *just* and *unjust war* principles developed by Hugo Grotius. And, as Grotius' efforts confirmed, war was never largely perceived as unquestionable evil, but instead as inescapable sin and acceptable vice.

Belligerent parties have always claimed to be on the just side of the war. The post-Cold War world is no different in this regard, and the civilized character of the West did not stop it from going to war. More than that, the Western countries were involved in at least four wars during this period, pretending with variable success that their cause was the right one. This intensive preoccupation to be perceived by the international society as benign has mostly to do with international prestige.

Prestige is an intrinsic element of international influence of a country, together with its population, territory, military might, and economic potential. Symbolic in its nature, prestige of a country is an element of international status, providing moral authority on the international stage.¹ Both prestige and international public opinion are perceived to be important by current Russian political establishment². The latter is perceived

by researchers and policymakers alike to be the *“arbiter of the history”*, and a *“measure as well as a source of power”*.³

The consideration of prestige has in fact guided the Russian foreign policy towards ex-Soviet republics since the collapse of USSR. In the beginning it was due to the desire of the new Russian leadership to disconnect from the expansionist image of the Soviet Union. To some extent this behavior was conditioned by the need for the Western financial assistance. Moscow did not formally impede the ex-satellites to pursue independence. As a matter of fact, the first president of Russia, Boris Yeltsin, is known for having said that the former USSR republics may take as much sovereignty as they can hold. Without much scrutinizing the phrase for its obvious double meaning (what if they cannot hold any?), we can see in retrospect that real policies contradicted such declarations.

As new political elites have consolidated in Kremlin they thought recovering the might and influence of the Soviet empire. There was and still exists an obsession among Russian elites that their country cannot get back in international politics as a powerful player, able to balance the United States as an equal, if it does not regain control over the ex-Soviet republics. Old habits die hard, which was confirmed by the famous phrase of the Russian ex-president Vladimir Putin, when he named the collapse of USSR as *“the greatest geopolitical cataclysm of the last century”*.

Some other factors played in, including the strategic culture of the Russian leadership, guided by the *“deep defense”* tradition and partially by the will to recover the Soviet-time defense-

oriented economic network. The former is conditioned by the historic experience of Russia, having extensive borders that it could not efficiently defend. As a result a tendency emerged to establish large spaces, as buffers, between its own borders and the potential enemy. If the intention to regain control over the ex-satellites was openly expressed by Russia, this would have hurt its international image, its status and moral authority on the international stage. Therefore Russian elites have adopted a different approach towards the ex-USSR republics. They have employed strategies of political subversion perpetrating an *"indirect aggression"* against them.

The concept of *"indirect aggression"* is not a new one. It comprises but is not limited to actions such as political subversion, economic disruption, propaganda dissemination, social disorganization and psychological warfare. Regardless various interpretations, mostly from the international law scholars, the indirect aggression aims, as a rule, to conceal the involvement of the influencing state or actor in imposing its will on a target state. The idea that a non-state actor can try to employ indirect aggression techniques against a state is important to retain. In case of Russia, the non-governmental institutions like state-created NGOs and state-controlled companies are actively working under the guidance and/or in tandem with the government to perpetrate on the territories of, or against other states, actions that may fall under the description of indirect aggression⁴.

The term was in usage even before World War II, being mentioned by the USSR in their negotiations with the Great Britain. Soviet Union claimed its right to invade Baltic States in

case those became the target of indirect aggression of Germany. Later, after the World War II, the Soviet Union has participated in the efforts of the international community to define aggression, and depending on its foreign policy goals, USSR provided differing interpretation for the term. During 1945-1950 it did not show a big interest in the international efforts to define aggression. The reason seemed to be explained by the intention of the Soviet leadership to exploit the external factor in extending the “*socialist world system*”, in addition to the internal factor of the revolutionary state, mentioned in the Marxist theory. It was the time when the USSR and other socialist states began to openly provide assistance to revolutionary movement worldwide.⁵

That's why, when USSR submitted in 1950 its proposal on the definition of aggression, it however did not include the reference to “support given to armed bands” operating on the territory of another country. After the death of Stalin, Soviet Union has submitted another proposal to define aggression, which among others covered actions such as encouraging subversive activity against another state, promoting the outbreak of civil war within another state, promoting an internal upheaval in another state or a reversal of policy in favor of the aggressor. Sending of “*volunteers*” to engage in hostilities against the target state was another, albeit not Soviet, proposed element of aggression.⁶ It is especially this practice that has been largely used during the violent stages of the conflicts in both Moldova and Georgia in 1990s, as well as in the recent Russian invasion of Georgia.

The Soviet legal school has also paid significant attention to the issue of aggression. In 1955 Baginyan was writing that

indirect aggression takes place when a state attacks another state secretly, "from behind the scenes" and using the hands of others. His conclusion was that indirect aggression has to be treated in the same way as the direct armed aggression, as being a crime against world peace and security.⁷

It is well known that the Soviet Union has largely used "*indirect aggression*" in its Cold War confrontation with the United States over the influence in third countries. This resulted in a magnitude of proxy-wars, which allowed the two superpowers not to face each other directly, decreasing the risk of a nuclear war. However, Soviet Union has more or less freely used armed aggression against its satellites in Europe and non-NATO countries. At the end of 1980s, the temptation to use military force against Soviet republics willing to pursue independence was significant. But after violent clashes of the military with the protesters in the capitals of few Union's republics the Soviet leadership decided it was not ready to afford the political costs that the use of armed violence against civilians could have brought. It aborted few "*order enforcement*" missions aimed at certain Soviet republics, stopping midway the military transport aircrafts packed with airborne troops and ordering them back to their home bases. It was the time when the leaders of the USSR have decided to switch to the indirect aggression methods in relations with some of their uncooperative republics. That was the period when the secessionist conflicts in Moldova and Georgia started to foment.

Probably the most obvious examples of indirect aggression of Russia against two post-Soviet states are the secessionist conflicts in Georgia and Moldova. Even though there was a decent understanding about this in the Western countries, it

has been more convenient for them to perceive the rebel regions as simple ethnic conflicts. This view allowed the luxury to not intervene in a way or another. The situation has changed somewhat over the last years, and one could witness a better understanding of the post-Soviet conflicts especially among experts. Janusz Bugajski wrote in his 2004 book a very revealing phrase, questioning whether it was *“the near or temporary abroad?”* while stating that *“during the 1990s, the Kremlin sought to regain much of its influence and leverage and to limit Western penetration in the region.”*⁸ In a recent publication another expert, Michael Emerson, has admitted the existence of *“Russia’s bullying foreign policy towards its smaller neighbors”*, mentioning that *“Russia manifestly sees its national interest in sustaining tensions over the Transnistria, Abkhazia and South Ossetia.”*⁹

As inferred earlier, the contemporary Russia has inherited the significant experience and methodology that the Soviet Union has acquired during the proxy-wars with its Cold War competitor. As a huge advantage in using it, it lacks any kind of domestic restriction, as there is no pressure from the Russian public on the government to abide by the rule of law in its foreign policy. Neither there is a free and independent main-stream media which would reveal such violations to the domestic audience. At the same time, Western media has usually limited or *“controlled”* access to the hot spots, which result in broadcasting of stories convenient or even supportive of the Russian actions in conflict areas. This is another conclusion one could draw from the Caucasian war.

The recent Russian blitzkrieg into Georgia has caught many observers by surprise, suggesting a different thinking about

security in the post-Soviet area. Even though there were some voices claiming beforehand that such a military invasion was approaching, very few have really expected this development. Despite that, there were clear signals preceding the August war, which hinted a Russian military aggression into Georgia was imminent. To understand this, one should have a good understanding of the nature of the secessionist conflicts in the post-Soviet space.

There is a volume of research providing interesting facts that the post-soviet conflicts were in fact skillfully plotted by Soviet Politburo and former KGB (FSB) through political subversion and social engineering techniques. It aimed at stopping them from leaving the Soviet Union, or to create mechanisms that would allow the Soviet leadership to control the national elites of the unruly republics. Mircea Snegur, the first president of Moldova, claimed that at the end of the 1990 he had a meeting in Moscow with Mikhail Gorbachev and Anatolii Lukianov, the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. According to Snegur, Gorbachev told him angrily that if he was not going to sign the new Union treaty, which was supposed to keep Moldova inside Soviet Union, then he was *“to get both Transdnistrian and Gagauz republics”*. Lukianov, who was present at the discussion, confirmed to Gorbachev that *‘they already have one [republic] on the left bank’*.¹⁰ In fact it was Lukianov who, through the *“Soyuz”* group consisting of USSR Supreme Soviet deputies, has coordinated and granted significant support to the Igor Smirnov’s secessionist endeavor in Transnistria.¹¹

The process of the USSR disintegration was not possible to stop, since in most of the cases it was not the simple folk who

pushed for it. It was the national and regional Soviet elites who instigated popular movements and protests, and used the crowd as powerful pressure on the central Soviet authorities. Even the leadership of the Soviet Russian Federation Republic was a part of this inertia, willing to release themselves of the control of the Politburo. However, when that happened, and the Soviet ministries, including those of defense, interior, and security services became ministries of the independent country, the Russian Federation, the Russian national elites just followed the policies of their Soviet predecessors, trying to regain their control over the former Soviet republics. That is how the *Commonwealth of Independent States* (CIS) was created, and the leaders of the newly independent republics were persuaded to join. It was not difficult to do so, given that there still were military troops on their territories; the personal links among national elites existed, all of them former Soviet nomenclature; and various control mechanisms were in place, such as secessionist conflicts, which while sparked by the Soviet Union's leadership, became effective tools in the hands of the Russia's leadership.

By creating the CIS it was meant to maintain the regionalism trends built during the Soviet Union, and prevent the former Soviet republics to build new regionalism links with the countries that neighbored them. In doing so, Russia's leadership understood that existing Soviet-rooted regionalism and resulting interdependence were far from being irreversible phenomena - they were socially constructed and politically contested processes - this made them open to change¹². For example in case of Moldova, Moscow was aiming to avoid a possible re-unification with Romania. Keeping the Soviet-rooted regionalism trends

was also aiming at continuously maintaining a degree of control over the former Union's republics, and rebuilding the Soviet Union in a form or another.

However it was clear for the Kremlin that overt or direct control over the CIS countries is impractical and expensive.¹³ Over the years Russian policymakers and generals have learned to disguise their actions, describing them in images acceptable to the Western audience. Even though it was the instigator and an interest part to the conflicts in post-Soviet space, it claimed Russian military troops were stationed on the territories of its ex-satellites for peacekeeping purposes. It invoked on numerous occasions humanitarian justifications for various actions in breach of sovereignty of CIS countries, and of international law. Apart from this Russian government has exploited old links with the national elites to create dependence mechanisms; has attempted to influence elections results by supporting with campaigning and money certain contestants; has taken over the key sectors of the economy; and has encouraged and supported the promotion of its sympathizers into high positions of the government structures of CIS countries. Russian Federation has relied extensively on more subtle tools of aggression. The way it dealt with the secessionist conflicts in the area of former Soviet Union was recognized by researchers as being similar to the proxy-war techniques¹⁴ that were used by the two Cold War competitors in third countries.

The used tools included diplomatic pressures, resulting in the manipulation of treaties and interstate agreements, various provocative and inflammatory declarations by Russian officials; propaganda attacks, which included demonizing and

disinformation techniques, targeting politicians in the unruly ex-Soviet countries; direct military threats and deployment of troops under the cover of peacekeeping or humanitarian needs, deployment of Cossacks recruited through the Russian Ministry of Defense offices¹⁵ and other kinds of volunteers-patriots; energy control and economic leverages, including through attracting indigenous high level politicians to invest on Russia's controlled territory and thus making them dependent; inflaming social discontent and exploiting divisions on ethnic, cultural and religious lines. The covert character of these tools makes it for the international community harder to uncover them, to understand and to believe that it is possible for such things to happen. Indirect aggression is a stealthy and perfect bellicose tool.

Many details would often come out revealed by the journalistic investigative efforts. For instance, a 2002 *"Moskovskie Novosti"* article claimed that the GRU¹⁶ was training and sending military personnel to do covert operations in Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transnistria. The same article confirmed the habit of Russian intelligence to infiltrate into foreign organized crime groups and use this for further intelligence activities.¹⁷ Apart from these methods Kremlin has built upon the Soviet-time regionalism in developing cultural and educational ties, involving politicians, academics, journalists, formal and informal leaders, and erecting its political influence capital. To decrease Western interest and involvement in CIS countries Russia has attempted to isolate the post-Soviet leaders, pushing them into corner until they had no perceived ally or supporter other than Russia. Moscow has also increasingly used its intelligence officers to penetrate criminal networks in target countries, and through their locally

built networks acquired influence on local authorities; it penetrated military and intelligence services of its former satellites.¹⁸

These strategies were tested and used to an extent or another all over the former Soviet Union, which proves the claim that Russia had a structural and organized approach towards using indirect methods of aggression against its neighboring countries. It was not only Moldova and Georgia that tasted the bitterness of this treatment. Bugajski gives a thorough account of this, writing about Ukraine:

*"In order to return Kyiv more firmly under its control, Moscow engaged in various forms of subterfuge and subversion. The diverse methods included energy blackmail, economic buyouts, media propaganda, discrediting pro-independence politicians, attempts at diplomatic isolation, manipulation of ethnic and regional issues, threats of direct military intervention to protect Russian ethnics, lingering territorial claims, and challenges over the ownership of the Sevastopol naval base in Crimea."*¹⁹

In fact, Russian politicians and analysts did not shy away from accepting they used subterfuge, subversion and indirection as key tools of their foreign policy in post-Soviet area. Konstantin Zatulin, who is a member of the State Duma on the party list of the pro-Putin *"Edinaya Rossiya"*, and exercises the duties of the first deputy chairman of the State Duma Committee on CIS affairs and relations with compatriots abroad, is a revealing example in this regard. In a 1997 Zatulin has co-authored an article, where he claimed that Russia have to "use all its economic, military, ethno-demographic and other instruments

of influence, and not allow for the consolidation of state power around forces of an anti-Russian and anti-integrationist orientation. Only active measures (including destabilization of situation on domestic arena in regions where the anti-Russian and anti-integrationist forces are especially active) are able to prevent the slow but irreversible process... of those countries leaving the Russian sphere of influence and transforming CIS into fiction." The article also mentioned in relation to Azerbaijan that Russia has to support military superiority of Armenia over Azerbaijan, to instigate the unionist feeling of Lezgin people, a part of which lives in the north of Azerbaijan, and to bring back on the agenda the issue of Talysh autonomy, triggering the federalization of Azerbaijan and making the country unstable for hydrocarbon-related foreign investments. Similar things were said in relation to Ukraine, insisting the only powerful guaranty of a friendly and cooperating Ukraine is its federalization in regard to Crimea.²⁰

Moscow has taken as habit to provide Russian passports to people leaving in the areas of Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transnistria. When according to some sources the number of people with Russian passports have reached as high as 80-90 percent in Georgian secessionist regions and some 25 percent in Transnistria²¹, Russia is insisting that it has the right to "*defend its citizens*" in the conflict regions even using military means, if necessary, putting additional pressure on Georgian and Moldovan governments. In the case of Moldova, however, because Chişinău did not accept the Russian request for the opening of a consular office in Tiraspol, Moscow has started to deliver visas in Transnistria through the office of the Russian LDPR in Tiraspol, using it as a de-facto Russian consulate.²²

A completely new mechanism of inter-state aggression has emerged in the post-Soviet space, which was enough subtle and did not generated images of destruction and human suffering that a conventional war would. Despite this it perfectly pursues the key goal that a conventional military invasion would traditionally have – coercing the other country to fulfill the aggressor's own interests and demands. According to a Chinese report, which seems to be one of the most detailed study attempts on the topic of indirect aggression available publicly, such methods *"have the same and even greater destructive force than military warfare, and they have already produced serious threats different from the past and in many directions for the comprehensible national security."*²³ The Chinese analysis echoed the very similar conclusion reached by prominent European experts in security studies. One of these has drawn the public's attention to the fact that in the post-Cold War world, ravaged by a larger array of security threats, the non-military challenges, such as the manipulation of ideas, are as efficient in creating serious dangers as the military force is. They can undermine the essence and concept of the state, state institutions, and even may affect the states' territorial integrity.²⁴ It is targeting the three components of the state: the idea of the state, the physical base of the state, and the institutional expression of the state.²⁵

Therefore, the secessionist conflicts were nothing but instruments of control over the countries on which territories they existed. They were maintained to keep Georgia and Moldova from joining NATO or European Union. When, regardless the two secessionist conflicts on its territory, Georgia has received during the April 2008 NATO Summit in Bucharest a clear signal

that it will still be considered for the NATO's *Membership Action Plan*, Russian president Vladimir Putin has openly stated that his country would take the necessary response measures. His words were not taken literally, as the later Russian invasion of Georgia proved they should have been. In case of Georgia, the two rebel regions did not fulfill effectively anymore their function of controlling mechanisms, so Moscow thought to reinvigorate them.

The biggest disappointment for the Russian leadership was to come when the West has reconfirmed its intention to keep the NATO's doors open to Georgia, even after the August war. The following declaration of recognition by Russia of the independence of the two rebel regions of Georgia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, was a response to this. It can be claimed it was a rather emotional response, willing to "*punish*" the West, and to teach it a lesson that in the future Russian interests to be taken into account.

There was a lot of confusion about the Russian decision to recognize the secessionist regions of Georgia as independent entities. The source of confusion included the similar secessionist problems that are dormant on the Russia's territory. And this fact has been confirmed by the current Russian leadership on a few occasions. A plausible explanation, and it is supported by the Russian foreign policy over the last few years, is that Russia is playing what in strategic studies used to be called "*chicken game*". The term describes a situation, when two states are confronting each other, and where one of them is claiming lack of control over the situation, by this forcing its competitor to make concessions, or to back off. The West giving in to such

pressure will only convince Russia that this strategy is effective, and would prompt Russian leadership to continue employing it. However, by making it clear that such a risky behavior of Russia endangering the international security will not be yielded to, future surprises like the recognition of Georgian rebel regions by Russia will be avoided.

Some may be tempted to say that Russia has proved its confidence and readiness to take harsh measures against possible future enlargements of NATO and EU. And that there should be no further membership offers to the countries to the East of NATO/EU community. Before transforming this faulted logic into a policy, one should think in terms of expected trade offs, costs and benefits, as well as consider the natural consequences as far as the future Russian foreign policy towards the West is concerning. What Russia has done, in fact, is nothing less than a political blackmailing. It threatens to question the established architecture and principles of international security in case what Russia perceives as its legitimate interests in the post-Soviet area are not considered by the West. However, using historic analogy and existing empiric evidence it becomes clear that accommodation to aggressive behavior has always generated more aggressive behavior. The appeasement shown by certain Western European states, in hope that Russia will be satisfied only with the control over the former USSR area, is pure irresponsible *nad'veté*. Such a response is counterproductive and will backfire, affecting the national security of the accommodating countries.

Very indicative in this regard is the Cold War experience of Norway and Turkey with the Soviet Union. USSR did not change

its behavior towards them in response to their softening stance on the balance of conventional armaments in the region, but instead was guided by larger strategic considerations, as perceived by the Soviet military planners.²⁶ It is doubtful that Russia will change its posture when faced with submissiveness. To the contrary, this is highly likely to encourage Russia perceiving the West as weak, and continuously look for concessions from what it would view as weaker states.²⁷ Such a behavior may even gradually invite aggression, in cases when the Russia's growing anticipation for a more accommodative behavior will clash with the inability or refusal of the West to yield. Then, according to the logic of its strategic culture, the Russian leadership may feel compelled to react with force, in order to "*save the face*" and avoid being perceived as weak.

The Russian-Georgian war and the consequent recognition by Russia of the secessionist regions of Georgia did have an impact on the secessionist issue in Transnistria, which is another proxy-war type of conflict maintained by Moscow in post-Soviet area. Unlike in the case of Georgia, Moldova does not have common borders with Russia, and a military invasion is much less likely. However, Russia does have military forces in Transnistria, whose military capabilities exceed those of Moldova. They are formally under the command of the secessionist leadership, which is in turn in a subordinate stance to Russia.

Nevertheless, Russia does not need to use military force in Moldova, given it has a wide range of indirect aggression mechanisms operational. Considering the current vulnerabilities of Moldova, and its relations with Russia, an effort to map the Russian indirect aggression tools that it can use against Moldova

is needed. In current conditions, Russia could use four strategies, or any combination of them, conventionally tagged persuasion, coercion, separation and conservation.

In case of persuasion, Russia will impose on Moldova a conflict settlement plan, which will include the key ideas and elements of the so-called *"Kozak Plan"*. For achieving this end, it will manipulate the personal vulnerabilities of the Moldovan political elite, encouraging and consolidating their economic and political dependence on factors managed by the Russian government. On the other hand, Moscow will put efforts into discouraging Chișinău's European partners to assist Moldova. This will be done addressing them both individually and institutionally, through the EU framework. Russia is creating a myth about the new status of Moldova as a *"fraternal to Russia country"*, similarly to Byelorussia. By doing this Russia is aiming at building a strong perception among European countries of Moldova as a *"zone of Russian legitimate interests"*, presenting this to the West as the sovereign decision of Moldova.

This should, in the intentions of Russian policymakers, create a basis for the legitimization of its requests that the West does not strengthen its cooperation with Chișinău, refuses its accession to the EU, denies under different pretexts any possible assistance, and by this avoids undermining the Russian influence in Moldova. In a practical sense, Russia may choose a twofold approach: putting direct pressure on the Moldovan leadership, financing its agents during the Moldovan national elections, and through its EU *"partners"*, by aiming to create a feeling of isolation among Moldovan elites. When Chișinău will not receive enough support from the West, as Russian leaders expect, Moldovan leadership will have to come to Moscow and beg for

favors and support. What Russia would like to achieve through this, is to press Moldovan political leadership to come with its own initiative of joining a supranational organization with Russia and asking for Russia's support. In fact, Moscow is already putting significant and directed pressure on Chişinău, to push it towards such a scenario.

The **coercion** strategy, used by Russia against Moldova, should be based on maintaining and enlarging the trade and economic sanctions, which were tested for effectiveness starting 2006. Moldovan leadership will have to take preventive measures, diversifying its economy (both export and import components), setting up procedures limiting the control of the Russian companies over the strategic segments of Moldova's economy, and the Russian ability to put effective pressure on the political leadership. The alternative will be an increasing loss of political independence of Moldova.

To diminish the effects of this coercion strategy, Chişinău will have to put a lot of efforts to dismount the Soviet-type links (personal among elites, economic, social and political) that it has with Russia. This needs to be done in order to offset the Soviet-inherited membership of this Russia-dominated region, where Chişinău has an asymmetric dependence on Moscow. Along the same line, Moldova will need to put effort for joining the EU-based regionalism structure, first by strengthening its links with EU on political, economical, and social dimensions. This should increase its chances of joining EU institutionally, and consequently will decrease its dependence on Russia.

The third strategy that Russia may pursue in its foreign policy towards Moldova is **separation**. As it suggests, that would mean

the recognition of Transnistria, by building the conditions that in the view of the Russian leadership will require a military involvement, under the “need to defend the Russian citizens” pretext. The financial support provided to the Transdnistriean leadership will increase, followed by the institutional integration of the region into Russia, based on a similar model that works in Kaliningrad. Beyond this, Russia will be instigating and fostering tensions in Moldova, aiming at damaging the fabric of the society and separate it in a similar way it happened in Ukraine. The Gagauz factor will be exploited by Russia, encouraging regional elites to challenge the political center in Moldova, and financing them through the Transnistrian proxies, with the final goal to build another secessionist region in Moldova. This would provide Russia with more leverage, which if used, should allow it to play on the internal political disagreements in Moldova. As a result, this would become a significant obstacle towards Moldova’s accession into EU, and will increase Russia’s influence on the right bank of the Dniester River, turning Moldova into its satellite.

Finally, the **conservation** strategy may be used by Russia in case all the previous strategies fail to be successful in achieving the Russia’s main goal – transforming Moldova into a client-state. It is sad to say, that this is the most optimistic scenario for Moldova, and it is in fact employed by Russia at present, with occasional efforts to support it with the strategy labeled earlier in the text as persuasion. That means Russia is using the Transnistrian leadership to block any initiatives on conflict resolutions it does not like, and to preserve the current “peacekeeping” format, creating obstacles to a more active involvement of the US and EU. Even though the Transnistrian

leaders are basically employed by the Russian government, holding Russian citizenship, being paid with Russia's money, and following Russia's instructions, Moscow is hardly pushing for presenting the secessionist leaders as independent actors. This is done to cover the involvement of Russia in the conflict and to protect the **legitimacy** of Russian presence in Transnistria, as a mediator and guarantor in negotiations. Moscow is trying to discredit and make dysfunctional the "5+2" format, gaining time and instantly investing in the education of a pro-Russian youth on the left bank of the Dniester river. Time passing, such an approach will allow to naturally implement the third scenario of separation, de facto including the Transnistria region of Moldova into Russia.

As recent meetings with the Russian officials showed, there is a powerful opinion among the Russian political elites that Moscow has no interest in leaving Transnistria. Instead, the supporters of this idea consider Russia has to build a military base in Moldova, as a countermove to the establishment of U.S. military bases in Romania and Bulgaria. It is obvious that the contemporary Russia has embarked on an aggressive foreign policy, and it is up the West to decide whether appeasement is the right response to it. Of course, the West will have to face the consequences of its choice in case it proves wrong.

Thank you!

• **Iulian Fota - Chairman**

Thank you very much for your extensive and extremely well documented presentation on the Russian diplomacy, on conflicts and vis-à-vis the former members of the Soviet

Union. Your presentation only shows how complex the realities of our region are, how huge the task of making this region a peaceful one, but I am sure that your arguments, your facts will be very useful in our search of finding correct answers to the problems of our region. Now, we have the last speaker on the list, Mr. Aslan Yavuz. Please, you have the floor.

NOTE

¹ For a more detailed account on prestige, see "Honor, Symbols, and War," by Barry O'Neill, University of Michigan Press, 2001, paying special attention to part II: Honor, Face, and Prestige.

² For example Russian analysts describe the incidents at Abu Ghraib U.S. military prison as carrying "serious strategic consequences": Harlan Alman, 'The War, the World, and the Future' [Voina, mir i budushee], *Eksport Voorujenii*, Russian Center for the Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, No. 5 (September-October 2004), <http://www.cast.ru/journal/2004/alman/>

³ Alan K. Henrikson, 'Discussion Paper in Diplomacy: What Can Public Diplomacy Achieve?' Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael' 2006, p. 4

⁴ Even though it needs additional research, there is a significant volume of empiric evidence suggesting that the Russian Orthodox Church may be engaged in promoting specific political agenda in countries of the former Soviet Union. As an example, the recent declaration of a handful of people in Ukrainian *Zakarpats'ka oblast'* of the Republic of Carpathian Ruthenia in October 2008, under the leadership of a Russian Orthodox priest Dmitry Sidor (Moscow Patriarchy) seems to be directed from abroad. The fact that the activity of this group started to be covered and promoted by the Russian Regnum news agency, owned by the Modest Kolerov, who used to work in the Russian presidential administration and supported with funds the pro-Russian youth movement "Proryv" in Transnistria is very telling. Regnum has also promoted the Crimea branch of "Proryv". Currently the Rusyn issue is actively covered by the Russian state-controlled *Izvestia* (12 November edition, <http://www.izvestia.ru/special/article3122515/>), Rusyn identification cards are being distributed, and that

movement is supported by the Natalia Vitrenko's party, whose political campaign in Ukraine was reportedly financed from Russia.

⁵ Leon Romaniecki. "The Soviet Union and International Terrorism," *Soviet Studies*, Vol. 26, No.3 (July, 1974), pp. 420-421

⁶ Ibid, p. 422-423

⁷ A. Baginyan, "Agressiya tyagchaishee mezhdunarodnoe prestuplenie. K voprosu ob opredelenii agressii," (M., 1955) cited in L. Romaniecki, p. 422

⁸ Janusz Bugajski, 'Cold Peace: Russia's New Imperialism,' (Westport: Praeger 2004), p. 1

⁹ Michael Emerson, 'Time to Think of a Strategic Bargain with Russia,' Center for European Policy Studies, Policy Brief No. 160, May 2008, p. 1 and 5

¹⁰ Interview with Mircea Snegur for 'The Role of the Russian Federation in the Transnistrian Conflict. Part I: The Decline of URSS and the Soviet leadership conspiracy' article. In the same article there is a reference to Vadim Bakatin, former KGB Chairman, who in a 1993 interview to the Russian "Moskovskie Novosti" newspaper has admitted that at the end of 80s KGB was creating 'interfronts' in Abkhazia and South Ossetia to oppose them to the Georgian national movement. According to Bakatin the creation of such 'international fronts' in unruly republics aimed at dividing their societies into two irreconcilable camps.

¹¹ In April 1992 P. Lutenko, a senior investigator from the Moldovan Prosecutor Office went to Moscow to study the file of Anatolii Lukianov, investigated for taking part in the August 1991 Russian coup that aimed at overthrowing Gorbachev. Moldovan investigator found in Lukianov's personal archives an address from the Supreme Soviet of secessionist Transnistria requesting to sign with Moscow the new Union treaty as an independent legal subject. The document had Lukianov's signature and instructions to a certain "comrade Nishanov" to think over the issue and draft the strategy on how Transnistria would be able to sign the Union's treaty. Later, even though Chişinău has refused to take part in the referendum for preserving the Soviet Union structures, Moscow sent to Moldova the troops of the Ministry of Interior of the USSR who, together with the 14th Army, enforced the referendum in Transnistria and also in the Gagauz-populated areas in the south of then still Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic.

¹² Peter J. Katzstein quoted in Edward D. Mansfield and Helen V. Milner, 'The New Wave of Regionalism,' *International Organization*, Vol.53, No.3, (Summer 1999), pp. 591

¹³ Bugajski (2004: 30).

¹⁴ Anneli Ute Gabanyi in "The Balkan Prism: A Retrospective by Policy-Makers and Analysts", Deimel, Johanna; Meurs van, Wim, eds., (Munchen: Verlag Otto Sagner, 2007), p. 501

¹⁵ Oleg Elenski, 'The New Volunteers' Army' [Novaya Dobrovolicheskaya Armiya], Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obozrenie, 25 August 2006, http://nvo.ng.ru//forces/2006-08-25/4_kazaki.html#. In this article it is also revealed that Russian Cossacks have fought in post-Soviet conflicts in early 90s, including in Transnistria. It is clear also that they are also, through some arrangement, a part of the Russian official military structures.

¹⁶ Russian Defense Intelligence Agency (GRU - Glavnoe Razvedyvatelinoe Upravlenie)

¹⁷ Igor Korolikhov, 'Killers' Trade Union,' *Moskovskie Novosti*, No. 25, 9 July 2002

¹⁸ Janusz Bugajski, 'Cold Peace: Russia's New Imperialism,' pp. 29-49

¹⁹ *Ibid*, p. 81

²⁰ K. Zatulin and A. Migranean, 'CIS: the beginning and the end of history. Changing the landmarks' [SNG: Nachalo i Konetz Istorii. K Smene Vekh], *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 26 March 1997, <http://www.zatulin.ru/index.php?§ion=publications&id=35>

²¹ Vladimir Bukarski, 'A Fort on Nistru' [Fortpost na Dnestre], *Zavtra*, No. 35 (667), 30 August 2006.

²² 'Moldova's Uncertain Future,' International Crisis Group Report, No. 175, 17 August 2006, p. 17, http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/europe/moldova/175_moldova_s_uncertain_future.pdf. LDPR stands for the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, and its leader is the notorious Vladimir Jirinovski. Actually it has become a habit for all Russian parties with a nationalistic agenda to open their offices in Transnistria, as if it was a Russian province.

²³ Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, "Unrestricted Warfare", Beijing: PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House, February 1999, p. 117, (<http://www.terrorism.com/documents/TRC-Analysis/unrestricted.pdf>).

²⁴ Barry Buzan, "People, States, and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era," Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1991, p. 97.

²⁵ *Ibid*, p. 65.

²⁶ Olav Fagelund Knudsen, "Did Accommodation Work? Two Soviet Neighbors 1964-88," *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 29, No. 1, (Feb., 1992), pp. 53-69

²⁷ Robert K. German, "Norway and the Bear: Soviet Coercive Diplomacy and the Norwegian Security Policy," *International Security*, Vol. 7, No. 2, (Autumn, 1982), pp. 55-82

Aslan Oir Yavuz

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Turkey's Foreign Policy in Southeastern Europe

Thank you, Chairman.

I will try not to be that boring at this time of the day. I will try to be as clear as possible.

First, I would like to introduce myself. My name is Aslan Yoshir Yavuz and I am coming from Ankara, the *Global Strategy Institute*, which is mainly focusing its research on Middle East. But we have a Caucasus desk as well and we are mainly concerned with the former Soviet space. We are reorienting our research towards the Middle East and on behalf of my institute and myself I would like to thank you to for giving me this opportunity here.

Since the name of this panel is *Non Conventional Security Issues in the Greater Black Sea Area*, I will be speaking about non-conventional security issues, but I will try to discuss Turkey's perspective mainly, with some restrictions on the subject, especially after the war in the Caucasus, in August 2008.

I would like to begin by mentioning two quotations that I want you to bear in mind during my presentation. One of them is somewhat constructivist, which is "*security does not derive from adulthood protection, but from a lack of definition*", which belongs to Jack Diliger. And the second one is a little bit realist,

which is *"keep your friends close and your enemies closer"*. Please, bear these two quotations in mind.

I would like to summarize today's conditions in the Black Sea. **Today, the Black Sea area is insecure. It is not stable either.** And we have a new presidency in the United States, an approaching NATO Summit in December [2008] and also the Ukrainian elections in the near future. And we have an aggressive Russia together with an aggressive US and we see today failed forces mainly pursued by, I do not know, Western countries, the Western alliance, maybe. I would prefer to define this term, but you can understand which Western countries, because I am trying to understand this stability, security and the opening of these countries in the region. You know, these are all hampered by the recent situation. And we have non-recognized states here - Kosovo, Abkhazia, South Ossetia - and we have on the one side forces such as Russia and on the other side forces such as the United States behaving very differently. I do not know if they are behaving in accordance with their pragmatic interests.

So, secondly, **we are insisting on those failed forces. We are not leaving them behind. And the resulting situation is instability, insecurity and intervention of non regional powers in this region.**

And under these conditions, I would like to mention Turkey's position which is mainly a discussion, not an overall presentation of Turkey's position, not an official one. So I would like to be much more flexible than the official position. **First of all, Georgia, Ukraine and Russia - the countries of the Black**

Sea - are seen as major partners. We cannot ignore Russia as a major partner of economic benefit. And the second most important country in the region is Turkey, one of the oldest NATO members in this region and a part of the Western alliance, although not accepted in the EU, for nearly 40 years or something like that.

And thirdly, Turkey is developing close relations with Russia and there are lots of enlarged projects that are planned for the future: increasing economic relations, common political perceptions on regional security issues like the American involvements in Middle East and Black Sea and also the EU partnership.

And fourthly, Turkey has close historical ties with the North Caucasian countries. This is one interesting position, which is not mentioned here, because I am the only Turkish representative here. But we have lots of close historical relations there. We have like 6 million North Caucasian ethnics in Turkey and this creates some kind of a bond between Turkey and the North Caucasian peoples.

• Question from the public (unknown discussant): How many people from the North Caucasus are living in Turkey?

Excuse me? How many people from the North Caucasus are living in Turkey?

About 6 million Turks have this ethnic origin, yes. I can give some more detail later. They were exiled by Russia, by the Russian Empire, in the 19th century.

And fifthly, **Turkey feels threatened by the separatist terrorism at its borders**, which, I do not want to call it Kurdish, because it is terrorism. I do not want to label it like this!

Sixthly, **Turkey is a candidate country to membership in the European Union, which, in my opinion, is a very critical process** and now, today, Turkey has lots of problems and still we see a change in Turkey's status in the region. It is my opinion actually, that we are seeing this change in Turkey like this: **Turkey is changing its perspective towards the Caucasus and the Black Sea and I think Turkey is becoming more active in the Middle East and more active in the Caucasus.**

We did not mention today, during our presentations, **Turkey's Stability Pact project, which was proposed after the war in Georgia.** It is not of much importance today, but **it can be developed into a regional pact.** Also we are active with these projects called the BTE, the BTAC, Nabucco, and we have new railroads here, which are very important, I think.

And I am coming to one of the critical parts of my presentation, which is how does Turkey see the region! It is also a discussion here. Again, I want you to bear in mind Turkey's close relations with Georgia and Azerbaijan. **But Turks see Abkhazia and Ossetia, this independence issue, as irreversible, actually.** We have to open these issues to discussion; I mean the Turks, not the state. But the state is changing its position, you know. They are planning to establish some dialogue with the region.

And secondly, **Turkey sees the European Union and the United States's position as destabilizing, rather than**

securitizing and this means not taking sides and ignoring Russia. Actually, the situation is the same in the Greater Middle East, you know! "*Greater*" is a little bit unsympathetic, when Turks are talking about the Greater Middle East project and they see it like the Greater Black Sea Area, and this is seen like aggressive American intervention in the Black Sea and Turkey's traditional policy towards Black Sea is non - intervention by foreign countries, actually. Because this bears on a very sensitive discussion about the Montreux Convention. During those days decision-makers in Turkey do not want to discuss this Convention any more.

There is also another issue. **Turkey also feels guilty about its policies in the region, because Turkey also underestimated the potential for conflict there and Turkey did not take any steps, it did not see Russia, it did not see the United States and it did not take into consideration those ethnic groups and their conflict potential.** So, you know, we understand that the problems in the region **require a new orientation.**

So, again bear in mind that even if **Turkey has close relations with Russia, we also feel threatened by the Russian expansion and Russia is getting more and more powerful in the region.** We have our historical reasons and we have political, economic reasons, **because our close economic relations are not creating interdependency, as my friend has called it, but it creates *dependency* between Turkey and Russia.** And this Russian expansion can also be seen in the cases of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. And one of my main contributions, maybe, in this presentation may be this

argument, which is that **Turkey sees the solution to this problem of future possible instability in not protecting the status-quo, but creating a new one.** So, we have to create some kind of new policy orientation, with a new basis for dialogue and this was created as doctor Puhl has already called, a new kind of confidence-building measures towards that region and Turkey can be really active in that process, I think.

And how this change of policy is going to take place? Firstly, **the United States and Western Europe and other countries, I mean other than the Black Sea region's ones, must be excluded.** Secondly, **humanitarian, economic involvement in those areas,** in that region, actually, the Caucasus and the Black Sea, **must be prioritized** so that, you know, we have to be involved, we have to be establishing this kind of dialogue with all the parts equally. So, this is very important, I think. And thirdly, **the BSEC must be more actively involved in the political plans in the Black Sea region.** We have lots of debates about this in BSEC. BSEC started involvement in these conflicts, but, you know, I can say that it is maybe very helpful for the BSEC to be more active in those areas. I know that the BSEC has an agenda on frozen conflicts. Last year, the last BSEC Chairman was in Turkey and one of the major issues he touched upon was the frozen conflicts in the Black Sea Area. And fourthly, **we may think more closely of the Stability Pact,** which our Prime-Minister has proposed, but which was originally based on ex-president's Suleyman Demirel's proposal in the '90s. The pact only involves the Black Sea and the Caucasus countries. But it may be generalized and it may put under the BSEC. Maybe there is some kind of a link

between these two, I do not know. We are seriously debating these issues in Turkey. And fifthly, **any military action in the region must be strictly stopped** and I do not know how to do that, but it concerns any military intervention or action. **Turkey sees such action as a direct threat to regional stability.**

And also sixthly, **any direct support, one sided policy or isolation, I think we have to abandon such a position today, because also one of my possible basic contributions to this presentation is suitable for big powers to infiltrate in the region, since political forces gradually begin to look for outside position for survival.** This is a really interesting argument which was made by Barry Buzan, like it was a constructive security theory, but he makes it by giving this region a security complex theory. **Weak states look for patron-states, big powers, to help them survive in their region.** So, Georgia and maybe Ukraine, maybe Kyrgyzstan in Central Asia, or other countries - we can give lots of examples for this isolation - this one sided policy makes them isolated and become alone and this, you know, this diminishes their chance of survival, their chance of choosing them on the alternatives. So this is also one major point. And I would like to touch a point, Turkey's potential for future. **Or in this region, I think Turkey, because of historical, political and economic reasons, has a huge potential in that area and may become an agent of transformation, especially in the Caucasus and the Black Sea, as we have close relations with all the countries in the region.**

Thus, to build the future stability and security, without foreign intervention and with a suitable environment for future dialogue,

I think the European Union must review its policy, because Turks have lots of problems with this European perspective towards the region. And actually, Turkey is beginning to review its relation with the European Union and it is not going that well actually. We have lots of chapters unclosed and one of the major reasons is that there is a limited understanding of this soft policy.

We are not looking for hard policy military intervention, but a review of this soft policy towards the region is really a critical issue we are discussing in Turkey. And actually there was a book by Graham Fuller, which is on Turkey and the book mentions the changing Turkish position in the Middle East. But I can generalize this new position to Black Sea also, which is not sympathetic to European Union policies, or American policies, but which is for the sake of the Western alliance. You know, Turkey can change a unique position, without the consent of European Union or America maybe, but it will be for the sake of the Western alliance, because it knows its partners, in this region Georgia, Azerbaijan, Ukraine and European Union, but for the sake of these countries, for the sake of the security in this area Turkey can take steps which are against our understanding of the region. So, it does not necessarily have to be perceived as anti-Western or anti-European, but they may be requiring the West to review its policies, by the help of Turkey, maybe.

And Turkey has its peculiar threat perceptions in that area, and we are reviewing our policies too. For example, we are in dialogue now with Armenia, and I hope it will be changing into that direction and we, in Turkey, are all taking

into consideration more constructive talk with Armenia. And we have some developments in Cyprus, recent developments, but neighbors must be helpful and not hampering this region's security, you know, giving foreign powers a hand in regional politics and not destabilize the region.

Well, this is my presentation.

Thank you!

• **Iulian Fota - Chairman**

Thank you very much for your very substantive contribution to our debate. You have presented before us a number of very valuable ideas. And certainly since Turkey is one of the major players in the region, its position counts very much and I think our hopes for stronger security cooperation and the stability in the region certainly find a great support in the suggestions you had made.

Questions and answers

• **Iulian Fota - Chairman**

Now, we are at the end of a very fruitful debate, so I presume that there will be some questions.

• **Maj-gen. Mihail Ionescu – *Institute for Political Studies of Defense and Military History, Romania***

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Being under the impression of Aslan's paper, I would like to confess that this is the first time hearing such a clear presen-

tation of a new Turkish policy in the region and I would like to congratulate you for these phrases, which will remain key words in the region for a long time in the future, it seems to me, like creating a new status-quo, like for example a new military intervention would be a direct threat to Turkey, it is unbelievable how clear it is explained here a new line of Turkish policy, and also that we, it is necessary to block the room for outside intervention, the big players coming inside the area. This kind of things and namely, that for Turkey, the target is to promote change in the region, namely to establish a new status-quo, which is for the benefit of the Western alliance, is very important. It seems to me, this is what you have said here tonight.

Thank you so much, Aslan.

• **Iulian Fota - Chairman**

I mean this needs discussion now, because these are very important things that have been mentioned, and maybe we can find tomorrow some time to include these.

I was thinking here, why not Aslan, tomorrow, during the round table, to present, your vision. These are your personal opinions, for sure, I believe you. But at the same time you are expressing what are the main issues discussed in Turkey now. So, why not, during the round table tomorrow morning, presenting for 5-6 minutes a resumé of your point of view, and after that the others in the audience to discuss about it, because now we need to speed up the discussion end that would mean that we would risk losing some of the significance of what you said here. Thank you again and congratulations.

May I just mention two points, you said *"these are my very important contributions"*. If you take those two points and we

discuss them tomorrow, I think that will be great, because I have a lot of questions.

• **Maj-gen. Mihail Ionescu – *Institute for Political Studies of Defense and Military History, Romania***

I know! Me too.

• **Iulian Fota - Chairman**

Any more questions? Yes, please.

• **Unknown discussant**

I know that you are going to discuss tomorrow more on the presentation of Aslan Yavuz, but, unfortunately I will not be here tomorrow, so it is very bad for me. But nonetheless I would like to ask him a question about this problem of creating a new status-quo. Basically I have two questions. The first one is: would that mean that Turkey will endorse the Russian initiative of discussing a new European security conference? And the second one is you mentioned I think three or four times in the presentation the so called failed policies or the uneasiness of Turkey towards policies, aggressive policies of the EU and the United States. Would have these policies to do with ideology in a way, or are they related to ideology?

Thank you!

• **Iulian Fota - Chairman**

Yes, please.

• **Unknown discussant**

Actually, for the first one, is it a European conference of some kind? I think this was Medvedev's proposal. And I would

like to mention the stability pact which was rejected by the United States and was approached by Russia very sympathetically, because it left other powers outside. So, I do not know about, I could not guess which proposal of these Medvedev's proposals, I do not know about this European conference actually, but I can guess that the stability pact, which was proposed by the prime minister, was including some kind of a conference in it, when it was first proposed, at that time. After that, maybe, we did not pay some attention to this stability pact and we are criticizing this pact in Turkey too, because it did not have sound bases and sound definitions, because in one week its name has changed for five times. So, now, what about the definition? So, how to consider about stability pact which is including all the Caucasian countries, but is it a conference or is it an organization, is it a pact, what is this pact, and is it a platform? Lots of different names and different, you know, definitions about it, but I know that Medvedev's conference of this issue was including all the parties, I guess. Isn't it? I think.

It is about a new kind of Helsinki Conference. It is about the new European security architecture, so to speak. So, this was the idea of the Russians and it is only started yet to be discussed in Europe.

This is the second international conference I have been attending to, which is employing this term, architecture, I think. We have a panel called *"New Security Architecture in the Black Sea Region"* I think here, today. There was one international conference in Ankara, which was called *"New Security Architecture in the Caucasus"*, or something, which was promoted by the Russians, and I was there, and they liked it actually and they are pronouncing it everywhere, but I do not know everybody is

talking about this conference, it was today until, you know, US involves itself in this one. For the second one, I think you are calling this one *"failed policies"*, are they related to ideology? No, they are not. It is not about any ideological thing, any ideological policy, it is about. I do not know, Turkey made a mistake there. Turkey entangling there, while giving military, direct military support to Georgian government and, which was, which in return, was a very bad issue in Turkey, between the government and the north Caucasian people. You know, we can continue this economic relation with Georgia, ok. And we can continue political relations, but selling guns to Georgian government, which will be, which are used for, you know, any intervention, within its quarters, or whatever you call, to, you know, make an intervention, to its citizens, again, whatever you may call, it is very aggressive and we do not like this. It was Turkey's mistake. And I can say, you know, there are lots of failed policies like this in that region, actually, in Caucasus, like, I do not know, US's direct involvement in Georgian military, they were training soldiers, but, again, it is not for the sake of Georgian military, but it is for this direct encounter with the Russians. You know, neither Georgians, nor Abkhazians, or Ossetians, or maybe borderline Azeri or Miskitsians, or Armenians, both powers neither Russia, nor US, you know, gives much importance, to their relations, these ethnic groups relations. They are just paying attention to their pragmatic policies and these policies can be seen today as failed policies, I think. It is my personal opinion, again.

• **Iulian Fota - Chairman**

Yes, please. Ladies first!

• **Unknown discussant**

Thank you.

I misunderstood something. I know that until the beginning of the war between Russia and Georgia, after this contact, Prime Minister Erdogan visited the Russian Federation, and after meeting with Medvedev, made a statement. Well, Erdogan and Medvedev declared that Turkey supported actions initiated by the Russian Federation in the international arena and in the Black Sea, but until this visit Turkey said that it supports the territorial integrity of Georgia, Azerbaijan and so on. This policy is a Turkish policy of double standards, because, during the visit in the Russian Federation, Erdogan said about the support of Russian actions in the framework of the region. Turkey supports the territorial integrity of the Caucasus republics. So, the second answer, in the case of a potential aggression from the Russian Federation on Ukrainian territory, for example in Crimea. Turkey supports Tatars from Ukraine or Russian Federation as strategic partners, because, for example, Turkey is strategic partner for Ukraine and strategic partner for Russia, and Tatar structure is very important for Ukraine in case of a potential aggression from Russian Federation. So, can we hope for Turkey's support in this case?

• **Aslan Yavuz - *Global Strategy Institute, Turkey***

Turkey will not be supporting any Crimean Tatars, because they have their problems with supporting Turks outside their borders. The Turkish foreign policy has this lack of interest to outside Turks, you know. We are calling them Turks, but, you know, we are not interested in them. So, we are not going to, support anything like this, or, I do not know how did you perceive this one, but it does not seem like a double standard to me,

because Erdogan spoke those words while he was with Medvedev, but he added that, you know, Georgia's territorial integrity is a primary objective, you know. It is about the international conflict, you know. He was talking about, I do not know what he was talking about, or I can guess that, he was talking about this interaction with Russia to that conflict. And then this interaction went further. And then Turkey began to talk with Saakashvili, you know, so, they did not stop talking to Saakashvili there. They went to Moscow, they tried to create some kind of basis for future dialogue, stop violence; from where it is coming it does not matter. They tried to stop that violence immediately, but, then, they came to Turkey and then began to speak with Saakashvili, *"how are you, what is the situation"* and so on and so on. You know, there is not much of a diminishing of relations between Georgia and Turkey, so we can conclude that, Georgians saw Turkey's attempts in this way, not the other way, not like supporting Russian aggression there. I do not know. Is it adequate?

• **Iulian Fota - Chairman**

I am sure we shall continue this very interesting discussion. We shall continue this discussion tomorrow at the round table. Thank you very much for your contributions!

ROUND TABLE

Perspectives on the Frozen Conflicts and their Evolution in the Aftermath of the War in Georgia

- **Academ. Mircea Malița – Chairman**

Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. I will start this meeting, this roundtable by giving the floor to general Ionescu who will tell us a few words.

General, you have the floor.

- **Maj-gen. Mihail Ionescu – *Institute for Political Studies of Defense and Military History, Romania***

Thank you, Ambassador.

I will say just a few words about the Center that is co-organizer of this conference, namely the Center for East European and Asian Studies which is a think-tank based in Bucharest, and affiliated with the *National School of Political Science and Public Administration*. The organization was launched in October 2007 to promote quality independent research in the area of Eurasian studies and to serve as a forum for experts, scholars and students from Europe, Asia and beyond. The decision to establish CEEAS was borne out of the recognition of the growing relevance of the Eurasian space for global politics, calling for a fresh approach to scholarship focusing

on this region. During the past two decades, academic debate in Romania, and Eastern Europe as a whole, has been to a large extent dominated by the study of the EU and NATO, while ignoring the Eastern dimension. CEEAS aims to fill this gap and to contribute to a renewed focus on Russia and the former Soviet Union, as well as their neighbors.

The center provides rigorous theory and policy insight into the Eurasian region via three research programs: security, foreign policy, and energy. By bringing together different dimensions of the Eurasian space, we hope to contribute to a holistic approach to the study of the region.

To this end, the center produces regular in-house analysis and monitoring, as well as occasional in-depth reports and working papers. We also welcome contributions from guest experts.

In February 2009, the center will launch a new academic publication, the Journal of East European and Asian Studies (JEEAS). Published primarily in English (while welcoming contributions in Romanian as well as Russian), JEEAS will be the first Journal of its kind in Romania, and one of the few in the region.

The team of the center also aims to serve as a hub for experts, scholars and students of Eurasian studies. By organizing conferences and symposia on topical issues, we wish to promote the dissemination of ideas, the spread of knowledge and thus to contribute to the development of a vibrant scholarship and research community.

So, pay attention from now on to our new center!

This is all.

Thank you!

• **Academ. Mircea Malița – Chairman**

Thank you, general Ionescu for that interesting presentation.
I now give the floor to professor Secăreș.

• **Vasile Secăreș – *National School for Political Studies and Public Administration, Romania***

The Greater Black Sea Area represents the connector interfaces with important Rimland areas for Euro-Atlantic security, the four lines of Central Asia and the Middle East and so on and so forth.

After discussing this large picture, we should start by addressing the hard facts, the reality or, at this moment the reality is that Russia has a de facto monopoly in the conflict management of this region. And I would say that it is not possible to discuss about the future of the European Union as a global actor. It is not possible to discuss about the future of NATO as a central component of the security structure of the 21st century without envisaging, or developing, or considering an important role of the European Union and NATO in the conflict management on this new Euro-Atlantic frontier. I mean, in the Greater Black Sea Area and especially in South Caucasus and the Caspian region. Because at this moment, in the newer abroad, the European Union and NATO are lagging behind Russia. Russia is gaining the game in the near abroad. And I will say that the starting point of this transformation of the regime of conflict management in this region, the starting point of a new attitude of the European Union and NATO in this region could be Transnistria. At this moment, I think, the EU and NATO should overcome a huge gap. I was shocked to see how direct the impact of the Georgian was on Moldova and Ukraine. For Moldova and Ukraine, for the political elites, for different was, political groups

in this region, for the civil society, the message was very direct and very clear. And what was this message? Russia is back. Look, guys, we are back. A few weeks ago I was discussing in Helsinki with a member of the Finnish parliament, who was in charge of the sub commission taking care of Moldova and Transnistria. The was back from a visit to Transnistria, and he told me that he discovered a new separatist attitude. Was been he discussing with some officials in Transnistria and their attitude was very assertive. They consider that they entered a new stage considering and should adopt a new attitude towards Moldova, and there is no other agenda for them. Mărăcuță, for instance was saying that, there was no other agenda than independence and that they are sort of avanpost, of Russia's new attitude in this region, as a sort of Kaliningrad, in Transnistria. So, I would say it is very important for the European Union to adopt a very bold and innovative attitude in order to enter the game. I mean playing a role in the transformation and transforming the conflict management regime in this area. And the first challenge will be the Transnistria. This is a very important challenge for Romania and other countries in the region, I mean maybe Poland should play a role in contributing to a new policy of the European Union towards its Eastern frontier. And, of course, engaging in a cooperative way Russia and Ukraine, but adopting a very offensive or proactive posture. I would say that the target or the objective for the European Union should be to become number one in the conflict resolution for Transnistria.

Thank you very much.

• **Academ. Mircea Malița – Chairman**

Thank you very much, Professor Secăreș. I think that you convinced us of the complexity of the issues, and I thank you for

introducing the idea of great powers and small powers and their problem of security. And you are choosing the small countries and their idea to have a safe systems of solving problems, systems of security, keeping them away from conflicts is absolutely important. The question is that when you move security borders or you change the existing systems, the EU must introduce in the equivalent equations, the big powers, necessarily. And then, you have to analyze their reasons and the behavior that the big powers must follow in order to create an engagement, and not to provoke conflicts, local conflicts. The beautiful result of the Cold War was there. 40 years absence of nuclear war. 40 years. 40 years long conflicts between the two alliances. Peace in Europe. Artificial peace, was not it? There was no war in Europe no conflict, but there were plenty of conflicts elsewhere, outside the area which was under the nuclear umbrella of the two big powers, of the two alliances. Huge conflicts, very bloody and very great sufferance for the population. So, I do not know if in the recent history, there are true efforts of the great powers to agree among themselves, not only to renounce the nuclear weapons, but also to renounce, to provoke or to encourage war elsewhere. So, I think that as long as the United Nations remains in this stage of uncertainty and weakness, and the international system does not create the right and powerful institution, with an instrument to introduce the break of peace everywhere in the world, to punish all those who create the wars, who start the wars, who are the aggressors, until then, we have climate of insecurity. And if you try to find more security for one country, then you invite the others to see that it has no less security itself. And this is the famous spiral of security in the world, and the history of wars is written in this ink, of increasing the security at the expense of somebody else.

• **Iulian Fota – *National Defense College, Romania***

So, probably this is very complex, it is not easy to find solutions, except for this idea of all the willingness and power and resources of the countries around the Black Sea to find solutions for themselves. Thank you very much for your contribution. I give the floor to Mr. Dumitru Mânzărari from Moldova.

• **Dumitru Mânzărari – *IDIS-Viitorul, Republic of Moldova***

Thank you very much, sir. In regard to the issues that you suggested for discussion, I would finally approach my presentation, which I did not have enough time to elaborate upon. Whether our problem was due to a lack of time to switch to the exact topic for this morning discussion and I would obviously mostly focus on the Transnistria secessionist conflict. My point, as I mentioned yesterday, is that there is a lack of understanding of the nature of the public for solid conflicts, whether they are perceived as plural-ethnic; however there is a very strong component of a proxy war element, whether where Russia, which is a country that pretends to be a governor and a mediator, is in fact a perpetrator of the conflict and benefits from it. So, until we do not deal with this issue somehow, the conflicts basically cannot be solved and we might just reach similar results, to what happened in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. In the case of the Georgian secessionist conflict, I would claim that the conflicts were used as impediments, as mechanisms to obstruct Georgia for getting out of the Russian influence and into NATO. And there are a few factors that I can draw your attention to. In April, the NATO Summit in Bucharest, when the invitation was extended to some Balkan states, confirmed that Georgia and Ukraine will have the open path to NATO.

President Putin said that his country will take everything it takes to stop this evolution, by a strong response. And nobody took his words literally, and they should have!

In due time, Russia has started to repair the railways in Abkhazia, where later it proved they used them to move troops to the Georgian border. Over the time, April to August, except for the fact that there were exercises close to the border and they were massing troops, I would claim that Russia was taking the so-called small steps tactics, where they were testing the threshold of the Western reaction, trying small violations and moving the threshold of the threat perception further and further, so that there will be no sharp reactions to what they have done. So, my understanding was that while they understood the true secessionist conflicts, their presence was not any more an obstruction for opening the doors to NATO, for Georgia tried to reintegrate, to defreeze the conflicts, so that they created a bigger threat perception and stoped for the time being any potential accession of Georgia into NATO, through the map. Even after the war in August, the West has still confirmed, that the doors for Georgia are open and Angela Merkel said it clearly. I mean one could claim that after this, Russia understood that those two conflicts are not any more, cannot any more be used as instruments, as an obstacle for keeping Georgia in its sphere of influence. And because they were not any more usable as tools of preserving Georgia, they decided to recognize those two secessionist republics. So, whether this is true or not, there are many variables that can be taken into account. My point is that until we do not understand the real nature of the conflicts, and until we do not have a peacekeeping mechanism that takes into account all these elements, we have the risk to get more such incidents in the future. Thanks.

• **Iulian Fota – *National Defense College, Romania***

Well, did you finish Mr. Mânzărari, yes? Thank you very much for your contribution. I understand that you are representing an NGO, IDIS-Viitorul, excuse my ignorance, but is it an Institute of Research?

• **Dumitru Mânzărari – *IDIS-Viitorul, Republic of Moldova***

Yes, that is true. It is a non-governmental think tank.

• **Iulian Fota – *National Defense College, Romania***

Thank you very much, Mr. Mânzărari. And now, Tetiana Starodub, from Ukraine, has the floor.

• **Tetiana Starodub – *National Institute of Institutional Security Problems, Ukraine***

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Taking into consideration the aftermath of the war in Georgia and the negotiations and meetings between different sides of influential geopolitical actors, I think that the situation is complicated through the different visions of influential geopolitical actors that precede the development of the region. Because, for example, according to the results of the extraordinary summit of the EU on the aftermath of the war in Georgia, they saw that the EU, at that moment, had no common vision on prospects of further development of security systems in the region, in the Black Sea Area and in the Caucasus, in particular. For example, the vision of the old members of the EU is different from the vision of the new members of the EU. Then, according to the results of this summit, countries such as Germany and France have different visions from the visions of such countries as Great

Britain, Poland and the Baltic states. So, according to the conclusions of this summit, I understood that the policy of the EU is weaker and, for example, such mechanism as the Black Sea Synergy and Eastern partnership is not any more an instrument of constraint, of containment, of aggressive policy of Russia in the region. So, I think that this weak policy of the EU has an influence on the further development of the former EU system of regional security in the Caucasus and the Black Sea Area, and I think that with the aim of formatting the new model of regional security system in the Greater Black Sea area the EU supports the regional initiatives of, for example, Ukraine, Georgia and Romania. This is aimed to build a new system of regional security. I think that, for example, for audit GUAM, it is necessary to elaborate agreements for cooperation in the field of security risk, for example, with the European Union and with NATO. And, according to the results of second security, Black Sea Security Summit, the Secretary General of GUAM, Valery Chechelashvili, talked about the necessity of interaction between Black Sea economic cooperation and GUAM in the field of security, in particular in the sphere of monitoring of illegal traffic and in the sphere of cooperation on issues as combating terrorism, international terrorism, organized crime, illegal immigration, etc.

Chechelashvili talked about creating a center on combating international terrorism in the Black Sea region and now Georgia initiated the elaboration process of conceptual documents; this conceptual document is called the Convention of the GUAM States in Combating International Terrorism in the Black Sea Region. In the last year, Georgia initiated the creation of the Anti-terrorist Center of Audit GUAM-EU. This center will be created, in the frames of interaction between Audit GUAM and

the European Union and in the region will accumulate information concerning existing terrorist groups, its members and implement a coordinating role in the activity of organs and ministers of different states, of Audit GUAM states and countries, and of member countries of the European Union. Then, as a conclusion of the last security summit, the Black Sea Security Summit said that the state members of such an organization as Audit GUAM resort to elaborate a frame agreement between Audit GUAM and Black Sea organization, Black Sea economic organization on issues of settlement of roles and conflicts. The working group of Audit GUAM on issues of combating terrorism, organized crime and fight the drugs with involving against representatives of working groups on cooperation in a sphere of combating crime and extraordinary situation in the frames of council or ministry of foreign affairs of Black Sea economic cooperation and this future document will contain provisions on future cooperation between Audit GUAM and Black Sea economic cooperation in the sphere of security. The final product of this interaction will be the appearance of a common strategy of this two regional organization, on the issues of combating transport crime. Another issue in the frames of this interaction is the creation of a future system of control and monitoring over the quarters. The Ministry of Internal Affairs of Georgia, is now elaborating such a system. This system is similar to a system that exists in the frames of the European Union. Another issue, is that the first task in the frames of interaction, in the frames of Audit GUAM, we sought to intensify our activity in the frames of establishment of interaction with another organization. For example, they have some common projects with such organizations as the Central European Initiator, and we have some common projects on the development of trans-border

cooperation. This cooperation consists only in issues of the economic and social sphere, but not in the security sphere. But after the last meeting at the level of the working groups, from Central European Initiator and GUAM, they have some vision on future interaction between these two organizations in the security sphere. And now, as a conclusion of the last meeting of the working group of GUAM on issues of combating terrorism, organized crime and of drugs, they approved a plan of creation of a center on issues ensuring legal state for countries of the Black Sea region. And now we elaborate possibilities of establishment, closing an interaction between the centre on issues of ensuring equality for countries of the Black Sea region and regional centre on combating transport crime, SECI, and regional centre of GUAM on combating organized international crime. So, from the Ukrainian point of view, the creation of such coordinating system of cooperation between, for example, GUAM and Black Sea economic cooperation with another regional organization such as the European Union, NATO, Central European Initiator and for example, initiator on cooperation in the South Eastern Europe, primary in the security sphere, will force to creation, in the Black Sea region, the atmosphere of stability will be obvious.

• **Academ. Mircea Malița – Chairman**

Let's follow the conference program, which says that this morning we discuss the perspective on the frozen conflicts. And this subject will, also be in the Black Sea Area, taking into account the new developments and events in the area. So, I will invite you to take the floor and present your views, hoping that you will identify those items that make us a community. I just attended a meeting, organized with the French Embassy and the European

Union on Europe, on the Black Sea Area, and somebody took the floor and said that we do not have in the area those features which usually create a system, so we are not exactly a region, but geographically. Otherwise, there is such a great turmoil, such a lack of so many conflicts, latent, frozen or manifested, that we are not exactly entitled to be considered a region. So, I was a little bit shocked by this remark and I know that it is in the mind of many people. In Odessa a few years ago, an American seminar tried to solve the problem if there is a region or not, around the Black Sea. So you can be geographically somewhere, without creating the ties and the connections which are necessary. In order to create such a thing you need common interest. Now, security is not the only interest in the Black Sea. The basic interest of any country in the world or every region, or the empires, the big states, the small states, is the interest of survival. Now you do not survive only through defense, or security, you survive through energy. Anywhere you find, where life is, life must be secured in a way, and then reproduced and then having a source of energy in the environment. So, we need energy, we need food, we need development, we want to have a better place in the civilization, a family, civilized countries or developed countries and advanced countries and also to show that we have the brains, the talents, the gifts, the inspiration, the energy of the young people to do social work, economic work in order to have a better position in the family, in the international family. So, there are the human resources of the area, which are part of the business and of the discussion. Now, do the countries of the area show that they find in their ties a help, an assistance for the normal aspiration of any modern country? Yes, I think they do. They already have a government, a common organization, they already have a parliamentary advice,

they have awfully bad ways of transportation and contact, in order to arrive from one point of the area to another point, you have to go to Rome, to Vienna, where in order to change the plane, it is impossible, we do not have lines of communication. It is empty, almost difficult to arrive from one country to another. So this is a problem, this is a problem bigger than any other issue of the situation in this area – communication. They have this kind of NGOs, working together like foundations, like the Foundation of the Greater Black Sea Area, dealing especially with the universities. So, waiting that we are trying to found the security, one of the meaningful subjects, in order to re-enforce the ties of the region and its personality, it is a common niche of the area, not being tracked in wars, to have local wars, for instance. You all know what geopolitics is. And geopolitics pleases a war somewhere, if you are big enough and if you do not have the desire to confront an equal enemy. Local wars, many of them, are invented, anyhow entertained, supported, and encouraged by the passive attitude of the big powers. I am sorry to say that they played a decisive role in the campaign. If we have some turmoil in the region, it is necessary to understand the roots of those conflicts in the member countries of the area, that is – how the people of the region perceive these tensions. But not necessarily. You can see bigger confrontation in our place. And the seas are always a wonderful place to be used as theatres of war. So, let us think that it is out problem.

Our problems are complicated. We could reduce them, but in different ways, some stupid people in the area do not have the power to imagine friendship, cooperation, partnership. They are too slow, too undeveloped to find solutions. No, no, everybody wants peace in the region. Regardless of the degree, or level, of the development of their civilization and culture. So,

we cannot find, I think, a hereditary, I mean a genetic justification for the biological or psychological call for conflicts in the region. It does not come necessarily from our nature. So, we are those stupid people of a region in which you cannot have a better situation, only conflicts. So, South-East Europe is accused of the same bad things. They say they do not think that many men, many historians are right, do not think the mental level of the people of the regions has the attitude of peaceful cooperation. Sometimes quarrelsome, they fight, by vocation, well, there is no special vocation for conflict in this region. So, I think that we must also look then for the reasons to be peaceful. One of the reasons I propose to you for discussion is the ambition. The ambition of the agreed category of countries, which are now in the category of emerging economies. So, until 2000, countries were divided between developed and underdeveloped. Or, to be more delicate, we say developing countries and developed countries. Now, there is a new category, which is called emerging economies. You know how many countries there are already in the emerging world? For every 20-30 developed, countries there are 32-40 emerging countries. Now, it is impossible to stay around the Black Sea and dream, seeing others how creating emerging economies and entering in the international area. Smaller countries, with less natural resources than us. So, they succeed. So, why we are not becoming an emerging regional world? All of us. Not only Russia and Turkey, which are more advanced than the others. So, this ambition is new and it is not new, maybe it is not familiar to the older generations, but to the newer generations it is an acceptable and desirable ideal. So, with this introduction, I think that the political argument is not the only one but we also have important economic reasons to take into account, and also the big trends in the world: globali-

zation and regionalization. These are processes in which we are willingly involved. Well, let me stop here, because your papers are more important, better organized and I hope more convincing and then I give the floor to the first speaker.

Where is Mr. Puhl? I am sorry, Mr. Puhl, please.

• **Detlef Puhl – *French Ministry of Defense, France***

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

This panel is supposed to discuss the perspectives of the frozen conflicts, the revolution and the aftermath of the war in Georgia, and we have already been discussing much of these questions yesterday, the whole day. You have been more or less obliged to listen to me twice yesterday, so I will keep my contribution very short and maybe some two-three ideas that come to my mind, when I focus on the perspectives of these frozen conflicts, of which, we talk about Georgia, which for some time was kind of warmed up, heated up, and put back into the freezer for some time, but the conflict still needs to be dealt with. I will take up two or three words that the Ambassador has mentioned, that I think could be helpful in reflecting on what kind of solution we might try to find for these frozen conflicts, because I think I just want to repeat, there are not just Georgia, there is Armenia, Azerbaijan, a very frozen conflict which needs to be solved, there is Transnistria, Moldova, a conflict that needs to be solved, there is somewhere back in our minds the question of the Crimea and the relationship between Ukraine and Russia, which potentially is a dangerous crisis and which we need to take care about. I think two ways or two paths are very important to be taken. And that is one we were talking about, the human resources. Let me phrase it in a different way. I would like to talk about the civil societies of our countries, which need to be

engaged. We have been seeing for the past 10-20 years an increasing engagement of NGOs, of non-governmental institutions worldwide taking very active role in shaping international relations. That is a very creative factor, not always leading to where we want to go, but governments do not always lead us there either, so it is a very creative pool of thinkers, of agents for the good, of agents for change, and I think those of us who are working for governments should take into consideration the enormously important role that NGOs and civil society can play in preparing these solution to the problems. And that starts with these discussions on the perception of history. That continues with the contacts between local politicians, between locals, about common problems, or the commonality of problems that we face in each of our societies. And that is in a way, and if we sum that up, I think a very important contribution to the building of confidence that we were talking about yesterday as well. Confidence building there where there is no confidence, which means that the efforts need to be strongest where there is no confidence, there are problems between people. So, that needs active engagement by those who are responsible, that needs courage, political courage to take steps that have not been taken before. That is probably something that we need to look at. And secondly, this is tied very, very closely, of course, to the development of economic ties between our countries. In some private discussion yesterday, we kind of compared the situation immediately after the World War II in Western Europe with the situation in Caucasus, and the beginnings of European integration and the functionalist approach to integration, which means that we go from little pieces, solving practical problems, uniting markets, uniting economic systems and then going to a political integration process. We have figured out that there are not much

economic relations between many of the countries of the region, so that there is also an effort to be undertaken to try to make these economic exchanges easier to make them possible, to make them secure, to give impetus for investors to come to these countries so that an economic fabric can develop quickly. Now, of course this all sounds very vague and very indecisive, but I believe these are the foundations upon which solutions of the frozen conflicts need to be built. And a final reflection on this, if I may, is that it does need the, active engagement of those bearing responsibility in our countries. And there we may come to the question of the definition of region, because we talked about this yesterday as well. Does it help to conceive of the Greater Black Sea Area as a region, or does it not? Does it alienate maybe people from trying to find solutions to the problems that exist? We do have two very strong and very solid institutions which exist and these are the EU and NATO. These are two institutions that are there to stay. They are not transitory, they are there to stay. And many of the countries, most of the countries, except one, want to be part of these institutions. So, why talk about the Greater Black Sea Area and not talk about how do we approach these countries of the area to these institutions that exist? I am just putting up the question. If the region provides a form for solution of problems, all the better, but if it does not, then I think we should not stick too much to that definition of a region, but look at what we have and look at what the instruments are at our disposal. So, to sum up, of course I cannot present to you and you probably will not expect it from me either, any solution to the frozen conflicts, and who would I be to do that. The important thing is that the solution for the conflicts comes from the countries themselves, and that those who play an active role in keeping up those frozen

conflicts and we know of the big power, we talked about the power game yesterday. The power game in which frozen conflicts are useful, because they provide for an opportunity for big powers to stay engaged somehow. If you want to go round that, you have to take the path of forming or trying to influence civil society, trying to influence public opinion and trying to create a network of economic ties that make it more sustainable to reach out, to reach across the borders. But for this to happen, each of these countries needs a leadership that is willing to do that, is willing to take risks and I tried to argue yesterday that there are examples in European history that can be useful and that suggest the position I will still keep up today and not change from yesterday, and I guess that is my perspective on the frozen conflicts. I do not have a solution, I just encourage the leaders to take courageous steps and to cross borders, also mental borders, but that has to be taken into account and can be best done by as many interactions as we can possibly organize between the countries involved. Thank you!

• **Academ. Mircea Malița – Chairman**

Now, let's think about the region. Cross the mental borders yourself. So, I think it is a duty to cross the mental borders ourselves.

Who is now next? Professor Secăreș will accept our invitation.

• **Vasile Secăreș – *National School for Political Studies and Public Administration, Romania***

I will try to have a contribution to this very, very important debate and I will also be very short and I am going to start by asking a question and I think that this question is very important. My question would be what perspective we intend to discuss

about frozen conflicts or about the conflicts in the Greater Black Sea Area? In a way, what we intend to do with these conflicts? Or exactly do we have the possibility to have a contribution to the management, the conflict management in this area? And especially, what kind of role we need for NATO and the European Union? And in order to answer this question I think that it is necessary to put this agenda, I mean the frozen conflicts in the Greater Black Sea Area and then put their resolution into a larger picture. I will try to design this global picture, this larger picture, by introducing some dimensions or discussing some dimensions of this larger picture. First of all, I will say that it is important to take into consideration the fact that we are in transition. We are entering a new cycle of power, at a global level. We have to take into consideration that the present transition is reshaping the global structure of power, and all the conflicts are having their role in this reshaping of the global structure of power. So, the frozen conflicts in the Greater Black Sea Area should be interpreted, should be analyzed as playing a role in this reshaping of the geopolitical map in Eastern Europe, in South-East Europe, and in the Greater Black Sea Area. So, it is very important who is playing a role and who is not playing a role in this context. It is important what the position of Russia, is what kind of role is Russia playing in this context and what is the position of the European Union and NATO in this context. Secondly, I would say that we should discuss the frozen conflicts and their possible resolution in connection with the strategic imperative for the European Union and for NATO. The frozen conflicts and the intervention on the role play of the European Union and NATO are connected to these strategic imperatives. Apart these strategic imperatives for the European Union and NATO, the fact is that we are witnessing this process of pushing

the institutional West, EU and NATO eastwards. This is a fact, this is a process, we are witnessing this pushing of the institutional West eastwards, in Eurasia. This is the result of these processes, the establishing of new security frontiers for the Euro-Atlantic area and the new political strategic agenda that facilitates the Western reach and influence into the Rimland. So, the role or the passive attitude of the European Union and NATO, as far as the frozen conflicts in the Greater Black Sea Area are concerned, should be interpreted in connection with these strategic imperatives. We could continue this list, addressing the dimensions of this larger perspective and we should discuss the frozen conflicts in this region, adding the fact that this is a very important energy corridor and Europe has direct stake in its control as particularly Mr. Yavuz, from Turkey as well as the representatives of Georgia and Azerbaijan pointed out.

Of course, this does not mean the direct involvement of NATO in the peacekeeping operations in this stage, but in long term, respectively, we will see. I'm saying that, because nobody could imagine, for example, two decades ago, during the Cold War period, that NATO would be involved in operations in Bosnia, in Kosovo and in Afghanistan, where Soviet troops were deployed.

With regard to the European Union, in the context of the post Cold War period, the European authorities have adopted, after the Amsterdam Summit and the following summit, a new program related to the development of defense and security policy, and has also created the post of the High Commissioner for foreign policy and Security of the European Union.

The European Union, in my point of view, has a real strong potential to be involved in peacekeeping operations. At this time the EU plays a very important role in Georgia by its monitoring

mission deployed in the field. Fortunately, the EU became more involved in the Georgia crisis and Russia has lost its role as a so-called peacekeeper in both conflicts.

I also hope that the European Union become more involved in the conflict resolution in the ex-soviet space, especially in the Nagorno-Karabakh and Transnistria conflicts, where the European Union is called to play a very important role.

The new course of the *European Neighborhood Policy* described by the new initiative of the ministers of foreign affairs of Poland and Sweden, related to the Transnistrian conflict and to the relations of the European Union with the Black Sea region countries, will also constitute a very important point in the conflict resolution process in this region.

And also, who are the true organizers, which international organization has a responsibility in the conflict resolution in Transnistria and Nagorno-Karabakh? In the last of these conflicts, the main role comes to the countries of the MINSK Group under the auspices of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Another mission of the OSCE it's the auxiliary mission deployed by this international organization in Transnistria.

In my point of view, the reformation of OSCE is necessary, because OSCE, in his actual configuration and mandate, could not become the main guarantee of peace and stability in the Greater Black Sea Area, and cannot play an significant role in the conflict resolution process.

Furthermore, with your permission, I want to discuss the reasons for a greater involvement in the crisis resolution in the Greater Black Sea Area of democratic international organizations, such as the European Union and NATO, and for more involvement of the United States of America as a main guarantee of the action of international community in the Area.

The geopolitical influence of USA in the Greater Black Sea Area increases, because the USA played a very important role during and after the Cold War period, in establishing a new security environment in Europe in general and in this area in particular.

One of the examples of this presence of the United States in the process of the establishment of the framework of the regional security environment was the Truman doctrine, related to the support of Turkey, Greece and the adoption of these two countries in NATO in 1952. Both of these actions were initiated and conducted by the United States of America.

In my point of view, this will need a very important involvement of all democratic societies in the Greater Black Sea Area. It will, of course, decrease the role of the Russian Federation, which, you know, was the main instigator of the conflict in the Greater Black Sea Area directly or indirectly. For example, if the in case of Georgia, Russia perpetrated a direct aggression against a sovereign country in August 2008, in the case of Transnistria, in 1992, Russia implemented an indirect aggression against Moldova, when it started to supply Transnistrian separatist with different kinds of military weapons. And Russia still continues to do it using its 14th Army, which is stated there.

Of course, the decreasing role of Russia in the Greater Black Sea Area depends in a great measure on the regional countries, where the territorial and separatist conflicts exist. It's counter-productive to sit and wait to know what will France say, what will Germany say, or other countries, for example. These states are very important, but at the same time, very much depend on the authorities of Georgia, Azerbaijan and Moldova. It is necessarily an economic development, stress on building the democratic institutions, and, by this way, to become more attractive for the separatist region.

I want to conclude by a final remark, related to the civil society. Also I would like to support you, Mr. Bucur, and your idea about the development of the civil society, because I think that NGOs and other specialist and analyst from the Greater Black Sea Area should be involved in the implementation of common projects related, not only to NATO resolution, but also to the discussion of other projects – economic, trade projects. They also must work out some recommendation for their own governments, how this cooperation should be developed.

I'm saying that because, for example, there are some funds, such as Black Sea Trust Fund for example, or East-East Program, which take into consideration the implementation of joint projects by the free tax from the complete region. In my point of view, if in this regard there will be some possibility of return to implement research projects in parallel to organize some conferences in capital, in any city of the Greater Black Sea Area, it will also play a very important role, because, very much depends on us independent expert. Thank you very much.

• **Academ. Mircea Malița – Chairman**

Thank you, Professor Secăreș, for your contribution to the debate and for your ideas, proposed for the discussion.

Now I give the floor to Mr. Aslan Yavuz, from Turkey.

• **Aslan Yavuz – Global Strategy Institute, Turkey**

Thank you, Chairman.

I would like to give away one small commentary about these secessionist republics, which goes like two different arguments.

Concerning the secessionist republics you either accept that they are problematic, but reversible cases and you accept that they successfully seceded, actually. The second situation is you insist on isolating these areas and leave them alone, with Russian guys, with no choice for any further doubt, or for any attempts

to integrate them in the international system. The result of this action will be the empowerment of Russia, and only Russia, in that area. And this action will create more insecurity.

So, what about the aftermath? Is there a chance to establish some links?

You choose to establish some dialogues, some links with these areas. This argument goes further with this assumption of creating of a chain reaction in that area, which will affect all the countries in that region, maybe Ukraine, or maybe Karabakh, or other regions, maybe Turkey. I do not want to include Turkey, but you know, there are lots of secessionist terrorist regions.

Firstly the only country which will be harmed by this kind of chain reaction will be Russia. I mean, in terms of massive consequences for Russia.

So, we have to consider Russia's future position. What will Russia's position, be you know. Russia will not be waiting to further these secessionists moments, I think. One of the cases that can be put in discussion in the context is represented by the attempts to establish some kind of a dialogue between the Armenians and Azeri in Greater Black Sea Area, so may be, this maybe a very small step that can be taken further.

And third, I think that we have to see the big picture in that area. When Russia and the US are confronting each other, the Greater Black Sea Area, the countries of this region are suffering the consequences.

One point of the Russian - American dispute is the missile shield in Central Europe, which is tried to be established by the United States who insists in this direction. I do not know why, but you know, in Turkey an academic article was published, written and signed by a group of the officers and security experts. In this article, it's showed that a missile shield in Central Europe

will not be preventing any threats from Iran, or North Korea, or any other problematic region. This will not work, actually. It is a technical article, who shows that the missile shield does not entirely protect Europeans from, for example, Iran, or any other country in that area, but it will be aiming Russian threats. This is a confrontation situation.

Another confrontation situation occurs at the level of Ukraine and Georgia and some of the Central Asian countries like, it happened in the last year, Kirghizstan. And the examples don't stop here. We can increase the numbers of these major confrontations, which actually occur between US and Russia in a number of fields.

I think that I had to go beyond this kind of argument, but these are possible explanations of the security situation in the Greater Black Sea Area, the main basis of the security threats in this region, I think.

Because we are really concerned with these secessionist republics, but we do not want to go further and wait for what ever consequences may come, we think, about what may be the ideas of the powers regarding this region.

In Turkey, we are discussing the possibility of creating some kind of a new pact, I mentioned yesterday. I do not know if it works or not, but it may be created. Yesterday one professor present at our reunion mentioned that, new institutions, new pacts will not work, so we have to work on the older ones. I agree, but if the older ones did not work, and if they all failed, we have to look for other ways and we have to look for a new method which will be excluding non-regional powers. This is my main argument. I'm sorry, but We have to be careful about including Russia, the, United States and EU, and NATO. EU must be supportive of lots of economic-financial issues and

confidence building projects, but I do not know if the European powers, the European Union states, one by one, must be included in that process, I have some doubts about it. It is only for the Greater Black Sea Area countries, which involves Russia, too. We have to be careful about including other powers too. At the moment Russia presents to us like a security threat. But this perception does not prevent us from your including this country in security negotiations and in our plans for the future of this region. I already mentioned that, if the secessionist republics will be hoping for a future development in that area, one of the worst influences will be Russia. We have to think about this and we have to establish some kind of empathy here. And Turkey will be very haunted by those secessionist movements if it doesn't work in the direction of countering this kind of influences. I think this could be some kind of basis for further arguments.

• **Academ. Mircea Malița – Chairman**

Mr. Iqbal Hadiev from Azerbaijan is now taking the floor.

• **Iqbal Hadiev – Azerbaijan**

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have, I would like to assure you, very short conclusions and opinions about our conference.

I would like to mention that solving this problem - the conflicts in the Greater Black Sea Area - is a vital and crucial issue for future collaboration in this area. I agree with Mr. Detlef Puhl that we need courage; we need active working NGOs; more government support and solutions for further collaboration with EU, with NATO. Of course, all of these relations cannot be built ignoring Russia's presence in the region, and I think that we

should bear relations with Russia, with some sacrifices too, if necessary. In relation with EU and NATO we need more attention for the projects in the region, such as the Nabucco project, the revival of the Great Tsukov project, the TRACECA project, which rehabilitates the infrastructure in the zone from China to Europe, and of course, the Trans-Caspian pipeline project, a very important project who, last year, had no attention from the EU. Of course the European Union should be the moderator in the jurisdiction of state in the of Caspian Sea.

In this context, one of the important conclusions to be considering is the importance and the causal character of the relations with GUAM countries. It's important to open eventually closer communications with these countries and to change, the visa regimes for GUAM countries. And again, bear a relationship to Russia, because, for example, as Romanians go to work in Italy and Spain, most of ex-Soviet population works in Russia. For example, over 1.5 million Azeri work in Russia. The industry in our country depends, in some part, on Russia.

And it should begin with the edification of a diplomatic dialogue between Georgia and Russia. That is possible by finding the solution which will satisfy every part. It will be difficult, but we should find the solution in this aspect also.

And, finally, the most important point to underline is the necessity to bear cooperation with Turkey, which begins to be a moderator in the area.

Thank you very much.

• **Academ. Mircea Malița – Chairman**

Thank you, Mr. Hadiev, for your presence and for your contribution. And now, there are two Romanian papers. The first one is presented by Radu Cucută and Horia Bărbulescu.

• **Horia Bărbulescu – *Center for East-European and Asian Studies, Romania***

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Good morning, ladies and gentlemen.

My name is Horia Bărbulescu, and my colleague is Radu Alexandru Cucută. We are both Ph. D. candidates at the *National School of Political Studies and Public Administration* and we are associated researchers to the *Center for East-European and Asian Studies*.

Our presentation focuses on the issue of Ukraine's statehood and national cohesion.

In the aftermath of the Bucharest NATO summit and the war in Georgia, this issue is highly debated.

Scholars and decision-makers have argued. Some with fear and others with satisfaction, that Ukraine's national cohesion might evolve into something similar to an ethnic complex. We focus here on some of the arguments against this perception.

• **Radu Cucută – *Center for East-European and Asian Studies, Romania***

Ladies and gentlemen,

Firstly, we will try to look on some arguments concerning the definition of Ukrainian statehood.

The issue of a Ukrainian state was never a political reality up to the twentieth century, in the aftermath of Great War, when federal Ukrainian political forces, such as the Ukrainian People's Republic, the headman and the director of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic used it much.

In the wake of the Riga Peace Treaty of 1921, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic became a founding republic of the USSR. The national identity issue became manifested after the breakup of the USSR. Although one cannot deny the powerful impact of

national myths and common basis, such as the Kazakh uprisings, the brief national revival in the early 1920s or the massive social and cultural implications of the Holodomor.

If the revival of the nationalism is a root of many of today's conflicts in the Greater Black Sea Area, it is only natural for a scholar to assert the way the national identity issue is socially and politically negotiated in the Ukrainian state. President Putin's alleged statements made after the NATO summit in Bucharest, according to the media Putin declared that on joining the Alliance, Ukraine will cease to exist as a state, may very well lie in the field of bilateral reference.

In spite of that, one must remember that Russia contested Ukrainian statehood after May 1997, when both countries negotiated and finally closed a deal.

At the same time, the national identity issue resurfaces during elections, or whenever far reaching political choices are to be made. For example, the Ukrainian bid for NATO or EU membership. In spite of threatening external comments, a union to the structural weakness of the Ukrainian state, one must conclude that political field, in our opinion, is dominated by pragmatic nationalism. The political leads have many of the best electoral cycles to marginalize both left and right wing extremists, promoting so far an inclusive civic nationalism.

The second issue we would like to address is, we try to assess its how stable it is the Ukrainian state, defining political establishment. From the rebellion perspective, the Ukrainian state succeeds in fulfilling all the goals it was meant to fulfill. It collects taxes, it manages the process of resource redistribution, and it exercises the legitimate monopoly of violence over the whole Ukrainian territory. Unlike other ex-Soviet states that have to deal with regional conflicts that affect their sovereignty.

Although some scholars point a low level of functionality in the Ukrainian statehood design, it is our belief that the recent turn of events, the seemingly endless political crisis that began with the Orange Revolution in 2004, is not necessarily a matter of state weakness, at least not in the Georgian or Moldavian way, but a renegotiation of the political regime.

What the Ukrainian crisis has brought for all these is not merely a collection of inadequacies of laws in the constitutional regime of the country, but a perspective of clarifying these problems. One must take into account that different interpretations of the constitution, for example, resulted in the open clash of institutions, which were confused over which authority they owe their allegiance to. It is our opinion that the record of political interactions between the leading political actors in Ukraine does not point necessarily towards an action outside the political game. What might seem as a devised conflict could be just a normal stage in the process of institutionalization.

Even though the issue of Crimea is often brought forward as a worst case scenario, that might mimic the frozen conflicts manifested in the Greater Black Sea Area, there are, in our opinion, several cases one must acknowledge. First of all, the legal status of Crimea is the result of the Ukrainian state building process. The Crimean Autonomous Socialist Republic was abolished before the transfer of the region to the Ukrainian Soviet Republic. The present legal status of Crimea is the result of a compromise between Ukrainian and Crimean political leads. Unlike other cases in the Greater Black Sea Area, there is, in spite of growing tensions, an institutional framework that favors cooperation.

And the last question we would like to address is the question of the Ukrainian identity, Ukrainian national identity.

There are several key arguments against the common opinion that Ukraine's east-west cleavage is a source for potential conflict.

First of all, this opinion is based on the headlong that followed the 2006 and 2007 parliament re-elections in which neither of the major political parties enjoyed but a plurality of the votes. One must take into account the fact that almost 40 percent of the electorate - people who did not vote, people who did not vote for a party that made a 3 percent threshold, absentees, and the invalid papers that were cast - is not directly representative of the Ukrainian parliament. The Ukrainian electoral system has thus a very high vote wasting ratio.

In light of these electoral figures, the east-west divide may seem a legitimate political topic only for two fairly low minorities. At the same time, the social demographic profile of Ukraine shows a remarkable diversity that is not encompassed by the east-west cleavage. Ethnic Ukrainians make only 77.8 percent of the population, while the religious picture is far more complex - three orthodox and two catholic churches. Ethnic and political diversity was definitely a source of conflict in the aftermath of the Soviet breakup. In the Ukrainian case, however, the diversity was negotiated in the form of civic nationalism. While social and cultural divides may be a necessarily cause of escalating conflicts, in the ex-Soviet space, they are not a sufficient cause of the same phenomenon. In fact, the national and political diversity affectedly prevented the coagulation of a dominant political movement, backed by a stable majority, which would leave the minority no other option than conflict and secession. The succession of political crisis that logs the negotiation has influenced the birth of civic nationalism. The latter is not based solely on cultural considerations, but also on very pragmatic interests. We must remember that a nation has as a prerequisite the people's will to live as a politically organized society.

Thank you very much for your attention.

• **Academ. Mircea Malița – Chairman**

Thank you to both authors of this paper.

Of course, we are facing possible future problems here, and we hope that this subject will also be addressed by those who directly know the problem. Now, after the list of speakers is closed, I invite you to have comments, remarks, questions, or your contribution, if you wish. The first is Mr. Puhl.

• **Detlef Puhl – *French Ministry of Defense, France***

May I just make one remark that may be interesting for our discussion. Yesterday we had a very interesting contribution by Mr. Aslan and today as well. I see one very profound contradiction that has been expressed today. And that is, Mr. Nika Chitadze told us about his wish or his idea that the United States and NATO and the European Union should be much more engaged in Black Sea security issues. Mr. Aslan told us that the Turkish consider reflecting on a change of the status quo, changes that, in any case, and should keep outsiders of the Black Sea out of it. That seems to me to be a very dark contradiction in these two expectations, from representatives of two Black Sea countries. And we have not talked with Russians yet.

So, that seems to me a very crucial problem. Do you want engagement or not? And if, what kind of engagement do you want? And I think we should engage at least part of our discussion on that contradiction, because that seems to me a very open one and it needs to be addressed.

• **Academ. Mircea Malița – Chairman**

Yes, I think what you said. Mr. Puhl, NATO and the United

States want, a single word will =summarize, Atlantic. So, the Atlantic factors, so to say, the Atlantic factor of an ocean regarding to a smaller sea.

Thank you very much for this question.

Who wants to continue the debate?

• **Marina Muscan – National Defence University, Romania**

My name is Marina Muscan. I am a Ph. D. candidate at the National Defense University. I want to make a consideration regarding the remarks of Mr. Aslan, who was saying that Turkey is facing separatist movements, but not people. I beg to differ, because these movements are made by people who came together to a conclusion that they need to be separated somehow. Therefore, their problem is also with the people, not only with the movement itself.

The second consideration is regarding the shield, the defensive missile shield placed in Europe today. I want to pinpoint that the problem with this shield is also put in Israel, which is now working on a similar program, to defend itself from the rocket fire come from Gaza. And, for now, this program is working, because, according to the Israeli data, the rocket fire coming from Gaza towards Israel doubled its power since 2004, from 86 fires per day, to 100 per day.

• **Academ. Mircea Malița – Chairman**

Now I give the floor to Mr. Alexandru Coita.

• **Alexandru Coita – Center for East-European and Asian Studies, Romania**

I find Mr. Yavuz's point of view truly very, very interesting, and I have also told you that last night.

At this point I think it would be quite interesting if we would hear some of the arguments that surround this debate of outside engagement in the Greater Black Sea Area, versus enlargement so in house holding of conflicts. For me I think it will be particularly interesting to see how you frame this argument considering the tensions that lie in the Greater Black Sea Area, namely how do you see an enlargement solution to the conflicts, that is cooperation only, or driven littoral states of the Greater Black Sea Area?

When these littoral states do not seem to agree on the conflicts, we have, for instance, Georgia, who is very, very, very keen on seeing they involve. We also have two EU member states, Bulgaria and Romania, who are also littoral states of the Black Sea and who favor the involvement of the European Union. Finally, of course, we have Russia, who takes an entirely different approach.

So, therefore, my question would be: how do you envisage solving these issues, just with the input of the Black Sea littoral states, when these states do not seem to have any answer or any common platform in terms of finding an answer to this conflict?

The second question, which, of course, draws in the first one, is the issue of allegiance and of membership. Now, we have Turkey, which is a long standing NATO member state, and also we have other NATO member states around the area, such as in South Eastern Europe, states which are also EU members. Also, Turkey has been a candidate for EU membership for quite a while now and I think that Turkey is firmly engaged on the path towards an accession in the EU. It seems to be quite a bit contradictory that the very same state seems to reject outside intervention from the clubs, let us say, or the organizations to which it belongs or which is to become a member of.

A third question, following the first two, would be the issue of Turkey and Russia. Here I would find it very interesting to elaborate about that, on the idea of cooperation between Turkey and Russia, and most specifically of how, because I think that such a solution that you have proposed, Aslan, would envisage that the two pillars which would sustain such a framework to be Turkey and Russia. Therefore it would be interesting to see what would be the common ground of Turkey and Russia in this conflict, considering the many issues involved – Central Asia, Armenia, Azerbaijan and the enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh. It must also bring in to discussion the Turkish minority that lives not only in Russia, but also in Northern Caucasus and Georgia.

In conclusion, we have three potential points of tensions here, which I would like to see clarified. Of course, we cannot say that these issues are insurmountable, but it would be very interesting to debate on them and see how exactly an indigenous, as I may call it, solution would work in the context of the Greater Black Sea Area and if such a solution would make the involvement of the EU and NATO unnecessary or perhaps even hard.

Thank you.

• **Academ. Mircea Malița – Chairman**

Thank you, Mr. Coita, for your comments. I think that it is also, there are the seats for further debate in it. Who is there? Please, Tetiana.

• **Tetiana Starodub – *National Institute of Institutional Security Problems, Ukraine***

I have some remarks on the speech which is debating Ukrainian identity. I should say that there we can speak about identity, national identity. We should defend the identity of

separate persons, Ukrainian persons and the identity of our state.

There are some levels of identity: identity of separate persons and local identity, regional identity, sub regional identity, national identity and foreign regional identity of a state. For example, you know that historically my country was divided for a long period of time, and its different parts have belonged to different empires. The Western parts of Ukraine have been integrated into the Austrian-Hungarian Empire and the national identity of the Western Ukrainian people was under the influence of this empire. The eastern part has been a part of the Russian empire. So, the identities were forming in the conditions of great influence of these empires.

As result now we have different local identities: Western identity, Eastern identity, North and Central identity and Southern identity. We also have a big problem with the unique identity of Crimea, because the Crimea is, at his turn, a center of different identities: Russian Kazakhs and many more other minorities - Greek, German etc. All these different minorities have an influence on formatting a new identity of the Crimea and this new Crimean identity has an influence on formatting a policy of different institutions at the local and general level.

Another point of our discussion about the national identity and its different ways of formation according to external and internal leverage is the influence of the process of formatting national identity on the formatting of foreign policy priorities of our country.

For example, if we spoke about Western Ukraine, Western Ukrainians look upon themselves and their region like a self made Central European state and speak about a Central European Ukrainian identity. When you can ask the representative from

Eastern Ukraine he will speak about a distinct Eastern European Ukrainian identity.

But, the persons, the representatives of North Eastern Europe and Western Ukraine consider that they are Europeans. So, for Ukraine, the European identity is not a characteristic. And for the people, for the Ukrainian people, the common European identity is a common characteristic of our state.

For example, in the political context, if you see the programs of regions party, Yanukovich party, and, the program of *"Our Ukraine"*, Yushchenko's party, we can see that Yanukovich and Yushchenko spoke about common identity, European identity of the state. But Yanukovich says that the European identity and the common European architecture of security and cooperation can include Russia, because Yanukovich consider Russia as an European state. In opposition with these assertions, Yushchenko states that only Ukraine is a European state contrary to Russia who is another distinct civilization. He also says that Ukraine should be an integral part of the European security and cooperation area.

I would give you another significant example for our discussion about identity. I am from the Western Ukraine, but I have been in school in Southern Ukraine. In this situation my identity is Ukrainian but I am, also, an European. In the same time, I also have an local identity: I am from the Bessarabia, so, according to my local identity I am an Bessarabian. It is simple for me because I have a lot of different levels of identity. But the most important of these levels is the identity of my state.

Another level of identity is the regional one. According to this vision, our state belongs to the unique Black Sea regional identity. Because our dream is to form a common space, a common Greater Black Sea Area, our state has developed a foreign policy aiming to contribute to the formation of common Black Sea

regional identity. According to this foreign regional policy, to the bases of our regional policy, Ukraine share with the other states of the area a unique Black Sea regional identity. But it is a reality at a local level. At a general level the identity of our minds is European.

• **Academ. Mircea Malița – Chairman**

Well, thank you.

I appreciate your comments very much because this is also a very complicated issue because of the confusion made between the political identity and the cultural identity. I mean, first of all, states and statehood like they have to do with sociology. Both are a creation, a historical creation. They are not done by nature. We are born with a kind of identity, which is our maternal language and family, which are given to us. It is given to us, we are not questioned, and we are not asked before to say what we have, what we prefer. So, this is the born identity, the cultural one. It includes culture, language, tradition, history, creeds, beliefs, religion, etc.

The states are giving another kind of a status to their subjects. They are the citizens. They are not men or women, they don't have cultural identities. They only have one quality: that of being citizens of the state. That it is the citizenship which describes the relation between the individual and its state. Nothing to do with this disregarding all other kind of identities in, what is ready to choose later. Including preference for this kind of European feelings, world feelings. There are a lot of people who think that they are citizens of the world. So, it is a special kind of participation.

If you discuss the state, you discuss the political issue. If you discuss the identities, all states have people which we call mino-

rities, with different culture, with different identities given usually by the language which is more their native language. In this context, we have to be very careful in using the culture to discuss the form of the states. This kind of distinction is a particular one.

States are created by history for their citizens. The idea of a description of the state by using the ethnic description of their citizens was for the first time introduced in debate by the German philosophy: *"Blood, blood and culture"*. The other vision about the state was the French one. The idea of the state like institution was clearly debated. State was for citizens. Not for French, for citizens. The laws were for citizens. And today, if you want to discuss the form of the states, the extension of the states, the power of the states, it possible, but this discussion doesn't allow putting in discussion the cultural argument. It is only a mix up.

Another element which belongs to culture is the religion. Some people are confounding the states with the people who have a certain religion. It is sounding against the history, against the basic laws of the development of mankind, to have a state based on a religion. It is not serious. It cannot last for long. It lasted for a while in the history. It is not the case anymore. The citizens are not believers in one or another religion. You cannot mix it up. It is awful if you start to mix these things, then you have explosions, you have wars, you have conflicts, blood sheds, etc.

I also had a comment on the question of Ukraine. It is a state. It is a state, with citizens. Just citizens can be, as in our region, very mixed population. All populations are mixed. There is no state with fewer ethnic populations.

Let us go further. Who wants to be next?

Yes, please, you have the floor, Mr. Chitadze.

• **Nika Chitadze – *International and Security Research Center, Georgia***

Thank you very much.

With your permission, I would like to make one comment related to Ukraine, and after that to answer on your question, Dr. Puhl.

With regard to Ukraine, I can say that Ukraine played a decisive positive role in the collapse of the Soviet Empire. In the beginning of December 1991 in Ukraine a referendum, was held and majority of Ukrainians voted for independence. it does not matter, eastern part or western part of Ukraine, they voted all for the sovereignty of Ukraine. After this event, Gorbacev mentions that "I cannot imagine the future of USSR without Ukraine". One week later, the agreement between leaders of Russian Federation, Ukraine and Byelorussia about the collapse of this last empire in the world was signed.

When we speak about the statehood of Ukraine, I find important to mention that Zbigniew Brzezinski mentioned about the subject in his book, "*The Grand Chessboard*", that Russia without Ukraine will be a simple Asian regional power. But in case Russia manages to establish control over Ukraine, Russia will become one of the biggest and strongest Euro-Asian powers.

In this context, it is very important to take into consideration that 76 percent gas and oil pipelines which connect Russia with Western Europe cross the territory of Ukraine. In this fact resides one of the reasons for according a very important geopolitical role of our friend country, Ukraine.

With regard to your question, Dr. Puhl, - why is the involvement of NATO, European Union important in the region? It is in my point of view, like I mentioned yesterday, that, for example, the United States also is an aggressive state. It is true also, for

example, that EU implements some aggressive policies, like my Turkish colleague mentioned.

I strongly disagree with the idea of putting Russia, USA and Europe in one pot. Let's see, for example, what will a confrontation between United States or EU, and Russia mean in the Greater Black Sea Area, in post-Soviet space.

First of all, the United States of America organized different kinds of programs related to the strengthening of the statehood of the countries in the Greater Black Sea Area. The United States of America invested money. Both the democrats, during the Clinton administration, and the republicans, during the Bush administration, have invested some money. So, they lobbied for the construction of pipelines, which bypassed the territory of Russia. I mean one gas pipeline and two oil pipelines.

With regard to the European Union, through the taxes policy, for example, or through the European Neighborhood Policy, the Union invested money; the European Union supported the revival of different state institutions in the countries which were in a transition period.

At the same time what Russia did, everybody knows. It inspired conflicts, it implemented and still implements other aggressions, by supplying arms, money and political or military aid for different separatist groups. The final result of this line of action was the direct aggression in August of 2008. In this context, Russia is, from geopolitical point of view, the revisionist power, and even Russian a politicians recognize that the revisionism it is not characterized by democratic thinking.

In the same time, the United States of America and the European Union represent a Western, liberal and progressive civilization and they played a very important role, and I hope that they will continue to play a more important role, because

they demonstrated that they can support the countries of the region. Of course, yes, they have their geopolitical interest, both United States and European Union, but, at the same time, by their expansion, let us say, they also offer to these countries economic and political aid for edifying a market economy and a democratic political system. They also detain an important role in the efforts of the countries of the region to find a peaceful resolution of the conflicts which they confront.

Russia offers us nothing, no useful alternative. For example Russia had said to us: *"ok, you want to become a plenipotentiary member of NATO, ok, forget about this idea, but at the same time, we will help you to resolve the conflict in Abkhazia and South Ossetia"*? Not! For example, what would Russia offer the Moldova and Azerbaijan governments about the conflict resolution process? I think that the answer is again nothing. Comparatively, the only difference that exists between the conflicts from Georgia and those of Azerbaijan and Moldova is that nobody bombs the Russian aids, the Russian aircrafts do not bomb the territory of those states, but at the same time, the Russians do everything in they powers to freeze those conflicts, to maintain the frozen conflicts. In this context, the recent meeting of Russian president Medvedev with the presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia was, in my point of view, just a Public Relations action, just to show how Russia plays the role of mediator in the conflict of Nagorno-Karabakh. In my point of view, this problem would not be solved by the bias of a Russian mediation. I hope that it will be solved in the future, but I think that it would be without Russia. This is my point of view.

Concerning a possible involvement of the Turkish state in the crisis management in Caucasus region. In my point of view, I apologized before, my Turkish friend, but I have some different

opinions in the matter. I think that Russia and Turkey intend now to divide their sphere of influence in the Caucasus region. For example, they tried, using the frameworks of the Black Sea Harmony process, to manage that only the Russian and Turkish fleet control the situation in the Greater Black Sea Area. Taking also into consideration that Turkey imports about 80% of natural gas from the territory of Russian Federation, through the Blue Stream project, and taking into consideration the volume of trade between the two countries has prevailed \$40 billion in 2007, yes, of course, they have a common interest to not admit NATO in the region. It is a paradox situation here, because Turkey is a member of NATO, and had also been an aspirant country to integration in the European Union having a special agreement with the European Union since 1966. In the same time, Turkey does not want, and my position is in accord with the opinion of some experts presents here, to admit in the Greater Black Sea Area NATO and European Union countries, which represents liberal democracy. In my point of view, this trust involvement of Russia and Turkey will not solve the problems of the region, because Russia interferes anyway in internal affairs of the sovereign countries in South Caucasus. I think that Turkey will not be able to support somehow, to solve this problem, to equilibrate the balance of power. And all that despite the fact that Turkey did very much to promote and support its regional aspirations. I can quote, for example, its investment with success in the implementation of energy project in Georgia.

In this context, with you permission, I would like to make one comment on the presentation of our Turkish colleague. He mentioned that Turkey supplied Georgia with different kind of military weapons, and these military weapons were used against their own population during the August event. I am responsible for my word and I would like to say that Georgia did not use

these military weapons against its own citizens. Georgia used these military weapons, I recognize, even the cluster bombs. I do not approve this idea, but anyway, we should recognize that Georgia used military force against the separatist and against the enemies of Georgia. I mean Russian military and against the separatist illegally armed formations. And we had our right to implement military actions on our own territory. If Turkey had conducted military actions on the territory of Iraq against the Kurd separatists, why Georgia has not the same right to sustain military actions against the military forces backing terrorists on its own territory? So, it is my point of view that, during the August events, Georgia maybe made some mistakes in its defense and security policy, but didn't violate any prescriptions of the international law. From the judicial and international legal point of view, Georgia was absolutely right. I am not an advocate of Mr. Saakashvili, the president of Georgia, but I would just like to say the truth.

This is my point of view.

Thank you.

• **Academ. Mircea Malița – Chairman**

Thank you very much for your comments.

Who wants to make other comments?

So, we have to invite the speakers to concentrate their remarks as much as possible.

Radu Cucută. Mr. Cucută, you have the floor.

• **Radu Cucută – *Center for East-European and Asian Studies, Romania***

I have to make some final remarks, because I believe we were unjustly misperceived and I have to make some justice to rectify the inexact understanding of our argument.

The point we tried to make was not that Ukraine is not a state, or should not be a state, or is a weak nation or a weak state. What we tried to say, that in spite of the fact that some people say that Ukraine has very stable and remarkable political means of negotiating its internal conflicts, therefore, the subject of Ukrainian weakness we found of external challenges, stirring from the inside, weakness I stirring from the inside, the Ukrainian potential of coping with this crisis is quite consistent.

Thank you very much.

• **Academ. Mircea Malița – Chairman**

Thank you. Thank you very much. I think that this is it for now.

I have a remark to make because you have spoken not about an identity, but of a potential influence of external factors on internal situation in Ukraine and we have some problems with, for example, different regions in my country and this sentence potentially will be in the case of external intervention in our situation. But now we have a difficult situation with, the influence of external mass-media from Russian Federation for example. We have those problems, because for example, until the war in Georgia and after this war, the mass-media company from the Russian Federation increased their influence on Ukrainian information space, and used that influence to promote the Russian interest in Ukraine.

One of the examples to be quoted in this discussion is the debate in Ukraine about the state of Russian language. The problem of language is a key one in formatting as identity and, for example, as a policy in Ukraine. Sustaining those interests, the party of Yanukovich, the region's party, said that Russian language should be an official language in Ukraine. Such a decision

is problematic for us because the given level of official to Russian language may be perceived as a threat to the Ukrainians. We consider that this process as a threat to the national security of our country. And the problem of language, those of the mass-media and other similar problems have repercussions, in terms of general situation in Ukraine, as well in the political and social situations, and, in future, these factors will be factors of social cohesion.

• **Detlef Puhl – *French Ministry of Defense, France***

I think the remarks made here today are very useful. However I want to go back to the issue of the threats in the Greater Black Sea Area. One of the things we have not discussed here is the issue of the American missile shield in Eastern Europe. These missile shields, in Poland and the Czech Republic are not against North Korea or Iran. Can we deny it? No, I do not think so. So, let us get over with this one and the other one US policies. I do not know if the United States or NATO's policies are all default correct.

I do not know, in the region, why being a part of these two institutions, Turkey, cannot contribute to NATO's policies or the European Union's policies, in that region, because, you know, is the some kind of aesthetic ideological background in NATO's or the European Union's policies in here. I do not think so. They are pragmatic, they are thinking really carefully about these issues there. Why cannot Turkey contribute in a more effective way, only by rejecting NATO's involvement in the Black Sea, as a part of NATO? I do not see any contradictions in this.

So, as one of the oldest parties to that treaty, as one of the oldest candidates to the European Union, Turkey has to contribute, Turkey has to indicate its rejections or, maybe, its perceptions about the policy of these international institutions. It may be otherwise.

And one of the others, I am sorry, but it will be a response to your comments. I did not say anything about the European Union's aggressions in that area; I do not remember anything like this.

About the United States' involvements, the European Union's involvements and Russia's involvements, I am not putting Russia and NATO, or Russia and the European Union, in an opposition to each other. We do not know any Russian view here. So, how do Russians view NATO? Maybe they do perceive a threat, while there is a threat actually, which is maybe a missile shield, or maybe a future alliance of Ukraine and Georgia, but we do not know if they are trying to come in a direct confrontation in the Black Sea with the NATO forces or the European Union or the United States. I do not think so. Because, in the last years, the Russian foreign policy was based on non-confrontation, Russia did not involve itself in Iraq or Middle East, or other places. They were very beneficiary of this significant rising of the oil prices and now we are seeing Russia directly confronting one of the regional conflicts and we say that Russia is aggressive.

I do not know if the United States aids have played a role in that. We, the Turks, we have a lot of experiences with American aids, we had a lot of American aid and we had Marshall Plan. We are now more pragmatic and we can see, the International Monetary Fund, maybe as not that beneficial and sometimes World Bank's Credits not that good and we can make our own plans sometimes. I hope the Georgian government will be able to do its plans in a more independent way, but, for the moment, we have our share of outsiders' involvement in that area. In Iran and in Middle East, these are all destabilizing regions.

If Georgia becomes a part of NATO it will be more secure. Let us talk about it, just hypothetical! Georgia becomes a part of NATO and then Mr. Saakashvili attacks, I do not know, somewhere,

and then, there is a war. And the first NATO country in the proximity of the conflict, who counters this kind of threats, will be Turkey, or another NATO country. I think that we cannot depend on some kind of Saakashvili type leaders.

I do not want to go into details with this Black Sea involvement. It is not only about Turkey or Russia; it is about an equal partnership. There has been an equal partnership, in which Russia has involved itself. This is Shanghai Cooperation Organization: Equal shares, equal participation. Why cannot we involve Russia in an equal Black Sea cooperation? We have to find some bases and we have to create something. Just eliminating and criticizing all these policies, rejecting sides, taking other sides and insisting on those confrontations is not useful actually.

I would like to differentiate between parts, parties. There was one question about Turkey facing separatist moments, and not people. Actually I hope that you can divide between these two, because, I do not want to mention anything ethnically, separatists or terrorists, this may be a very own fault. In Turkey we have no problems with our Kurdish people, or Turkish people, or Cherkessk people, or whatever. We have lots of non-Muslims; we have lots of different ethnic groups and us holding the legacy of the Ottoman Empire, which established lots of mosques, which has established lots of churches, even here. I heard that there is one mosque which is given the name of the opposite, I think, or maybe a church or something, maybe, but there is a legacy. We know how to respect these differences until these parties do not respect their own people.

Those Kurds, in our South-Eastern Turkey, are killing those people who, decided that they are seeking the independence for. They are calling themselves Kurdish freedom fighters, but they killed like 30,000 Kurdish people and I think we can separate between this kind of a terrorist movement and the people who

are killed there. I do not want to go into details, I am kind of sensitive about this issue, but, I think that Turkey has rights and NATO has too, and we are debating this issue very seriously. From the borders of Iraq there are terrorist threats coming into Turkey's borders and NATO does nothing, but NATO will be intervening in the case of Georgia. What is the difference? I do not know. You know, from the Iraqi borders someone is coming and attacking your soldiers, attacking your villages, and NATO does nothing for one of the oldest allies, for one of the oldest members of NATO.

At the same time, we are looking for NATO support in the Black Sea, which will be causing lots of troubles for the Black Sea countries and, again, for Turkey, for Georgia.

Yesterday I was trying to explain this kind of thinking - for the sake of the regional countries, countries of the region, we have to accept something and reject something. And those things that we have to reject will be outside effect. Because this is one original, this is one argument which has the future which, maybe, is holding the possibility of a future dialogue. Not the oldest one, this is a new one. The oldest one rejects everything it was an outside power: US, NATO or any Western European country.

Let us talk together. Mr. Malița was talking, was saying something like this: *"we have to talk to ourselves"*. So let us talk to ourselves and then go and let us seek support of those others, those European countries and European Union. The European Union cannot be excluded, but if those European countries with their specific interest in this region are included, it does not matter if it is Germany or France, or Britain, or US, it does not matter. But if the European Union was successful in developing Black Sea policy, it would not matter. There is no such policy now.

I tried to answer all the questions. If something is missing, please let me know and I will answer all your questions.

Thank you very much.

• **Academ. Mircea Malița – Chairman**

Thank you.

I have just a small remark. If we hear so many views in this debate, it must be taken as a plus for the debate, for this conference and for the utility of it.

• **Unknown discussant**

I wish to make a small remark on Mr. Puhl's remarks that he saw a big contradiction in this debate, between two views: One, which would like the European Union and NATO to play a role in the region, or even a greater role in the region, and another view, that considers that it would be wiser if those actors were kept out.

Apparently, there is a contradiction. In reality, the situation is somehow a little bit different. The European Union has a program for the region that is accepted by all countries, without any exception in the Greater Black Sea Area. The European Union is an effective participant in so many big efforts made to make the region stable, peaceful and secure. The European Union develops plans of cooperation and partnership with all GUAM countries. They have a partnership which has been widening all the time with the Russian Federation. They are negotiating membership with Turkey. Certainly, we understand the frustrations in Turkey that the pace of those negotiations is too slow, but, I think, that, eventually, it will speed up in the future, and Turkey will become a member. Then the presence of the European Union will be even more visible. We spoke yesterday of the Synergy, which is sort of a pact between all Black Sea countries and the

European Union, on projects including energy projects of the area. Taking into account all these I think that the European Union is accepted by all Black Sea actors and it is logical because this region is part of Europe.

The question is with NATO. Probably at this time, NATO does not have a clear policy on the Greater Black Sea Area, a policy negotiated or discussed with the countries of the region, which have their major interest there. For anybody who would come from outside it should be mandatory to be asked them too why they are coming, what they can do useful for the region, in order to avoid possible complications in the future.

Again, I can understand frustrations and fears in Turkey, not only in Turkey, that or if the Montreaux Convention is to be revised and if the Black Sea is open to the NATO fleet, then it will most probably escalate their rivalry between the two major powers of the day here, United States and Russia. In such circumstances the field of this competition and rivalry will be the Greater Black Sea Area. And we come to the old African saying that when two elephants fight, if they will fight there, then the grass with small animals will suffer.

Thank you.

• **Academ. Mircea Malița – Chairman**

About the question which must be part of our study is to encourage a definition of NATO's policy for the Greater Black Sea Area. They have partnership arrangements, all countries are linked to partnership relations with NATO, and, why not, NATO policy on projects of fighting organized crime, but very precise and certainly, when you define the policy to fight organized crime, you do not need bringing big fleet in the region, because it is a matter for police and system of information. They have both.

Thank you very much.

• **Maj-gen. Mihail Ionescu – *Institute for Political Studies of Defense and Military History, Romania***

Thank you very much.

Ambassador, the grass and the small animals will suffer not only when the elephants are fighting, but you will have the same situation when they make love. More than this!

• **Academ. Mircea Malița – Chairman**

It was a wonderful exercise of reasoning, of strategy, of analysis. I appreciate so much the views which were expressed in, not only conventional views. There were new ideas; there are new incentives to work or to act.

I will end our debate through a small vision of the future. You can take it seriously or as a joke, but 30 years from now, we can imagine a meeting, similar to ours, in which there will be a new element. Until now, we can see and identify the preoccupation and the interest of a big ocean to look at a small sea. Everything is Atlantic, United States, Europe, NATO they expressed interest in the security in our region. In 2035, the new emerging big, important, maybe the biggest of all will be China. And then you can imagine that China will be very interested in their borders, all of the borders of their continent with Europe. So, a new region will be discovered, which will be not Euro-Atlantic, but Euro-Asian. They will be preoccupied to have good relations and security at the borders of Asia with Europe. The problems become very serious. So, until then, let us work hard to solve the frozen problems and more important, to than that, is to avoid making new conflicts possible.

Thank you very much.

General Conclusions and Closing Remarks

Major General (r) Mihail E. Ionescu, Ph.D.

Director

Institute for Political Studies of Defense and Military History

Bucharest, Romania

We, together, we will try to draw some conclusions from our one and a half day of debates here. I would like to highlight some points which had been expressed here, without entering into details, and, afterwards, I would kindly ask Mr. Malița and also Detlef Puhl and Vasile Secăreș, also to highlight their own opinion in terms of what conclusions are worthy to be drawn from what we have discussed here. I have thought that only one guy, even if the best and the brightest, is not able to draw all the conclusions, because always an event should be seen from different angles of view in order to put light on everything and on its entirety.

Firstly, I would to say that we have discussed here what means Greater Black Sea Area. And here it seems to me that, the real issue has been raised by Detlef Puhl, who said we would have to define this area about which we are discussing here. Why it is necessary to define? Thinks that is necessary because I have seen, for example, Aslan, talking only about the Black Sea Area, and it seems to me that he had taken into account the maritime area, a kind of naval point of view on the area, when, in the same time, others, like myself, for example, we are considering

the hinterland of this sea like being important in terms of ensuring communications and also making the Greater Black Sea Area and the sea visible on the international scene. It is important to define this region, because we have here and I have listed now some issues, which seems to me are important.

We have also spoke about the problems that we encountering in the matter of the existence in the area of a kind of residual thinking, of a kind of imperial thinking, of a residual imperial thinking. I have read a lot of articles and I am sure that you are doing the same, in which the authors are asking themselves "wait a minute, think about France, think about England, think about other empires. How many decades, how many centuries took for those empires to disappear?" The empires are not disappearing out of a sudden, like that, but it is a long period in which the empires are consuming themselves. Now, in the Greater Black Sea Area, we have this kind of evolution, and talking about Russia it is important to underline it.

Another point in which we would have to think to include in the definition in discussion, is that this area is also an area in which we are witnessing new emergent economies. It is not only about the fact that a lot of countries in the region are building up market economies, but it is also about the fact that two very important countries, which are bordering the Black Sea, Russia and Turkey, are growing in a sense, becoming what we are calling today new emerging economy, which would have an impact on the world itself, not only here, in the area.

Also, and I am referring now also to what Detlef has said, the area, and here we would have to highlight in our definition,

is an area where the power game already began. What do we understand in terms of power game, it seems to me that the debate here already had proved.

The second point of the definition of the region is what kind of lessons should we draw from the recent conflict between Georgia and Russia, or, broadly, what kind of consequences we would have to take into account, seeing this conflict in a historical perspective and looking into the future. It seems to me that two points have been expressed here.

Firstly, that after this war, the world has changed, the situation in the region is clearly a new one and we would have to understand what kind of novelty is implied in this kind of new environment.

The second, I would not say that is a status-quo vision, but the fact that, even if during the Georgian conflict we have witnessed some binding treaties being broken, it seems to me that one of the most important things to be taken into account is the fact that territorial integrity of all the states in the region have been reaffirmed by the most important nations and global actors. What is here very important, is not only about Abkhazia, South Ossetia and the territorial integrity of Georgia, but it is about the territorial integrity of all the states in the region. So, if you would like to call this point of view like a status-quo vision, we would not accept the new security environment and we will try to block any changes to it. It seems to me that these two points have been expressed here.

We have discussed also, and this is a proof that the region is connected with the most sensitive international issues, about

the missile shield. We have discussed about conventional forces treaty in Europe, we have discussed about Helsinki Act.

I would like to underline only the missile shield issue, which has been raised several times here, including by our friend, Aslan, from Turkey. I have tried to understand what means this showdown between Russia and USA and Europe playing around, concerning this issue. It seems to me that, when the Americans are saying that this missile shield in Poland and the Czech Republic is not about Russia, it is only about Iran, they are right. But, at the same time, we should give the same credit to the Russians, who are saying *"no, it is about us."* And, for sure, we would have to believe both of them. Why? Because, for sure, this is, in the American vision, only one steps towards creating a global system. Finally, a global system which would assure the shield for America has this missile shield, I do not know which step is this missile shield in Europe, for sure, lik the first step. When they are saying it is not only against Iran, but also against North Korea, we would have to take into account the fact that so, in a way or another, we would have to consider that also the Black Sea is becoming, if not already has become, connected to the globe. It is not anymore a question of keeping up, of keeping it isolated from other international issues, but to think about it, and oddly enough I would say, to remember that at the beginning, end of 60's, beginning of 70's, Mr. Ambassador, when firstly it was a proposal of Russia for a conference of security in Europe, of the Soviet Union at the time, USA had been against, saying that there is no necessity for such a conference. Gradually, they have accepted it, they refined it and this had been transformed beginning with '72, it seems to me, in the conference of security

in Europe, which had ended up in the Helsinki Act. So, if we would think in cycles, historical cycles, Kondratiev circles, perhaps finally not everything is changing, for transforming, so we would have to take this into account to.

In Europe, when Sarkozy says things like that, he is thinking that, in a way or another, we cannot exclude Russia from Europe and we cannot exclude USA from Europe and we would have to think about the security in Europe, involving all the actors which are interested in.

Why am I raising this and whis am I putting on the table such a conclusion? I'm doing that because, for sure, the Greater Black Sea Area would be, due to the oil and gas transportation corridor and due to the importance of the nation building processes in the countries of the region, one of the most important region which the artisans of the new security architecture would have to tackle with.

We have discussed about the perspectives of the security in the region and especially about frozen conflicts. There is for sure a contradiction were: the West is asking for territorial integrity of Georgia; Russia has recognized South Ossetia and Abkhazia. So it appears that there is no way in between. It is a clear stance of two global actors in a way. What kind of way exists out of this, except war? Here it seems to me that globalization and economic development would offer an answer. If Georgia, for example, would develop a vibrant economy and democracy, showing to the Ossetians and Abkhazians that it is better for them to live together, this would be managed. This

could be an answer, not the only one, but I am putting the point here, because you would have to think about, how to tackle with this issue.

Except this Georgian issue, we have also other frozen conflicts and there were opinions expressed here that defrosting them it is on the order of the day in the immediate aftermath of the Georgian conflict. There were a lot of question marks. Who will be the next one? I put this question thinking about Transnistria, or about other frozen conflict.

About the enlargement processes of NATO and European Union, there were also two points of view. The first, a pessimistic one, was stating that it is necessary to make a break, in order to absorb new members. The second, the optimistic point of view, declaring that enlargement would continue; the gates of NATO are open; we have the so-called DIPAT countries, partners which share with NATO their processes of transformation, and also we have European Neighborhood Policy, and here very important points of view had been expressed, concerning this European Neighborhood Policy.

So, what about the enlargement? We would have to listen in two weeks from now, what be the answer the of foreign ministers of NATO, will be concerning the *Membership Action Plan* of Georgia, but we would not have to consider this *Membership Action Plan* like being an absolute answer to enlargement, because, in my personal view, if you would look at Georgia, you can consider, for example, the NATO-Georgia Council, like a new step in the enlargement process. Anyway, the Georgia-

NATO Council, is a step forward from intensified dialogue, and perhaps, a step forward toward full fledge membership of Georgia.

In such circumstances, you would have to compare a pessimistic point of view and an optimistic point of view and to think about which ones are conquering the scene.

Now, I would like to say something about our main topic of the risks and threats in the region, after the Georgian conflict. Can we make a new list of threats after the Georgian conflict? There were some opinions here, that, for sure, we have this military intervention, like being a tool which is considered to be used more and more in the future. There are also some opinions, which say no, it is not necessary, it is not any more available, or, how do you call it, it is not in the spirit of developing the region and security in the region to allow a new military intervention.

So, we would have to oppose any new military intervention. But we have said that also prior to the Georgian conflict. The point here is, I would agree, not possible to make a very detailed list of new risks and threats after. But the fact that the hard security is becoming more important in the region, is obvious today, after the Georgian conflict. In this context, the appearance of the new independent entities, even though they have not been recognized internationally, like South Ossetia is a proof that this kind of process of applying hard security could become a feature turmoil period, which had been presented yesterday like a forecast by Mr. Malița. Also, in close connection with this new list of risks and threats, the opinion was expressed here

that perhaps we would have to think about the network of institutions in the region and we would have to update them in order to tackle with this new kind of risks and threats in the region, where the hard security is appearing like being a new and useful tool of tackling with the issue in the region. In this matter I think that updating the security institutions, or updating this network of institutions is necessary to be carefully approached, thinking about the global regional security, the indivisibility of security and the connections which I have been underlying previously between the security in this region with the global security, due to the energy issue, due to the involvement of other actors in the region, global actors, due to the globalization process itself.

These have been some of the points which I have tried to highlight here, after what we have discussed in the previous panel, and here I would end up my presentation.

I would kindly ask Detlef Puhl to add more, to highlight more points to what I have said in order to draw the necessary conclusions of our meeting here.

Detlef Puhl, Ph.D.

**French Ministry of Defense
Paris, France**

How can I top the highlights that you have given?

Let me offer some conclusions that I have drawn from this conference and which I have found very stimulating.

First of all, I think it has become clear, that it is from the Caucasus, including the Greater Black Sea Area, that today we see the most important challenges for the questions of continental security coming. And that includes the discussion that we have to have about the role of Russia in Europe, about the relationship between Russia and the US. That includes also the discussion about the role of the Europeans in that constellation. And that includes our role within the Euro-Atlantic community.

After the Balkans, conflict is back to the Western part of Europe, and we have to cope with that. I think that the debate has shown also the different aspects of security in this area, the different kinds of security issues that we have to deal with. When you want to call it hard and soft issues of security, you might kind of grasp it.

It has also shown that there are still doubts about the usefulness of this strategic category of the Black Sea. Are the hard core security issues being taken care of in the Black Sea context, or are they being taken care of in the context of the Alliance, or of the great power game? That, I think that still is open. And that applies to the situation when we discuss how to engage everybody.

This morning I did mention the contradiction between two positions, namely: the one that wants the outsiders in and the other, which wants outsiders out. If I say outsiders, we are talking about US, to speak very frankly. That is, I think, a discussion that we need to address. We cannot turn around that. That is one question that is going to be important for the discussions that we are going to have over NATO's strategy scheduled for

the next year, and which are having like principal problem to address the reformulation of the European security strategy. It is a very fundamental issue - what is the role of the US in Europe - and that question is condensed to this problem in the Greater Black Sea Area.

What this conference taught me? Yes, there are serious security problems that are connected with this area, so there is a reason to talk about the Greater Black Sea Area, although this is not being perceived as such, by everybody. I firmly believe that this area represents the forth line of what I call the power game. I think that because this region and its problems reflect different kinds of behavior of great powers, there is a certain comparison that can be made between the behavior of the great power, that Russia wants to be, and the behavior of the great power, that the United States is. And that is trying to look for spheres of influence, trying to secure spheres of influence.

This behavior is, in my view, a complete contradiction to what we have experienced in Europe as principle of the European integration. For fifty years we have been former great powers, we are not great powers any longer, but former great powers, we have been applying the policy that is the negation of looking for spheres of influence. It is the overcoming of spheres of influence. It is not playing the power game, it is playing the cooperation game, and it is playing the win-win situation game. So, in my view, the conflicts that we were talking about do reflect these two very different kinds of approach to international relations. And the question is that: does that represent a new paradigm in international relations, which we have to deal with?

I think, what has been made clear to me, is: if there is another dimension to the Black Sea security issue, than the issues that we really talked about, when we talked about the Black Sea and that is the role of the European Union, the question is: if an actor should take part in the power game? If so, can he do that? Now we come to the question raised yesterday as well: of the political will and about what the political win is, and who determines it?

It is also a very wide, very fundamental issue that is at stake in this circumstances. It is the question of the role of the transatlantic relationship, the role of the US, for us, for the region, for the continent, and of course, the role of Russia and what kind of influence can we have on the role of Russia.

We all recognize that security in Europe is not possible without Russia or against Russia, but what does that mean in political terms, in operational terms? What and how does that influence our behavior towards Russia? Are we doing the right things or not?

All these big questions, I think that they are kind of highlighted by the conflicts that we were talking about when we talked about the Greater Black Sea Area.

Let me add another little thought about the frozen conflicts, because that was also something that we have addressed in this conference. There is the approach that states that Russia, as a major actor in the area, has every interest in keeping the frozen conflicts alive, not necessarily fighting them out, but keeping them alive, because if there were solved, as Nika said, then the

Russians would not have any saying in all, they would not be needed anymore. The resultant conclusion is that the frozen conflicts make them feel that they are needed, and that they have something to say and that they have some sort of power over the corner, over the countries of the region. That maybe an argument for the leaderships in those countries confronting with this frozen conflicts, that they would do a service to themselves if they overcome difficulties and solve their own conflicts, so that they are free finally to shape their own future.

Now, again, you could ask the question, would that not then lead to another humiliation of the Russians? Well, who knows, but the problem has to do with what the Russians perceive themselves to be and what the role they want to play. Also I believe, we have to think about what can we do to change the mindset of the players within Russia.

I come back to what I said earlier today, about the civil society issue. The Russians are not blocked, are not genetically stupid or authoritarian; there is also a society in development, and I think we could, we should use soft power, our NGO power, our philosophy, if you like, to have an impact on their civil society. I do not think that we have to be afraid of Russia. I think that our soft power is very strong. And now we should, maybe live more aware of that, knowing though, that we have to take good care of our soft power, we have to take good care of our values and of our ways of doing things. We have to work for that as well, so my plea would be to not analyze the situation in a way that will transform all Russians in evil. Yes, there are behaviors that are not acceptable and we should tell them that, but, at the same time, let us use our strength, which is our soft power, and try

to use a little bit the philosophy that we have been using during the Cold War, when the strength of our spirits and strength of our philosophy prevailed over hard power.

Let me finish this conclusion and remarks with thanking especially our participants from Turkey, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, for having presented us very clearly with the positions that are discussed within their countries, because it does not help anybody if we turn around the problems, if we avoid addressing the problems. That was a contribution to being able to address the problems and I hope that one day, because that discussion will go on and on for quite a long time, that we will have also an active and constructive Russian participation in that debate.

Thank you very much.

• **Maj-gen. Mihail E. Ionescu, Ph.D.**

Thank you, Detlef. I also hope that next time we will have in our reunion the Russians discussing with us about the problems of the region together.

Now, I would kindly ask Academician Malița to present his points of view in terms of conclusions of our seminar here. I am asking Excellency due to the fact that I would like to exploit your wisdom.

Please, do it.

Academician Mircea Malița, Ph.D.

Honorary President
The Black Sea Foundation
Bucharest, Romania

Mr. Chairman,

I will be brief because the time is pressing us and also I have no new ideas to add to the wise conclusions you have formulated. Also, I would like to underline Mr. Puhl's idea, which is very important, regarding the methods of soft power and diplomacy as a matter of fact and of the peaceful means to solve or to prevent conflicts. At the same time, I liked the expression "*great power*". We have to look at the mind-set of the leaders of those great powers, to see if they want to continue the game by its current rules, or to change the rules and bring something new. I can already see signs of change, if you want a shifting towards a new set of rules.

A few years ago, in 2000, we were dominated by an ideology and a doctrine of unilateralism which very much reduced the fear of action in international affairs through military means and military intervention (we had two wars immediately). Well I don't discuss the reason and the conditions in which this unilateralism was created. The fact is that now, in 2008, all the great powers have announced their multilateralism and also their desire to accommodate to a constructive dialogue. The new president of the United States has a few remarks which announce a new attitude in the United States foreign policy and I think that he being brought in the great tradition of two democrats like Wilson and Roosevelt, who both condemned explicitly the

idea of the zones of influence, may have a large influence over the new president

Now, let me say that we have signs of some possible improvement of the international space, international system of security. Now, I just want to say that frozen is a terrible term, almost scary, you see, because if it is frozen – what do you do? – you live with it! Then another term was proposed, by a Lebanese scientist, who lived in the United States and worked at the University of Maryland. He said **protracted conflicts**. So he said that those conflicts must be studied, and the Middle East was the example for him, but they are protracted. He studies an entire branch, deals with the protracted.

Recently, the *Institute for Peace Studies* in the United States published a book on unsolvable problems. Those are even that is a small, is difficult to accept that they are unsolvable. But the Americans also have a great taste and vocation to deal with impossible problems. For them, it is a nice idea and almost compulsory. To be American is to deal with impossible problems. Roosevelt said that.

Now, let me say that Europe was the moment in history in which the issue of frozen or unsolvable or protracted conflicts was solved. Miraculously! It was fantastic! It was the birth of Europe! The moment in which the problem, as we discussed today in our conversation, the politicians said that no more Lorena and Alsace. It is finished with this endless story of two territories of France, Alsace and Lorena going here and there, century after century, ten times on one side, ten times on the other side, how long will we play this game power. Yes! They gave a paradoxical answer. You see what they say. This problem

does not exist. Because it is a paradox. No, there is no problem, no conflict any more! Why? They replaced the conflict in the mindset of Europe through a big project called Europe, in which the old adversary, adversaries, became partners, equal members with equal common, new common identity. They became suddenly French or Germans parts of a big common project called Europe. They started with, as you know, something very neutral at the beginning, steel and coal. So, there are issues, there are problems which can be solved. Replacing them through huge projects of immense attraction which will keep the energies and the minds of people engaged to solve a common interest, to provoke a common interest.

And that is why I listen to your words, economic and other fields which can be engaged in the cooperation, which will replace this kind of conflict, dominated climate of Europe.

So, thank you very much. I learned a lot from you. It is the biggest compliment I can give to a meeting, if I learned something or not. I learned a lot of things from you!

Thank you very much. You are doing real efforts to promote, to solve these issues, to find solutions, to look for solutions and your presentations are witnessing a real source of intelligence and competence.

Thank you.

• **Maj-gen. Mihail E. Ionescu, Ph.D.**

Thank you very much, Your Excellency, for your kind words and for these, not kind, but true words, I would

say, like multilateralism, organization of the international system.

Thank you so much.

I would kindly ask now to Professor Vasile Secăreș to present his concluding remarks.

Please, Mr. Secăreș.

Professor Vasile Secăreș, Ph.D.

Representative

**National School for Political Studies and Public Administration
Bucharest, Romania**

Thank you very much.

I will say that my remarks will continue the way Professor Malița was appreciating this reunion.

I consider that we had a very good reunion, not only because we had a very important agenda, we had to address a series of important questions connected to this region, to this area, but, I would say, that our approach and the approach of all participants in this reunion and the panels of the seminar was flexible enough and non-conventional. Based on this attitude, the result was the fact that we managed to develop or to present here, a lot of interesting remarks and ideas and we managed to make some good points on this agenda on the political and security problematic of the Greater Black Sea Area.

I think that our debate managed to develop a more accurate perspective on the region, paying more attention to the real

issues of this region. As Professor Malița was saying, the participants from the region, from South Caucasus, had a very important contribution to this effort to address the real issues. We were paying more attention to the present situation; I mean the place of the region in the process, this process of reshaping the geopolitical map in South East Europe. More attention is paid to the requirements of this new frontier of the Euro-Atlantic community and also more attention to the impact of the Georgian war, and generally speaking on the new power status of Russia and of its new assertive behavior.

I think that the Center for East Europe and Asian Studies of the National School of Political Studies and Public Administration will continue to contribute to this effort of better understanding the problematics of the region, making some steps in the right direction, and this seminar was a very important step in this context. I hope also that we will manage having this instrument, I mean the Center for East Europe and Asian Studies, but also the Institute for Political Studies of Defense and Military History, to pay more attention to the conditions, the necessary conditions of the regional dynamics of cooperation and to the special characteristics of this area.

We were saying at a moment that this area is a region, a geopolitical region in making. But let me draw your attention to the fact that at the level of public opinion, there is no such thing that a common perception on this area or the idea that this is a region and the problems of this region are our problems. It is very difficult to say that, at the level of the political elite, the media or the public opinion, we can discover a direct perception of the problems in South Caucasus for East has been

our problems here, in Romania or in Bulgaria. So, making this bridge between the Western shore and the Eastern shore of the Black Sea and of course, the South Caucasus and the Caspian region.

Let me add to this the lack of a tradition of regional cooperation in this area, in the Greater Black Sea Area. And even more, the lack of an enthusiasm for regional cooperation. At this moment, going in the region, or again in South Caucasus or the Caspian Sea area, one can discover the fact that the countries in this region like to have bilateral relations or a direct cooperation with the European Union, or NATO, but not in a multilateral framework. For instance, I remember one, when NATO was developing a project in this area, for a regional cooperation, Azerbaijan was not very happy to attend a multilateral conference, with the idea that could be better to have a different event in Azerbaijan. We have to overcome this gap, to breach this gap. Starting from this kind of realities, the problem is to ignite, to develop a regional cooperation process.

Finally, we must observe that this regional dynamic of cooperation is affected or is influenced by the present power game. Many participants at the reunion were mentioning this power game; Detlef also was mentioning it again with his final remarks, connecting this appreciation with the discussion about the spheres of influence problematic. It is important to say that we would like to develop a different approach, eliminating the policy of spheres of influence, but this power politics is a reality in the region.

I remember that during the NATO summit in Bucharest, this spring, president Saakashvili was asking this very direct

question, during a night session. Is the West ready to enter a game of spheres of influence with Russia in this region? Let us know. It was not simply rhetoric. It was a very direct political question, because I would analyze and I would interpret the evolution after the Bucharest summit in the context of this perception, because we are dealing with the impact of power politics and in this region.

Let us put it in a very direct manner. At this moment some very important actors in the region do not know exactly what is the political geography of this region. The United States, NATO and the European Union, do not know exactly where the future border or the frontier of this Euro-Atlantic area will be put on, in the field. That is why we have to deal with this discussion about traditional Russian interest. In the context, the former Russian space or sphere of influence is a reality beyond contestation.

I remember that after the revolution in Romania, I was involved in politics and it was very difficult in the 1990, '91, '92 to work under this umbrella, that we are in a great area and, we, in Romania, do not know exactly where the, border, the frontier is, how the political geography is in this area. I remember the shock of some representative in this region, when, during a conference in Warsaw, in February 1990, we heard the American ambassador saying that the United States do not have direct strategic interest in this area. And that the relation of the United States with Poland, Romania and Bulgaria are subordinated to the strategic relations with the Soviet Union. That was in February 1990.

So, I can understand the feelings and the reactions in the Greater Black Sea Area, more exactly in the South Caucasus and the Caspian region, the reaction of the political elites, the media and the public opinion in the context of this fatigue that put it in a very delicate way, of this fatigue with the enlargement process, but knowing very well that this process is a little bit more complicated.

Thank you very much.

• **Maj-gen. Mihail E. Ionescu, Ph.D.**

Thank you so much, Professor Secăreș, for your words, and for bringing to us this not so optimistic words like power game, spheres of influence, which we have considered in the recent past like belonging forever to the past. It seems to me that now they are back and we would have to think, taking into account the heavy discovered realities.

Thank you so much for that and I am sure that all of you would have something to add, drawing the conclusion to our reunion.

Finally, I would like to say that I am pleased, like the main organizers of this seminar, having here the new wave of experts in security studies, and in the region. It seems to me that it is an encouraging sign of the transformation of the region and also an expression of the fact that the region is creating its own network of academic experts in the field.

In order to leave a sign of your presence here, we would have to publish what we have discussed here. I already have registered what had been said here, but the process of deciphering and transcription, would take long. So I

would kindly ask the speakers to give us the text, if they have now, or if not, we are waiting in two weeks to receive. And finally, truly finally, thank you so much for your presence here, thank you so much for the academic environment in which we have expressed our own opinion, even if they were not shared by all of us, but we have learned how to behave in a region where cooperation should become the main important key word.

Thank you so much for your presence and I hope we will meet again soon.

CONFERENCE AGENDA

ROMANIA
MINISTRY OF DEFENSE



*Institute for Political Studies
of Defense and Military History*
- Conventional and Unconventional
Risks and Threats to Security in the
Greater Black Sea Area Research Grant -

NATIONAL SCHOOL FOR
POLITICAL STUDIES AND PUBLIC
ADMINISTRATION



*Centre for East-European
and Asian Studies*

CONFERENCE AGENDA

2nd Annual International Conference

SECURITY RISKS AND THREATS IN THE GREATER BLACK SEA AREA

Bucharest, November 24-25, 2008

SUNDAY, November 23		
Time	EVENT	Location
10:00-21:00	Arrival of foreign participants	Henry Coandă Airport, Bucharest
20:30-22:30	Icebreaker	"Byzantine Room" National Military Club

MONDAY, November 24		
Time	EVENT	Location
08:30-09:00	Participants' registration	"Nicolae Grigorescu" Rotunda National Military Club
09:00-09:30	<p>Opening Remarks</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Major General (r) Mihail E. Ionescu, Ph.D., Director of the Institute for Political Studies of Defense and Military History, Bucharest, Romania - General Constantin Degeratu, Presidential Counselor on National Security, Romanian Presidential Administration, Bucharest, Romania - Lt.-gen. Mihail Orzeață, Ph.D. - Representative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Romanian Armed Forces, Bucharest, Romania - Academ. Mircea Malița, Ph.D. - Honorary President of the Black Sea University Foundation, Bucharest, Romania - prof. Vasile Secăreș, Ph.D. - Representative of the National School for Political and Administrative Studies, Bucharest, Romania - Sebastian Huluban - Representative, Defense Policy and Planning Department, Ministry of Defense, Bucharest, Romania 	"Alba Iulia" Hall National Military Club
	PANEL 1: Major Trends of the Regional Security Environment in the Post-Cold War Period	

MONDAY, November 24		
Time	EVENT	Location
09:30-11:00	<p>Moderator: Major General (r) Mihail E. IONESCU, Ph.D. Director of the Institute for Political Studies of Defense and Military History, Romania</p> <p>Section I: Presentations</p> <p>09:30-09:45 <i>The Regional Security Environment in the Aftermath of the Russian-Georgian Conflict</i> Panelist: Major-General (r) Mihail E. IONESCU, Ph.D. (IPSDMH, Romania)</p> <p>09:45 - 10:00 <i>Georgia-Russia War as one of the Main Challenges for the Development Cooperation in the Black Sea Region</i> Panelist: Nika CHITADZE, Ph.D. (International and Security Research Center, Georgia)</p> <p>10:00 - 10:15 <i>Institutionalization of Security Risk Assessment among Nations within the Wider Black Sea Region</i> Panelist: Hariton BUCUR-MARCU, Ph.D. (Romania)</p> <p>10:15-10:30 <i>A Typology of the Security Environment's Evolution in the Greater Black Sea Area after the Cold War</i> Panelist: Șerban PAVELESCU, Ph.D. Candidate (IPSDMH, Romania)</p> <p>10:30-10:45 <i>The Impact of the Russian Federation's New Approach to Regional Policy in the Greater Black Sea Area</i> Panelist: Simona SOARE, Ph.D. Candidate (IPSDMH/CSEEA, Romania)</p> <p>Section II: Questions and Answers Session</p> <p>10:45 - 11:30 Discussions</p>	<p>"Alba Iulia" Hall National Military Club</p>
11:30-11:035	Group Photo	Courtyard of the National Military Club
11:35-12.00	Coffee Break	"Billiard Room" National Military Club
	PANEL 2: Regional Institutional Security Architecture in the Greater Black Sea Region	"Alba Iulia" Hall National Military Club

MONDAY, November 24		
Time	EVENT	Location
12:00-14:00	<p>Moderator: Detlef PUHL, Ph.D. (French Ministry of Defense)</p> <p>Section I: Presentations</p> <p>12:00 - 12:15 <i>The Strategic Value of the Wider Black Sea Area within the European Architecture</i> Panelist: gen. lt. prof. Teodor FRUNZETI, Ph.D. (Chief of Land Forces Staff, Romania)</p> <p>12:15 - 12:30 <i>Changes in the security system of the South Caucasus</i> Panelist: Diana ANANYAN, (SPECTRUM, Armenia)</p> <p>12:30 - 12:45 <i>Processes of Regional Security and Cooperation System Institution-Building in the Greater Black Sea Area: Prospects for Ukraine</i> Panelist: Tetiana STARODUB, Ph.D. (National Institute of Institutional Security Problems, Ukraine)</p> <p>12:45-13:00 <i>Rationalization of European Policies in the Greater Black Sea Region</i> Panelist: Iulian CHIFU (Conflict Prevention and Early Warning Center, Romania)</p> <p>13:00 - 13:15 <i>TBC</i> Panelist: LTC Vladimir NIKOLOV (Rakovsky Defense and Staff College, Bulgaria)</p> <p>Section II: Questions and Answers Session</p> <p>13:15 - 14:00 Discussions</p>	
14:00-15:00	Lunch	NMC's Restaurant
15:00-16:30	<p>PANEL 3: NATO and EU Enlargement in the Greater Black Sea Region</p> <p>Moderator: Hariton BUCUR-MARCU, Ph.D. (Romania)</p> <p>Section I: Presentations</p> <p>15:00 - 15:15 <i>The EU and the Greater Black Sea Region (the ESDP Dimension)</i> Panelist: Detlef PUHL, Ph.D. (Germany)</p>	"Alba Iulia" Hall National Military Club

MONDAY, November 24		
Time	EVENT	Location
	<p>15:15- 15:30 <i>The Black Sea Synergy as the Main Vehicle for European Integration</i> Panelist: Ambassador Nicolae MICU (EURISC Foundation, Romania)</p> <p>15:30- 15:45 <i>NATO and EU Enlargement Revisited: the Georgian War</i> Panelist: Prof. Vasile SECĂREȘ, Ph.D. NSPSA, (Romania)</p> <p>15:45- 16:00 <i>Cooperation and Complementarities in NATO and the EU's Policies in the Greater Black Sea Area</i> Panelist: Iulian FOTA (National Defense College, Romania)</p> <p>Section II: Questions and Answers Session</p> <p>16:00- 16:30 Discussions</p>	
16:30- 17:00	Coffee Break	"Billiard Room" National Military Club
17:00- 18:30	<p>PANEL 4: Non-Conventional Security Issues in the Greater Black Sea Area</p> <p>Moderator: Iulian FOTA (National Defense College, Romania)</p> <p>Section I: Presentations</p> <p>17:00 - 17:15 <i>The Pipeline Geopolitical War in Caucasus (1991 to Nowadays)</i> Panelist: Iqbal HAGIYEV, Ph.D. (Azerbaijan)</p> <p>17:15 - 17:30 <i>Romania's Energy Priorities and Dilemmas in the Greater Black Sea Region</i> Panelist: Șerban CIOCULESCU, Ph.D. Candidate (Romania, IPSDMH)</p> <p>17:30-17:45 <i>The changing nature of inter-state Aggression in the post-Soviet Area and its effects on the Secessionist Conflicts in Georgia and Moldova</i> Panelist: Dumitru MÎNZĂRARI (IDIS-Viitorul, Republic of Moldova)</p> <p>17:45-18:00 <i>TBC</i></p>	"Alba Iulia" Hall National Military Club

Panelist: ASLAN YAVUZ (Global Strategy Institute, Turkey)	
Section II: Questions and Answers Session	
18:00– 18:30 Discussions	

MONDAY, November 24

Time	EVENT	Location
18:30-20:00	Dinner	NMC's Restaurant

TUESDAY, November 25

Time	EVENT	Location
09:00-11:30	<p>ROUND TABLE: <i>Perspectives on the Frozen Conflicts and their Evolution in the Aftermath of the War in Georgia.</i></p> <p>Co-organizers:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • BLACK SEA UNIVERSITY FOUNDATION (Conflict Prevention Center) • CENTER FOR EAST-EUROPEAN AND ASIAN STUDIES – The National School of Political and Administrative Studies • INSTITUTE FOR POLITICAL STUDIES OF DEFENSE AND MILITARY HISTORY – <i>Conventional and Unconventional Risks and Threats to Security in the Greater Black Sea Area Research Grant</i> <p>Moderator: Academ. Mircea MALIȚA (Black Sea University Foundation)</p> <p>Panelists:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Ambassador Sergiu CELAC (Black Sea Foundation, Romania) – Detlef PUHL, Ph.D. (Germany) – Mugurel RĂDULESCU, Ph.D. (Coca-Cola Hellenic, Romania) – Prof. Vasile SECĂREȘ, Ph.D. (Romania) 	"Alba Iulia" Room National Military Club

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Dumitru MÎNZĂRARI (IDIS-Viitorul, Republica Moldova) - Tetiana STARODUB, Ph.D. (National Institute of Institutional Security Problems, Ukraine) - Diana ANANYAN, (SPECTRUM, Armenia) - Nika CHITADZE, Ph.D. (International and Security Research Center, Georgia) 	
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TUESDAY, November 25

Time	EVENT	Location
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - ASLAN YAVUZ (Global Strategy Institute, Turkey) - Stanislav SECRIERU, Ph.D. (CSEEA, Romania) 	
11:30-12:00	Coffee Break	"Billiard Room" <i>National Military Club</i>
12:00-13:00	General Conclusions and Closing Remarks <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Major General (r) Mihail E. IONESCU, Ph.D., Director of the Institute for Political Studies of Defense and Military History • Detlef PUHL, Ph.D. (Germany)- Representative of the Romanian Ministry of Defense • Academ. Mircea MALIȚA, Honorary President of the Black Sea University Foundation • Representative of the National School for Political and Administrative Studies, Bucharest, Romania - prof. Vasile SECĂREȘ, Ph.D. 	"Alba Iulia" Room <i>National Military Club</i>
13:00-15:00	Lunch	NMC's Restaurant

WEDNESDAY, November 26

Time	EVENT	Location
Departure of foreign participants		

LIST OF SPEAKERS PARTICIPANTS

2nd Annual International Conference "Security Risks and Threats in the Greater Black Sea Area"

November 24-25, 2008, Bucharest, Romania

FOREIGN and ROMANIAN SPEAKERS

No.	Last Name	First Name	Title of Paper	Country	Institution	Position	E-mail	Status
1.	CHITADZE	NIKA (Ph.D.)	"Georgia-Russia War as one of the main challenge for the development cooperation in the Black Sea Region"	Georgia	George C Marshall Alumni Union/ International and Security Research Center	President	nikachita@yahoo.com	Speaker
2	ANANYAN	DIANA	"Changes in the security system of the South Caucasus"	Armenia	Center for Strategic Analysis, SPECTRUM	Assistant of the Director	d.ananyan@spectrum.am d_ananian@yahoo.com	Speaker
3	IQBAL	HAGIYEV (Ph.D.)	"The Pipeline Geopolitical War in Caucasus (1991 to nowadays)"	Azerbaijan	Bucharest University, History Faculty		iqbal20@yahoo.com	Speaker
4.	PUHL	DETLEF (Ph.D.)	"The EU and the Greater Black Sea Region (the ESDP dimension)"	France	French Ministry of Defense		detlef.puhl@defense.gouv.fr	Speaker

5.	STAROUBD	TETIANA (Ph.D.)	<i>Processes of Regional Security and Cooperation System Institution-Building in the Greater Black Sea Area: Prospects for Ukraine</i>	Ukraine	National Institute of Institutional Security Problems, National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine	State Expert of Global Security and European Integration	slart@niisp.gov.ua	Speaker
6.	MÎN ZĂRARI	DUMITRU	<i>The changing nature of inter-state aggression in the post-Soviet area and its effects on the secessionist conflicts in Georgia and Moldova</i>	Rep. of Moldova	Institute for Development and Social Initiative "IDIS-VIITORUL"	Political Analyst	dumitru.minzarari@viitorul.org minzararki@hotmail.com	Speaker
7.	YAZUV OIR	ASLAN	<i>Frozen conflicts and their evolution in the aftermath of the war in Georgia</i>	Turkey	Global Strategy Institute, Ankara	Specialist	y.sir@globalstrateji.org	Speaker

8.	MICU	NICOLAE	<i>The Black Sea Synergies as the Main Vehicle for European Integration</i>	Romania	EURISC Foundation	Ambassador	eurisc@eurisc.org	Speaker
9.	BANU	DANIEL	<i>The Strategic Value of the Wider Black Sea Area within the European Architecture</i>		Ministry of Defense	Locuitorul Sefului Statului Major al Fortelor Terestre		Speaker
10.	CHIFU	IULIAN	<i>"Rationalization of European policies at the Black Sea"</i>		Conflict Prevention and Early Warning Center, Bucharest	Director	keafuyul@yahoo.com	Speaker
11.	SECĂREȘ	VASILE (PH.D.)	<i>NATO and EU Enlargement Revisited: The Georgian War</i>		National School for Political Studies and Public Administration	Professor	vasile.secares@ibr-rbi.ro	Speaker
12.	BUCUR-MARCU	HARITON	<i>Institutionalization of security risk assessment among nations within the Wider Black Sea Region</i>		Center for Democratic Control of the Armed Forces	Researcher	haribm@nato-studies-center.org	Speaker

13.	FOTA	IULIAN	<i>Cooperation and Complementarities in NATO and the EU's Policies in the Greater Black Sea Area</i>		National Defense College	Director	iulianf88@hotmail.com	Speaker
14.	IONESCU	MIHAIL	<i>The Regional Security Environment in the aftermath of the Russian-Georgian Conflict</i>		IPSDMH	Director	ionescu_mihail@yahoo.com	Speaker
15.	SOARE	SIMONA	<i>The Strategic Impact of the Russian Federation's Emergence as a Great Power for the Greater Black Sea Area</i>		IPSDMH	Junior Researcher	simona.soare@cssce.ro	Speaker

16	PAVELESCU	ȘERBAN	<i>A Typology of the Security Environment's Evolution in the Greater Black Sea Area after the Cold War</i>		IPSDMH	Senior Researcher	pake100@yahoo.com	Speaker
17	COICULESCU	ȘERBAN	<i>Romania's Energy Priorities and Dilemmas in the Greater Black Sea Area</i>		IPSDMH	Senior Researcher	<u>fario33@yahoo.com</u>	Speaker

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

1. Corneliu V. Dobrițoiu

Secretary of State and Chief of Defense Policy and Planning
Department Ministry of Defense, Romania

2. Admiral Gheorghe Marin, Ph.D.

Head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Ministry of Defense, Romania

3. Rear-admiral Cornel Mihai, Ph.D.

Acting Chief of Defense Policy and Planning Department
Ministry of Defense, Romania

4. Lt-general, Professor Teodor Frunzeti, Ph.D.

Head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of Land Forces
Ministry of Defense, Romania

5. Rear-admiral Dorin Dănilă

Head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of Naval Forces
Ministry of Defense, Romania

6. Lt-general Constantin Croitoru, Ph.D.

Head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of Air Forces
Ministry of Defense, Romania

7. General Florin Râpan, Ph.D.

Acting Commander

National Defense University "Carol I", Romania

8. General Alexandru Cotoară

Head of International Defense Cooperation Direction

Defense Policy and Planning Department

Ministry of Defense, Romania

9. Lt-general Mihail Orzeață, Ph.D.

Acting Head of the Joint Chief of Staff

Ministry of Defense, Romania

10. Rear-admiral (r) Marius Hanganu, Ph.D.

Vice-Chancellor

National Defense University "Carol I", Romania

11. Col (r) Constantin Moștofleu

Director

Center for Strategic and Security Studies

National Defense University "Carol I", Romania

12. Professor Vlad Nistor, Ph.D.

General Director

Romanian Diplomatic Institute

13. Professor Ion Bulei, Ph.D.

Institute for Political Sciences and International Relations, Romania

14. Alexandru Șerban

Executive president

"Casa NATO", Romania

15. Doru Claudian Frunzulică

President

"George C. Marshall", Romania

16. Violeta Alexandru

Director

Institute for Public Policy, Romania

17. Sever Voinescu

Program Coordinator Foreign Affairs Forum

Institute for Public Policy, Romania

18. General (r) Nicolae Spiroiu

"EURISC" Foundation, Romania

19. Liviu Mureşan

Director

"EURISC" Foundation, Romania

20. Professor Paul Dobrescu, Ph.D.

Chancellor

National School for Political Studies and Public Administration,
Romania

21. Professor Adrian Miroiu, Ph.D.

President

National School for Political Studies and Public Administration,
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22. Lecturer Iordan Barbulescu, Ph.D.

Dean

Department for International Relations and European Studies
National School for Political Studies and Public Administration,
Romania

23. Victor Babiuc

Superior Commerce Chamber, Romania

24. Aurel Sorin Encuțescu

“Manfred Wörner” Association, Romania

25. Dan Petre, Ph.D.

Romanian Diplomatic Institute

26. Cristian Băhnăreanu

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27. Teodor Repciuc

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Redactor: Simona Soare
Tehnoredactor: Maria Dumitru

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